diff --git a/manifests/context-packs/skill-triggers@1.json b/manifests/context-packs/skill-triggers@1.json index 48081c3fb..909217e79 100644 --- a/manifests/context-packs/skill-triggers@1.json +++ b/manifests/context-packs/skill-triggers@1.json @@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ "id": "hand-seeded", "source": "manual-curation-pending-regeneration" }, - "registryDigest": "6f213dc845937b4093bc018d041b25b538d88d78451b9d799ad614989b360ee4", + "registryDigest": "65b0e26848994515124a8e256e8f2ec996453b98bd89c461407edf3c2d1e3883", "schemaVersion": 1, "triggers": { "skill:agent-runtime-gateway-smoke-test": [ diff --git a/skills/continuous-learning-v2/hooks/observe.sh b/skills/continuous-learning-v2/hooks/observe.sh index aecb29a07..fa6ddd7d7 100755 --- a/skills/continuous-learning-v2/hooks/observe.sh +++ b/skills/continuous-learning-v2/hooks/observe.sh @@ -271,25 +271,39 @@ import json, sys, os, re # Linear-time secret matcher. Bounded quantifiers and a fixed set of auth # schemes (instead of a generic [A-Za-z]+\s+ that overlapped the value class) # prevent the catastrophic backtracking that pegged python at 100% CPU (#2278). +# The value class is disjoint from the separators, so it runs to the end of the +# token: a long labeled key is redacted whole instead of leaving its tail. _SECRET_RE = re.compile( r"(?i)((?:api[_-]?key|token|secret|password|authorization|credentials?|auth)(?:_access_key|_key)?)" r"""(["'"'"'\s:=\\]{1,8})""" r"((?:bearer|basic|token|bot)\s+)?" - r"([A-Za-z0-9_\-/.+=]{8,256})" + r"([A-Za-z0-9_\-/.+=]{8,})" ) # Value-shaped secrets that carry no keyword: PEM private key blocks (to END or -# end of the truncated text), GitHub tokens, AWS key IDs, and DSN passwords -# (scheme://user:PASSWORD@host keeps scheme and user). Each branch is anchored -# on a literal prefix and uses bounded or non-overlapping classes (#2278). +# end of the truncated text), GitHub tokens, AWS key IDs, Anthropic and OpenAI +# style sk- keys, JWTs (eyJ header, payload, optional signature) and DSN +# passwords (scheme://user:PASSWORD@host keeps scheme and user). Each branch is +# anchored on a literal prefix and uses bounded or non-overlapping classes (#2278); +# the sk- and JWT classes run to the end of the token so a long value is never +# half redacted. # Tokens may follow a JSON escape (\n, \t, \uXXXX) since dict I/O is encoded # before scrubbing; a DSN cut by truncation before its "@" ends at \Z, # except a bare trailing host:port after http(s):// such as http://localhost:3000; # any other scheme (postgres://app:1234) is redacted even when the password is numeric (#3568). +# PEM blocks run first: a label such as secret= in front of the BEGIN marker +# would otherwise let _SECRET_RE eat "-----BEGIN" and hide the block from this match. +_PEM_RE = re.compile(r"-----BEGIN[A-Z ]{0,40}PRIVATE KEY-----[\s\S]*?(?:-----END[A-Z ]{0,40}PRIVATE KEY-----|\Z)") _SECRET_VALUE_RE = re.compile( - r"-----BEGIN[A-Z ]{0,40}PRIVATE KEY-----[\s\S]*?(?:-----END[A-Z ]{0,40}PRIVATE KEY-----|\Z)" - r"|(?:(? 2000: + raw = _CUT_TAIL_RE.sub("[REDACTED]", raw) print(json.dumps({"timestamp": os.environ["TIMESTAMP"], "event": "parse_error", "raw": raw})) ' >> "$OBSERVATIONS_FILE" exit 0 @@ -356,31 +374,50 @@ observation = { # Linear-time secret matcher. Bounded quantifiers and a fixed set of auth # schemes (instead of a generic [A-Za-z]+\s+ that overlapped the value class) # prevent the catastrophic backtracking that pegged python at 100% CPU (#2278). +# The value class is disjoint from the separators, so it runs to the end of the +# token: a long labeled key is redacted whole instead of leaving its tail. _SECRET_RE = re.compile( r"(?i)((?:api[_-]?key|token|secret|password|authorization|credentials?|auth)(?:_access_key|_key)?)" r"""(["'"'"'\s:=\\]{1,8})""" r"((?:bearer|basic|token|bot)\s+)?" - r"([A-Za-z0-9_\-/.+=]{8,256})" + r"([A-Za-z0-9_\-/.+=]{8,})" ) # Value-shaped secrets that carry no keyword: PEM private key blocks (to END or -# end of the truncated text), GitHub tokens, AWS key IDs, and DSN passwords -# (scheme://user:PASSWORD@host keeps scheme and user). Each branch is anchored -# on a literal prefix and uses bounded or non-overlapping classes (#2278). +# end of the truncated text), GitHub tokens, AWS key IDs, Anthropic and OpenAI +# style sk- keys, JWTs (eyJ header, payload, optional signature) and DSN +# passwords (scheme://user:PASSWORD@host keeps scheme and user). Each branch is +# anchored on a literal prefix and uses bounded or non-overlapping classes (#2278); +# the sk- and JWT classes run to the end of the token so a long value is never +# half redacted. # Tokens may follow a JSON escape (\n, \t, \uXXXX) since dict I/O is encoded # before scrubbing; a DSN cut by truncation before its "@" ends at \Z, # except a bare trailing host:port after http(s):// such as http://localhost:3000; # any other scheme (postgres://app:1234) is redacted even when the password is numeric (#3568). +# PEM blocks run first: a label such as secret= in front of the BEGIN marker +# would otherwise let _SECRET_RE eat "-----BEGIN" and hide the block from this match. +_PEM_RE = re.compile(r"-----BEGIN[A-Z ]{0,40}PRIVATE KEY-----[\s\S]*?(?:-----END[A-Z ]{0,40}PRIVATE KEY-----|\Z)") _SECRET_VALUE_RE = re.compile( - r"-----BEGIN[A-Z ]{0,40}PRIVATE KEY-----[\s\S]*?(?:-----END[A-Z ]{0,40}PRIVATE KEY-----|\Z)" - r"|(?:(?= 5000 + val = _PEM_RE.sub("[REDACTED]", val) + val = _SECRET_RE.sub(lambda m: m.group(1) + m.group(2) + (m.group(3) or "") + "[REDACTED]", val) + val = _SECRET_VALUE_RE.sub(lambda m: (m.group(2) or "") + "[REDACTED]", val) + return _CUT_TAIL_RE.sub("[REDACTED]", val) if cut else val if parsed["input"]: observation["input"] = scrub(parsed["input"]) diff --git a/tests/hooks/observe-secret-redaction.test.js b/tests/hooks/observe-secret-redaction.test.js index 3ad3d8eb0..150a6a661 100644 --- a/tests/hooks/observe-secret-redaction.test.js +++ b/tests/hooks/observe-secret-redaction.test.js @@ -42,6 +42,13 @@ function capture(phase, input, expectedEvent) { } } +// The persisted input/output is the scrubbed JSON of the tool payload, so one +// field can be compared exactly instead of only checking a canary is gone. +function capturedField(records, field) { + const record = JSON.parse(records); + return JSON.parse(record.event === 'tool_start' ? record.input : record.output)[field]; +} + console.log('=== Actual registered observation secret redaction ==='); if (process.platform === 'win32') { console.log('Skipping shell fixtures: native Windows runner requires platform CI.'); @@ -52,6 +59,17 @@ if (process.platform === 'win32') { // Synthetic canary data proves that captured credential-shaped text is masked. const canary = 'CANARY_TOKEN_abcdefghijk'; const pemCanary = 'MIIEcanaryPEMbodyAAAA'; + // Prefixes are split so secret scanners do not flag the synthetic fixtures. + const anthropicCanary = 'CANARYanthropic_Key-0123456789abcdefghijklmnop'; + const anthropicKey = `${'sk-'}ant-api03-${anthropicCanary}`; + const openaiCanary = 'CANARYopenaiProject0123456789abcdefghij'; + const openaiProjectKey = `${'sk-'}proj-${openaiCanary}`; + const legacyCanary = 'CANARYlegacy0123456789abcdefghijklmnopqrstu'; + const legacyKey = `${'sk-'}${legacyCanary}`; + const jwtCanary = 'Q0FOQVJZc2lnbmF0dXJl'; + const jwt = `${'eyJ'}hbGciOiJIUzI1NiJ9.eyJzdWIiOiJjYW5hcnkifQ.${jwtCanary}`; + // e30 is base64url for {}, a valid but very short claims segment. + const emptyClaimsJwt = `${'eyJ'}hbGciOiJIUzI1NiJ9.e30.${jwtCanary}`; for (const [label, content, secret = canary] of [ ['double-quoted source', 'const apiKey = "CANARY_TOKEN_abcdefghijk";'], ['single-quoted source', "const password = 'CANARY_TOKEN_abcdefghijk';"], @@ -68,13 +86,30 @@ if (process.platform === 'win32') { ['truncated PEM private key block', `-----BEGIN OPENSSH ${'PRIVATE'} KEY-----\n${pemCanary}`, pemCanary], ['GitHub classic token', `GH_PAT=${'ghp_'}CANARY${'0'.repeat(30)}`, `CANARY${'0'.repeat(30)}`], ['GitHub fine-grained token', `use ${'github_pat_'}CANARY_${'1'.repeat(40)}`, `CANARY_${'1'.repeat(40)}`], - ['AWS access key id', `key id ${'AKIA'}CANARY0EXAMPLE00`, 'CANARY0EXAMPLE00'] + ['AWS access key id', `key id ${'AKIA'}CANARY0EXAMPLE00`, 'CANARY0EXAMPLE00'], + // Bare sk- keys and JWTs carry no keyword, so only their shape gives them away (#3846). + ['bare Anthropic key', `echo ${anthropicKey} > key.txt`, anthropicCanary], + ['bare OpenAI project key', `client = OpenAI(${openaiProjectKey})`, openaiCanary], + ['bare legacy sk- key', `KEYS = [${legacyKey}]`, legacyCanary], + ['bare JWT', `curl -H "X-Session: ${jwt}" https://api.example.com`, jwtCanary], + ['bare JWT with empty claims', `curl -H "X-Session: ${emptyClaimsJwt}" https://api.example.com`, jwtCanary], + // Redacted to the end of the token, not skipped because a hyphen follows. + ['bare legacy sk- key with a suffix', `KEYS = [${legacyKey}-CANARYsuffix]`, 'CANARYsuffix'] ]) { test(`redacts ${label} before persisting tool input`, () => { const records = capture('pre', { tool_name: 'Write', tool_input: { file_path: '/tmp/example.js', content } }); assert.ok(!records.includes(secret), 'seeded credential persisted'); assert.ok(records.includes('[REDACTED]')); + if (label === 'bare JWT') { + assert.equal(capturedField(records, 'content'), content.replace(jwt, '[REDACTED]')); + } + if (label === 'bare JWT with empty claims') { + assert.equal(capturedField(records, 'content'), content.replace(emptyClaimsJwt, '[REDACTED]')); + } + if (label === 'bare legacy sk- key with a suffix') { + assert.equal(capturedField(records, 'content'), 'KEYS = [[REDACTED]]'); + } }); test(`redacts ${label} before persisting structured tool output`, () => { const records = capture('post', { tool_name: 'Read', @@ -92,7 +127,9 @@ if (process.platform === 'win32') { ['GitHub fine-grained token after tab', `col\t${'github_pat_'}CANARY_${'1'.repeat(40)}`, `CANARY_${'1'.repeat(40)}`], ['AWS access key id after CRLF', `id:\r\n${'AKIA'}CANARY0EXAMPLE00`, 'CANARY0EXAMPLE00'], - ['AWS session key id after newline', `id:\n${'ASIA'}CANARY0EXAMPLE00`, 'CANARY0EXAMPLE00'] + ['AWS session key id after newline', `id:\n${'ASIA'}CANARY0EXAMPLE00`, 'CANARY0EXAMPLE00'], + ['Anthropic key after newline', `key:\n${anthropicKey}`, anthropicCanary], + ['JWT after tab', `jwt\t${jwt}`, jwtCanary] ]) { test(`redacts ${label} in structured tool output`, () => { const records = capture('post', { tool_name: 'Read', @@ -102,6 +139,107 @@ if (process.platform === 'win32') { }); } + // The three commands from #3846. Only the first two have a keyword in front of the key. + for (const command of [ + `ANTHROPIC_API_KEY=${anthropicKey} claude -p hi`, + `curl -H "x-api-key: ${anthropicKey}" https://api.example.com`, + `echo ${anthropicKey} > key.txt` + ]) { + test(`redacts the Anthropic key in Bash input and output: ${command.split(' ')[0]}`, () => { + for (const records of [ + capture('pre', { tool_name: 'Bash', tool_input: { command } }), + capture('post', { tool_name: 'Bash', tool_input: { command: 'cat key.txt' }, + tool_response: { stdout: command, stderr: '' } }) + ]) { + assert.ok(!records.includes(anthropicCanary), 'Anthropic key persisted'); + const field = JSON.parse(records).event === 'tool_start' ? 'command' : 'stdout'; + assert.equal(capturedField(records, field), command.replace(anthropicKey, '[REDACTED]')); + } + }); + } + test('redacts a bare Anthropic key in the parse-error fallback', () => { + const records = capture('post', JSON.stringify([`echo ${anthropicKey}`]), 'parse_error'); + assert.ok(!records.includes(anthropicCanary), 'Anthropic key persisted'); + assert.ok(records.includes('[REDACTED]')); + }); + + // Truncation can also cut a bare JWT inside its payload or a key inside its + // body. What is left at the end of the capture must still be redacted. + const jwtKept = jwt.slice(0, jwt.indexOf('.') + 10); + const jwtPayloadStart = jwtKept.slice(jwt.indexOf('.') + 1); + const keyKept = anthropicKey.slice(0, 'sk-ant-api03-'.length + 12); + const cutAt = (end, value, kept) => `${'a'.repeat(end - kept.length - 1)} ${value}`; + for (const [label, value, kept, leak] of [ + ['JWT', jwt, jwtKept, jwtPayloadStart], + ['Anthropic key', anthropicKey, keyKept, keyKept.slice('sk-ant-api03-'.length)] + ]) { + for (const [where, phase, input, expectedEvent] of [ + ['string tool output', 'post', { tool_name: 'Bash', tool_input: { command: 'env' }, + tool_response: cutAt(5000, value, kept) }], + // json.dumps prefixes '{"content": "' (13 chars) before the value. + ['structured tool output', 'post', { tool_name: 'Read', tool_input: { file_path: '/tmp/x' }, + tool_response: { content: cutAt(5000 - 13, value, kept) } }], + ['parse-error fallback', 'post', JSON.stringify([cutAt(2000 - 2, value, kept)]), 'parse_error'] + ]) { + test(`redacts the ${label} cut at the truncation boundary in ${where}`, () => { + const records = capture(phase, input, expectedEvent); + assert.ok(!records.includes(leak), `cut ${label} persisted`); + assert.ok(records.includes('[REDACTED]')); + }); + } + } + + // A long key or JWT is redacted whole, never only up to some length cap. + const longTail = 'CANARYlongTail'; + for (const [label, value] of [ + ['an over-long Anthropic key', `${anthropicKey}${'A'.repeat(600)}${longTail}`], + ['a JWT with a long signature', `${jwt}${'s'.repeat(1500)}${longTail}`] + ]) { + test(`redacts ${label} completely`, () => { + const records = capture('post', { tool_name: 'Read', tool_input: { file_path: '/tmp/x' }, + tool_response: { content: `value ${value} end` } }); + assert.equal(capturedField(records, 'content'), 'value [REDACTED] end'); + }); + } + // A keyword-labeled value is redacted whole, however long it is and whatever + // shaped token sits at its start. + for (const [label, text, expected] of [ + ['long sk-proj key', `OPENAI_API_KEY=${openaiProjectKey}${'B'.repeat(300)}${longTail}`, 'OPENAI_API_KEY=[REDACTED]'], + ['sk- password with a suffix', `password=${'sk-'}${'A'.repeat(30)}.${longTail}`, 'password=[REDACTED]'], + ['GitHub token with a suffix', `token=${'ghp_'}${'0'.repeat(30)}/${longTail}`, 'token=[REDACTED]'], + ['PEM private key block', + `secret=-----BEGIN RSA ${'PRIVATE'} KEY-----\n${longTail}\n-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----`, 'secret=[REDACTED]'] + ]) { + for (const [phase, input, expectedEvent] of [ + ['post', { tool_name: 'Read', tool_input: { file_path: '/tmp/x' }, tool_response: { content: text } }], + ['post', JSON.stringify([text]), 'parse_error'] + ]) { + test(`redacts a keyword-labeled ${label} completely (${expectedEvent || 'tool_complete'})`, () => { + const records = capture(phase, input, expectedEvent); + assert.ok(!records.includes(longTail), 'value tail persisted'); + assert.ok(records.includes(expected)); + }); + } + } + // A labeled JWT cut inside a payload longer than 256 chars at the capture limit. + test('redacts a keyword-labeled JWT cut inside a long payload', () => { + const labeled = `Authorization: Bearer ${'eyJ'}hbGciOiJIUzI1NiJ9.eyJ${'p'.repeat(600)}${longTail}`; + const records = capture('post', { tool_name: 'Bash', tool_input: { command: 'env' }, + tool_response: `${'a'.repeat(5000 - labeled.length + 5)} ${labeled}` }); + assert.ok(!records.includes('pppp'), 'JWT payload persisted'); + assert.ok(records.includes('Authorization: Bearer [REDACTED]')); + }); + + // The end-of-capture match only applies to text that was actually cut. + for (const output of ['git checkout sk-learn', 'payload eyJhIjoxLCJiIjoyfQ']) { + test(`keeps short string output ending in "${output.split(' ').pop().slice(0, 8)}" unredacted`, () => { + const records = capture('post', { tool_name: 'Bash', tool_input: { command: 'echo' }, + tool_response: output }); + assert.ok(records.includes(output), 'short output altered'); + assert.ok(!records.includes('[REDACTED]')); + }); + } + // Capture truncation (5000 chars, 2000 in the parse-error fallback) can cut a // DSN right before its '@'; the password must still be redacted (#3568). const cutSecret = 'CANARYcutPassw0rd'; @@ -148,7 +286,17 @@ if (process.platform === 'win32') { 'password_hash = hashlib.sha256(pw)', 'fetch(http://localhost:8080/api/v1)', 'git clone git@github.com:org/repo.git', - 'https://user@example.com/path' + 'https://user@example.com/path', + // Hashes, ids and base64 that look random but are not keys (#3846). + 'git show 3f9a1c2b7e4d5f6a8b9c0d1e2f3a4b5c6d7e8f90', + 'sha256 e3b0c44298fc1c149afbf4c8996fb92427ae41e4649b934ca495991b7852b855', + 'id 550e8400-e29b-41d4-a716-446655440000', + 'background: url();', + 'payload: data:application/json;base64,eyJhIjoxLCJiIjoyLCJjIjozfQ==', + 'git checkout -b sk-learn-upgrade-for-pipelines', + 'risk-assessment-for-the-quarterly-report-v2', + 'ssh deploy@eyeglasses.example.com', + 'Keys start with the sk- prefix.' ]; test('keeps ordinary code and credential-free URLs unredacted', () => { const records = capture('post', { tool_name: 'Read', @@ -156,6 +304,51 @@ if (process.platform === 'win32') { for (const line of benign) assert.ok(records.includes(line), `benign text altered: ${line}`); assert.ok(!records.includes('[REDACTED]')); }); + // Both writers carry the same patterns. Run them on 300 KB of adversarial + // input so a pattern that backtracks quadratically (#2278) fails here. + test('scrub patterns stay identical in both writers and linear on 300 KB input', () => { + const hook = fs.readFileSync( + path.join(repoRoot, 'skills/continuous-learning-v2/hooks/observe.sh'), 'utf8'); + const copies = hook.split('_SECRET_RE = re.compile(').slice(1).map((rest) => + `_SECRET_RE = re.compile(${rest.split(/\n(?:import signal|def scrub)/)[0]}` + .replace(/'"'"'/g, "'")); + assert.equal(copies.length, 2); + assert.equal(copies[0], copies[1], 'the parse-error copy of the patterns drifted'); + const driver = String.raw` +import re, sys, time +ns = {"re": re} +exec(sys.stdin.read(), ns) +patterns = [ns[n] for n in ("_PEM_RE", "_SECRET_RE", "_SECRET_VALUE_RE", "_CUT_TAIL_RE")] +n = 300000 +cases = { + "hyphen run": "a-" * (n // 2), + "sk- then hyphen run": "sk-" + "a-" * (n // 2), + "repeated sk-": "sk-" * (n // 3), + "sk- keys followed by a hyphen": (" sk-" + "a" * 40 + "-") * (n // 45), + "eyJ segments": ("eyJ" + "a-" * 10 + ".") * (n // 24), + "repeated eyJ dots": "eyJ." * (n // 4), + "label then hyphens": "token=" + "-" * n, + "repeated labels": "token:" * (n // 6), + "escaped newline before sk-": "\\nsk-" * (n // 5), + "unfinished DSNs": "a://b:" * (n // 6), + "unterminated PEM": "-----BEGIN RSA PRIV" + "ATE KEY-----" + "A" * n, +} +for name, text in cases.items(): + start = time.perf_counter() + for pattern in patterns: + pattern.sub("X", text) + print("%s\t%.3f" % (name, time.perf_counter() - start)) +`; + const result = spawnSync('python3', ['-c', driver], + { input: copies[0], encoding: 'utf8', timeout: 60000 }); + assert.equal(result.status, 0, result.stderr || 'timed out'); + const timings = result.stdout.trim().split('\n'); + assert.equal(timings.length, 11); + for (const line of timings) { + const [name, seconds] = line.split('\t'); + assert.ok(Number(seconds) < 2, `${name} took ${seconds}s`); + } + }); test('keeps a trailing host:port in string output unredacted', () => { const records = capture('post', { tool_name: 'Bash', tool_input: { command: 'npm run dev' }, tool_response: 'listening on http://localhost:3000' });