From 4d3e66e0ab93189e5fd8de700b97f4586cab5a2e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Gaurav Dubey Date: Wed, 4 Nov 2026 03:41:05 +0000 Subject: [PATCH] fix(hooks): redact joined-fragment secret values and make JWT scan linear - Replace the secret=/api_key= value regex with a single-pass, quote-aware scanner so the whole Bash word is redacted when quoted and unquoted fragments are joined (e.g. --secret='prefix-'suffix), while a value inside an enclosing quoted string stops at that string's closing quote. - Searching for the keyword itself (grep -n "secret =" file, rg 'api_key:' dir) no longer redacts the rest of the command. - Use a lookbehind instead of \b before the JWT header so long dot-free ey-ey-... runs are scanned in linear time instead of quadratic. - Add regression tests for joined fragments, keyword searches, and the ey- performance case. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 --- scripts/hooks/post-bash-command-log.js | 94 +++++++++++++++++++-- tests/scripts/post-bash-command-log.test.js | 46 ++++++++++ 2 files changed, 132 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) diff --git a/scripts/hooks/post-bash-command-log.js b/scripts/hooks/post-bash-command-log.js index 7cb09f338..283f06d13 100644 --- a/scripts/hooks/post-bash-command-log.js +++ b/scripts/hooks/post-bash-command-log.js @@ -33,18 +33,96 @@ function redactJwt(token) { return token; } +const ASSIGNMENT_KEY = /(\b|_)(secret|api[_-]?key)(\s*[:=]\s*)/gi; + +function isQuoteStart(text, i) { + return text[i] === '"' || text[i] === "'" || (text[i] === '$' && text[i + 1] === "'"); +} + +// Index just past the quoted fragment opening at `start`, or the end of the +// text when the quote is never closed. +function skipQuoted(text, start) { + const ansi = text[start] === '$'; + const quote = ansi ? "'" : text[start]; + const escapes = ansi || quote === '"'; + let i = start + (ansi ? 2 : 1); + while (i < text.length) { + if (escapes && text[i] === '\\') i += 2; + else if (text[i] === quote) return i + 1; + else i++; + } + return text.length; +} + +// End of the shell word starting at `start`. Bash joins adjacent fragments, +// so `'prefix-'suffix`, `a"b c"` and `first\ second` are each one value. +function wordEnd(text, start) { + let i = start; + while (i < text.length && !/\s/.test(text[i])) { + if (isQuoteStart(text, i)) i = skipQuoted(text, i); + else if (text[i] === '\\') i += 2; + else i++; + } + return Math.min(i, text.length); +} + +// End of a value that sits inside an enclosing quoted string, e.g. +// `-H "x-api-key: VALUE"`: the value runs to the enclosing closing quote. +function enclosedEnd(text, start, open) { + const close = open === '"' ? '"' : "'"; + const escapes = open !== "'"; + if (text[start] === close) { + // `grep "secret =" file` is a search, not an assignment. If a word + // follows the quote instead, the quote state was misread; fall back to + // redacting the whole word so nothing leaks. + const next = text[start + 1]; + return next === undefined || /\s/.test(next) ? start : wordEnd(text, start); + } + let i = start; + while (i < text.length && text[i] !== close) i += escapes && text[i] === '\\' ? 2 : 1; + return Math.min(i, text.length); +} + +// Redact secret=/api_key= values in one pass, tracking the enclosing quote. +function redactAssignments(text) { + let out = ''; + let copied = 0; + let scan = 0; + let open = null; // '"', "'", "$'" or null + ASSIGNMENT_KEY.lastIndex = 0; + let match; + while ((match = ASSIGNMENT_KEY.exec(text))) { + const valueStart = match.index + match[0].length; + while (scan < valueStart) { + if (open === null) { + if (isQuoteStart(text, scan)) { + open = text[scan] === '$' ? "$'" : text[scan]; + scan += open.length; + } else scan += text[scan] === '\\' ? 2 : 1; + } else if (open !== "'" && text[scan] === '\\') scan += 2; + else { + if (text[scan] === (open === '"' ? '"' : "'")) open = null; + scan++; + } + } + const end = open === null ? wordEnd(text, valueStart) : enclosedEnd(text, valueStart, open); + if (end > valueStart) { + out += `${text.slice(copied, valueStart)}`; + copied = end; + ASSIGNMENT_KEY.lastIndex = end; + } + } + return out + text.slice(copied); +} + function sanitizeCommand(command) { - return String(command || '') + const masked = String(command || '') .replace(/\n/g, ' ') .replace(/-----BEGIN [A-Z0-9 ]*PRIVATE KEY-----[\s\S]*?(?:-----END [A-Z0-9 ]*PRIVATE KEY-----|$)/g, '') .replace(/\bsk-[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,}/g, '') - .replace(/\be[wy][A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,}\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]+\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]*/g, redactJwt) - // Value: "..." with escapes, $'...' with escapes, '...', or a bare word - // with backslash escapes. Unterminated quotes are redacted to the end. - .replace( - /(\b|_)(secret|api[_-]?key)(\s*[:=]\s*)("(?:[^"\\]|\\.)*(?:"|$)|\$'(?:[^'\\]|\\.)*(?:'|$)|'[^']*(?:'|$)|(?:[^\s"'\\]|\\.)+)/gi, - '$1$2$3' - ) + // Lookbehind, not `\b`: `\b` matches after each `-`, making `ey-ey-...` quadratic. + .replace(/(?') .replace(/Authorization:[: ]*[^ ]*[: ]*[^ ]*/gi, 'Authorization:') .replace(/\bAKIA[A-Z0-9]{16}\b/g, '') diff --git a/tests/scripts/post-bash-command-log.test.js b/tests/scripts/post-bash-command-log.test.js index b347a36f6..cf3abc044 100644 --- a/tests/scripts/post-bash-command-log.test.js +++ b/tests/scripts/post-bash-command-log.test.js @@ -131,6 +131,52 @@ if ( passed++; else failed++; +if ( + test('sanitizeCommand redacts the whole Bash word when fragments are joined', () => { + const tail = ['suffix', 'tail', '123'].join(''); + const commands = [ + `app --secret='prefix-'${tail} --next`, + `app --secret=prefix-"${tail} two" --next`, + `app --secret=first\\ ${tail} --next`, + `app --secret=${FAKE_VALUE}\\`, + ]; + for (const command of commands) { + const sanitized = sanitizeCommand(command); + assert.ok(!sanitized.includes(tail) && !sanitized.includes(FAKE_VALUE), `value leaked: ${sanitized}`); + } + assert.strictEqual(sanitizeCommand(commands[0]), 'app --secret= --next'); + }) +) + passed++; +else failed++; + +if ( + test('sanitizeCommand keeps the rest of the command when the keyword is searched for', () => { + const commands = ['grep -n "secret =" settings.py', "rg 'api_key:' config/ --type yaml"]; + for (const command of commands) { + assert.strictEqual(sanitizeCommand(command), command); + } + assert.strictEqual( + sanitizeCommand(`curl -H "x-api-key: ${FAKE_VALUE}" -d "payload" https://api.example.com`), + 'curl -H "x-api-key: " -d "payload" https://api.example.com' + ); + }) +) + passed++; +else failed++; + +if ( + test('sanitizeCommand stays linear on long dot-free ey- runs', () => { + const start = Date.now(); + sanitizeCommand('ey-'.repeat(350000)); + sanitizeCommand('eyJ-'.repeat(250000)); + const elapsed = Date.now() - start; + assert.ok(elapsed < 2000, `took ${elapsed} ms`); + }) +) + passed++; +else failed++; + if ( test('sanitizeCommand redacts secret= and api_key= assignments (#3846)', () => { assert.strictEqual(