From 57309114a827846d1b33a265c5e20cbeec742df1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: StealthMark Security Team Date: Mon, 26 Oct 2026 16:06:16 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 1/5] feat(skills): add web-perimeter-owasp-2025-audit skill --- .../web-perimeter-owasp-2025-audit/SKILL.md | 113 ++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 113 insertions(+) create mode 100644 skills/web-perimeter-owasp-2025-audit/SKILL.md diff --git a/skills/web-perimeter-owasp-2025-audit/SKILL.md b/skills/web-perimeter-owasp-2025-audit/SKILL.md new file mode 100644 index 000000000..3d1dbe1b1 --- /dev/null +++ b/skills/web-perimeter-owasp-2025-audit/SKILL.md @@ -0,0 +1,113 @@ +--- +name: web-perimeter-owasp-2025-audit +description: Passive, non-destructive web perimeter security auditing across OWASP Top 10:2025 ("The 10 Gates"), CDN Unkeyed Header Web Cache Poisoning (X-Forwarded-Host), supply chain manifest exposure, git object dumping prevention (/.git/HEAD), cryptographic headers, and AI crawler boundary governance (llms.txt, robots.txt, HTTP 402). Use when auditing production domains, configuring Cloudflare/Vercel/Nginx edge security, or preparing pre-launch security gates. +metadata: + origin: ECC +--- + +# Web Perimeter & OWASP Top 10:2025 Audit + +Conduct non-destructive, deterministic perimeter security audits against web applications, APIs, and CDN edges. Map every finding to **OWASP Top 10:2025 ("The 10 Gates")** and verify fixes with reproducible checks before shipping to production. + +## Important + +- Never send destructive payloads, brute-force traffic, or unisolated cache-poisoning probes against shared production cache keys. +- Always append a unique cache-buster query parameter (`?__cb=`) when testing CDN cache behavior so legitimate visitors are never served a probe response. +- Verify real HTTP responses rather than relying on framework defaults; reverse proxies and CDNs frequently strip or override upstream headers. +- Treat `403 Forbidden` on directory roots (such as `/.git/`) as insufficient unless direct object paths (`/.git/HEAD`, `/.git/config`) also return `404`/`403`. + +## When to Activate + +- Auditing a live domain or staging environment before launch +- Reviewing Cloudflare, Vercel, AWS CloudFront, Nginx, or Next.js middleware security configurations +- Investigating CDN Web Cache Poisoning (`X-Forwarded-Host`, `X-Forwarded-Scheme`) or CORS origin reflection +- Hardening supply chain artifacts (`package-lock.json`, `.npmrc`, source maps) and AI crawler boundaries (`llms.txt`, `robots.txt`, `security.txt`) + +## Audit Workflow: The 10 Gates (OWASP Top 10:2025) + +### Gate 1 & Gate 2: Broken Access Control & Security Misconfiguration (A01 / A02:2025) + +1. **Direct Git Object & Env Exposure (`git-dumper` vector):** + - Disabling directory indexing on `/.git/` (`403 Forbidden`) does **not** stop repository reconstruction if `/.git/HEAD` or `/.git/config` returns `200 OK` with `ref: refs/heads/...`. + - Probe `/.git/HEAD`, `/.env`, `/.env.local`, and `/docker-compose.yml` and ensure the response is not `200 OK` with non-HTML content. +2. **CORS Arbitrary Origin Reflection:** + - Send `Origin: https://evil-probe.invalid`. + - Flag **CRITICAL** if the response reflects `Access-Control-Allow-Origin: https://evil-probe.invalid` together with `Access-Control-Allow-Credentials: true`. +3. **Unkeyed Header Web Cache Poisoning (DoS / Defacement Vector):** + - Send an isolated request with a unique cache-buster: + ```bash + CB=$(openssl rand -hex 8) + curl -sI "https://example.com/?__cb=${CB}" \ + -H "X-Forwarded-Host: cache-probe.invalid" \ + -H "X-Forwarded-Scheme: nothttps" + ``` + - Flag **HIGH** if `cache-probe.invalid` is reflected in the `Location` header or HTML body, or if an error status (`4xx`/`5xx`) is cached by the CDN (`CF-Cache-Status: HIT/MISS`, `X-Cache: Miss from cloudfront`, or `Cache-Control: public, max-age=...`) without `X-Forwarded-Host` listed in `Vary`. + +### Gate 3 & Gate 8: Software Supply Chain & Data Integrity Failures (A03 / A08:2025) + +1. **Public Lockfile & Registry Config Exposure:** + - Verify that `/package.json`, `/package-lock.json`, `/pnpm-lock.yaml`, `/yarn.lock`, and `/.npmrc` return `404` or `403` in production so attackers cannot harvest your exact dependency tree (SBOM) or registry tokens. +2. **Production Source Maps & Subresource Integrity (SRI):** + - Check whether production JavaScript bundles expose `.js.map` files containing original TypeScript/business logic. + - Require `integrity="sha384-..."` and `crossorigin="anonymous"` on third-party `