8a7d6129 added the external-contract question for every code change that
handles data and updated the pinned tests to match, including the legacy
test "code condensed Edit hint for an unknown profile is unchanged". Its own
evaluation then found the gated arm did not improve (25 to 23 of 48), so the
question has no evidence behind it as a default.
- Restore the test expectations 8a7d6129 changed: questionIdsFor, the
byte-identical code text for src/a.py, the condensed hints, and the hook
question lists default to data-schema without external-contract.
- Add questionIdsFor/condensedHintFor cases with { externalContract: true }.
- Add hook cases: GATEGUARD_EXTERNAL_CONTRACT_QUESTION=1/true/ON asks it
beside data-schema and in the unknown-profile set, never without data;
unset, 0, false and off keep the original four.
Against main: target-class 5 failures, fact-force 10 failures.
Each of these is credited on main, reproduced against upstream 2d515e4f:
- rg -t py / -T js / --type-not js, fd -e py, and the Grep tool's
type: "py" credit an Edit of tokenizer.js. Type and extension values
are skipped as plain value flags, so they never filter.
- Glob **/tokenizer.py, rg tokenizer src/*.py, and
git grep tokenizer -- '*.py' credit tokenizer.js. The Glob pattern is
never a filter, and a glob operand scopes as its literal directory.
- Glob **/tokenizer.js, find -name tokenizer.js, rg -g tokenizer.js and
Grep glob: "tokenizer.js" credit tokenizer.js, although each search
could only find the target itself.
- An Edit of "// note<U+2028>foo(1);" to "// note<U+2028>foo(2);" passes
as comment-only, although JavaScript ends the comment at U+2028 and
foo(2) runs.
Scenario 21-bypass-filter-forms adds ten must-deny steps and four
controls. Four hook controls that asserted exact-name lookups still
credit (find -name widget.py, Grep glob widget.py, Get-ChildItem
-Filter widget.py) now assert the lookup is denied; each keeps its
original purpose, that the exclusion parser leaves a positive include
alone, through a wildcard include (widget.*).
Resolve six conflicts:
- hooks/hooks.metadata.json: keep this branch's gateguard description and
fingerprint, add upstream's hookify-runtime entries.
- package.json: keep both gateguard-report.js and github-coordination.js.
- scripts/hooks/gateguard-fact-force.js, tests/hooks/gateguard-fact-force.test.js,
skills/gateguard/SKILL.md: upstream added a simpler session denial cap; this
branch already has the fuller one (cap threaded through
markCheckedAndCountDenial, malformed-value warning, miss and target notes),
so keep it. Upstream's taskset and su wrapper handling, fail-closed
recursion limit and soft-hyphen sanitising merged cleanly and their tests pass.
- manifests/context-packs/skill-triggers@1.json: take upstream's file and
recompute registryDigest for the merged registry.
main resolves SQL clients behind env -S and its launcher grammars, but a
destructive statement still passed under four forms:
- a shell -c inside a short-option cluster (bash -lc, sh -ec), since only
an exact -c was looked up;
- su, whose -c / --command / -lc value runs through the target user's
shell, before or after --;
- taskset, whose mask or CPU list precedes the command, like timeout's
duration;
- a command nested past the shell -c recursion limit, which was allowed
instead of denied.
The first three are checked like sh -c; past the limit the check now
fails closed.
Across 240 evaluation trials every question the gate raised was about code
structure - importers, callers, public API, data schemas - while every deciding
fact in the hidden-intent corpus was an external contract: a consumer's CSV
dialect, a reporting timezone, retry safety against a non-idempotent endpoint,
collation rules, a quota policy. Obtaining the deciding fact predicted the
outcome almost perfectly in both arms, and the gate did not reliably cause it.
Add an external-contract question for code targets whose change profile touches
data, beside data-schema rather than replacing it: data-schema asks what the
change touches, external-contract asks who decides what it has to be. It reuses
the existing touchesData signal, so it stays as selective as the question it
sits with and adds no new detection, and it therefore does not reach a change
with no data involvement - pure retry semantics, for instance - which is a known
limit to be measured rather than guessed at.
Code edits that touch data now ask four questions instead of three, so the
condensed hint for an unknown profile changes too. That string was pinned by a
test as legacy-stable; the pin is updated deliberately, because a hint that
names fewer questions than the gate asks is worse than a hint that changed.
Suites: target-class 31, fact-force 1019, scenario-gate 25, eval 15, and the two
effectiveness suites 29 and 26, all passing. The 23 relevantQuestions
annotations that listed data-schema now list external-contract as well.
Include and exclusion globs now honour class members, ranges and negation.
A malformed class admits nothing as an include and covers the target as an exclusion.
- Ask class-specific first-touch questions (instruction, test, prose,
config, code); code questions are unchanged.
- Credit a completed Glob/Grep/LS or shell search from the current human
turn that covered the target; Read and exclusion globs never count.
- Collapse same-class new-file creations in one directory within a turn.
- Add opt-in GATEGUARD_FACT_FORCE_MAX_DENIALS session cap (from #2755).
- Always gate sensitive targets, judged on lexical and real paths.
- Canonicalize checked-path keys.
Closes#2608
Co-authored-by: SulimanAbdulrazzaq <suliman9000a@gmail.com>
Preserve contributor history and current-main behavior while resolving the exact reviewed follow-up.
Source-PR: https://github.com/affaan-m/ECC/pull/2829
Source-Parent: d811349224
Review-Manifest-SHA256: a7209685b2a5726777f7450a5983c28add8759654969b09ba3e4b803fcfaf8bd
Preserve the contributor repair and current main protections. Handle operand ordering, bounded literal command wrappers, executable containers and find actions while keeping quoted prose and option values passive.
Source-PR: https://github.com/affaan-m/ECC/pull/2829
Source-Head: c88b3f879a
Integration-Main: d3b8a3e908
* fix(gateguard): sanitize dangerous invisible unicode in denial paths
sanitizePath only stripped control characters and bidi overrides, so
the 394 codepoints that the repo-wide unicode safety policy classifies
as dangerous-invisible (zero-width U+200B-200D, U+2060, U+2061-2064,
variation selectors U+FE00-FE0F, tag block U+E0000-E007F, Hangul
fillers, U+FEFF, U+180E, U+3164) plus the U+2028/U+2029 line and
paragraph separators passed verbatim into Edit/Write denial messages.
Invisible characters in a quoted file path let a malicious path look
clean to a human reviewer.
Align sanitizePath with the CI policy list and cover it with a
hook-output regression test that asserts no dangerous invisible
character survives into the denial reason while visible path text
stays intact.
* refactor(gateguard): name the sanitizePath unicode policy constants
Address review feedback: move the code points and ranges out of
sanitizePath into descriptive constants mirroring
scripts/ci/check-unicode-safety.js, so the policy is auditable in one
place. Also seed the regression test input with U+2029 so the
paragraph-separator assertion is exercised rather than vacuous.
* fix(gateguard): sanitize C1 control characters in denial paths
Follow-up on the sanitizePath policy alignment: the Unicode C1 control
block (U+0080..U+009F) is invisible in every renderer like the ASCII
controls below 0x20, but the strip only covered the ASCII range. Add
C1_CONTROLS to the policy constants and seed U+0091 into the
regression test input.
* fix(gateguard): detect destructive SQL passed quoted to SQL clients
Quoted SQL like psql -c "drop table users" was stripped before the DESTRUCTIVE_SQL_DD regex ran, making it unreachable. Check dequoted tokens for known SQL clients (psql, mysql, sqlite3, ...) so real invocations are gated while git commit -m / echo mentions stay allowed. Fixesaffaan-m/ECC#3024.
* fix(gateguard): unwrap sudo/env flags and ignore SQL string literals
Address review: sudo -u/env VAR= wrappers now resolve to the real SQL client; SQL single/double/dollar-quoted literals are stripped before the destructive regex so SELECT 'drop table' stays allowed. Adds deny/allow regression tests for quoted SQL, wrappers, literals, and non-SQL clients.
* test(gateguard): cover env PGPASSWORD wrapper variant
* fix(gateguard): close wrapper sh-c, env dir, tagged literal gaps
Review 5189686662: recurse sh -c from unwrapped wrapper index (sudo/doas/env + sh -c now denied); consume env -C/--chdir separate values; strip tagged dollar-quoted literals ($tag$...\baseline). Tests: 200 passed.
A first-touch Edit/Write denial marks the file checked so the retry
passes. Sibling edits to the same file in the same parallel batch are
therefore judged against post-denial state and silently apply, leaving
the file in a state neither version intended.
Hooks see tool calls one at a time, so a batch-wide lock is not
possible. Instead make the partial application explicit: the Edit,
Write, MultiEdit, and condensed denials now name the file and warn
that other edits from the same batch may already have been applied,
and SKILL.md tells agents to send dependent edits sequentially and
re-read the file after a gated batch.