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fix(gateguard): treat .claude/settings files as restricted for subagents too (#3862)
Removing the exemption gated top-level edits, but subagent Edit/Write/MultiEdit still consult only sensitive or hard-linked targets, so an ordinary settings file bypassed the gate. Classify .claude/settings*.json as sensitive in the shared target class and cover all three subagent edit tools plus both settings file names. Co-Authored-By: TRAE <noreply@trae.ai>
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@@ -297,11 +297,22 @@ function isSensitiveTarget(classPath) {
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}
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}
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// `.claude/settings*.json` holds the switches for GateGuard and the other
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// hooks, so it must count as restricted on every edit path — including the
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// subagent paths that only deny sensitive or hard-linked targets (#3862).
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const CLAUDE_SETTINGS_PATH = /(^|\/)\.claude\/settings(?:\.([^/]+))?\.json$/;
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function isClaudeSettingsPath(classPath) {
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return CLAUDE_SETTINGS_PATH.test(String(classPath || '').replace(/\\/g, '/').toLowerCase());
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}
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/** Sensitive on the lexical or the real (symlink-resolved) path; any error is sensitive. */
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function isSensitiveTargetFor(filePath, data) {
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try {
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if (typeof filePath !== 'string' || !filePath) return true;
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if (isSensitiveTarget(classPathFor(filePath, data))) return true;
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const classPath = classPathFor(filePath, data);
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if (isClaudeSettingsPath(classPath)) return true;
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if (isSensitiveTarget(classPath)) return true;
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return isSensitiveRealTarget(filePath, data);
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} catch (_) {
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return true;
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