diff --git a/docs/recorded-crashes.md b/docs/recorded-crashes.md
index 836aa82677..7af17e7bbe 100644
--- a/docs/recorded-crashes.md
+++ b/docs/recorded-crashes.md
@@ -105,6 +105,27 @@ GDB/Python/pwndbg/strace. Fixture generation explicitly launches its owned test
 program; subsequent inspection only reads the resulting core. Real acceptance
 checks recorded threads, high registers, missing/malformed notes, opaque owners,
 CLI/MCP parity, optional debugger context and historical PID collision with an
-owned live sentinel. The syscall trace also rejects access to the still-present
+owned live sentinel. An observed Node thread group must launch the exact ownership
+`ps` inventory before it can read that live process's `stat` or `status` for native
+identity/UID facts. Only traced `CLONE_THREAD` members share this allowance;
+exec-replaced threads, ordinary children, debugger and decoder processes cannot
+use it. The purpose of stat/status reads within the same Node thread group
+cannot be distinguished by strace. A second recording uses a valid
+historical PID above the host's assignable PID range and rejects resolved lookups,
+including Node `stat`/`status` reads, to detect historical-PID-driven access separately
+from live inventory. Descriptor paths come from strace's `-yy` decoding; exact
+PID-directory opens and relative accesses through those handles are rejected.
+Failed FD-relative pathname attempts are checked across syscall variants.
+Legacy relative pathname calls without dirfd/cwd evidence and symlink aliases
+remain unverified; the verification report declares these gaps rather than
+establishing their absence.
+One syscall/selector contract supplies trace selection, target interpretation
+and the report's explicit coverage catalog. Unlisted PID-directed syscalls remain
+unverified. The catalog includes PID-directed resource
+limits, scheduling, priority, process metadata, signals and pidfd controls.
+Self, group and UID selectors retain their syscall-defined meanings; unresolved
+targets cannot qualify. Coverage is reported once for all CLI/MCP traces and
+does not establish containment of every possible kernel interaction.
+The syscall trace also rejects access to the still-present
 source executable. The CI workflow defines Ubuntu 24.04 and Debian 13 (GDB 16)
 container lanes. Original inputs and host configuration remain unchanged.
diff --git a/scripts/lib/recorded-core-fixtures.py b/scripts/lib/recorded-core-fixtures.py
index cc8d654439..ba65bb3cab 100644
--- a/scripts/lib/recorded-core-fixtures.py
+++ b/scripts/lib/recorded-core-fixtures.py
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ from elftools.elf.elffile import ELFFile
 from elftools.construct import Container
 from pwnlib.elf.datatypes import elf_prstatus_amd64
 
-source, directory, sentinel = Path(sys.argv[1]), Path(sys.argv[2]), int(sys.argv[3])
+source, directory, sentinel, unlisted = Path(sys.argv[1]), Path(sys.argv[2]), int(sys.argv[3]), int(sys.argv[4])
 original = source.read_bytes()
 image = ELFFile(io.BytesIO(original))
 segments = list(image.iter_segments())
@@ -81,14 +81,15 @@ content = bytearray(original)
 start = descriptor_start(status) + elf_prstatus_amd64.pr_pid.offset
 content[start:start + ctypes.sizeof(ctypes.c_uint32)] = (0xfffffffe).to_bytes(4, "little")
 save("negative-pid", content)
-content = bytearray(original)
-content[start:start + ctypes.sizeof(ctypes.c_uint32)] = sentinel.to_bytes(4, "little")
-for note in notes:
-    if note.n_name == "CORE" and note.n_type == "NT_PRPSINFO":
-        # Build with unchanged pyelftools; no hard-coded PID offset or host file resolution.
-        raw = dict(note.n_desc, pr_pid=sentinel)
-        encoded = image.structs.Elf_Prpsinfo.build(Container(**raw))
-        offset = descriptor_start(note)
-        content[offset:offset + len(encoded)] = encoded
-save("historical-pid-collision", content)
+for name, pid in [("historical-pid-collision", sentinel), ("historical-pid-unlisted", unlisted)]:
+    content = bytearray(original)
+    content[start:start + ctypes.sizeof(ctypes.c_uint32)] = pid.to_bytes(4, "little")
+    for note in notes:
+        if note.n_name == "CORE" and note.n_type == "NT_PRPSINFO":
+            # Build with unchanged pyelftools; no hard-coded PID offset or host file resolution.
+            raw = dict(note.n_desc, pr_pid=pid)
+            encoded = image.structs.Elf_Prpsinfo.build(Container(**raw))
+            offset = descriptor_start(note)
+            content[offset:offset + len(encoded)] = encoded
+    save(name, content)
 print(json.dumps(files))
diff --git a/scripts/verify-recorded-crash.mjs b/scripts/verify-recorded-crash.mjs
index eb59749c73..c8eb29f1df 100644
--- a/scripts/verify-recorded-crash.mjs
+++ b/scripts/verify-recorded-crash.mjs
@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@ import {
   startCoreSentinel,
 } from "./verify/recorded-crash/fixtures.mjs";
 import { verifyCoreInspectionTrace } from "./verify/recorded-crash/trace.mjs";
+import { historicalPidTraceContract } from "./verify/recorded-crash/trace-policy.mjs";
 
 const environment = Object.fromEntries(
   Object.entries(process.env).filter(([, value]) => typeof value === "string"),
@@ -61,6 +62,10 @@ try {
   const core = await createRecordedCore(options);
   sentinel = await startCoreSentinel(options);
   sentinel.assertAlive();
+  // Valid signed ELF PID, outside this Linux host's assignable PID range.
+  const unlistedPid = 2 ** 31 - 1;
+  const pidMaximum = Number(await readFile("/proc/sys/kernel/pid_max", "utf8"));
+  assert.ok(Number.isSafeInteger(pidMaximum) && pidMaximum < unlistedPid);
   const fixtures = JSON.parse(
     await fixtureCommand(
       environment.REA_PWNTOOLS_PYTHON,
@@ -72,6 +77,7 @@ try {
         core,
         root.path,
         String(sentinel.pid),
+        String(unlistedPid),
       ],
       options,
     ),
@@ -276,6 +282,15 @@ try {
     core: fixtures["historical-pid-collision"],
     sentinel,
   });
+  trace.push(
+    ...(await verifyCoreInspectionTrace({
+      ...options,
+      entrypoint,
+      core: fixtures["historical-pid-unlisted"],
+      historicalPid: unlistedPid,
+      sentinel,
+    })),
+  );
   cases += trace.length;
   assert.ok((await readFile(core)).length > 0);
 } catch (cause) {
@@ -308,6 +323,7 @@ const result = {
     "Linux x64; pwntools4.15.0/pyelftools0.33/Unicorn2.1.2; core-only BYO GDB/pwndbg2026.09.15",
   fixture_generation: "owned test program executed",
   inspection_trace: trace,
+  historical_pid_access_coverage: historicalPidTraceContract,
   verifier,
 };
 console.log(JSON.stringify(result, null, 2));
diff --git a/scripts/verify/recorded-crash/trace-client.mjs b/scripts/verify/recorded-crash/trace-client.mjs
index f38f1d6cff..43ae3b8f7a 100644
--- a/scripts/verify/recorded-crash/trace-client.mjs
+++ b/scripts/verify/recorded-crash/trace-client.mjs
@@ -1,11 +1,19 @@
 import { connectRecordedCrash } from "./public.mjs";
+import assert from "node:assert/strict";
 
 const session = await connectRecordedCrash({
   entrypoint: process.argv[2],
   environment: process.env,
 });
 try {
-  await session.inspect("mcp", process.argv[3], { debuggerContext: true });
+  const report = await session.inspect("mcp", process.argv[3], {
+    debuggerContext: true,
+  });
+  const historicalPid = Number(process.argv[4]);
+  assert.ok(
+    report.threads.some((thread) => thread.historical_pid === historicalPid),
+    "MCP must decode the selected historical-PID control before its trace qualifies",
+  );
 } finally {
   await session.close();
 }
diff --git a/scripts/verify/recorded-crash/trace-ownership.d.mts b/scripts/verify/recorded-crash/trace-ownership.d.mts
index 0daeba3737..c265488fac 100644
--- a/scripts/verify/recorded-crash/trace-ownership.d.mts
+++ b/scripts/verify/recorded-crash/trace-ownership.d.mts
@@ -1,6 +1,17 @@
-/** Assert the documented procfs allowance over strace -ff process/thread files. */
-export function assertHistoricalPidReadsAreOwnershipOnly(options: {
+export interface OwnershipTraceExecution {
+  readonly pid: number;
+  readonly path: string;
+  readonly line: string;
+  readonly succeeded: boolean;
+  readonly ownershipInventory: boolean;
+}
+/** Parsed topology and execution facts for one complete strace observation. */
+export function collectOwnershipTraceFacts(options: {
   readonly traces: readonly { readonly pid: number; readonly text: string }[];
-  readonly sentinelPid: number;
+  readonly nodeExecutable: string;
   readonly psExecutables: ReadonlySet<string>;
-}): string[];
+}): {
+  readonly ownershipThreads: ReadonlySet<number>;
+  readonly psProcesses: ReadonlySet<number>;
+  readonly executions: readonly OwnershipTraceExecution[];
+};
diff --git a/scripts/verify/recorded-crash/trace-ownership.mjs b/scripts/verify/recorded-crash/trace-ownership.mjs
index 0267dcdaa8..2787ebe41d 100644
--- a/scripts/verify/recorded-crash/trace-ownership.mjs
+++ b/scripts/verify/recorded-crash/trace-ownership.mjs
@@ -3,18 +3,10 @@ import assert from "node:assert/strict";
 const ownershipPsArguments =
   '["ps", "-axo", "pid=,ppid=,pgid=,uid=,stat=,command="]';
 
-/**
- * Allow only the procfs paths used by the process-ownership scan: ps may
- * inspect its process-table fields, and its caller's thread group may read
- * native identity and UID records. With strace -ff, libuv worker threads get
- * separate files; follow CLONE_THREAD edges, never ordinary child-process
- * edges. strace cannot distinguish the purpose of a stat/status read inside
- * the same Node thread group, so this is deliberately limited to those two
- * files; provider Python/GDB children remain outside the permit.
- */
-export const assertHistoricalPidReadsAreOwnershipOnly = ({
+/** Parse execution/thread facts once; only an observed Node ps caller owns inventory reads. */
+export const collectOwnershipTraceFacts = ({
   traces,
-  sentinelPid,
+  nodeExecutable,
   psExecutables,
 }) => {
   const processGroups = new Map();
@@ -71,57 +63,65 @@ export const assertHistoricalPidReadsAreOwnershipOnly = ({
     const childPid =
       event.childPid ?? /\) = (\d+)(?:<[^>]*>)?$/u.exec(event.text)?.[1];
     if (childPid === undefined) continue;
-    event.childPid = Number(childPid);
+    const observedChild = Number(childPid);
+    // A child-side clone return of zero is not a parent-to-child edge.
+    if (!Number.isSafeInteger(observedChild) || observedChild <= 0) continue;
+    event.childPid = observedChild;
     if (/\bCLONE_THREAD\b/u.test(event.text))
       joinThreadGroup(event.parentPid, event.childPid);
   }
 
-  const psPids = new Set();
+  const executions = [];
   for (const trace of traces) {
-    const successfulPsExec = trace.text.split("\n").some((line) => {
-      const executable = /^execve\("([^"]+)"/u.exec(line)?.[1];
-      return (
-        executable !== undefined &&
-        psExecutables.has(executable) &&
-        line.includes(ownershipPsArguments) &&
-        line.endsWith(" = 0")
-      );
-    });
-    if (successfulPsExec) psPids.add(trace.pid);
-  }
-
-  const psParentGroups = new Set(
-    cloneEvents
-      .filter(({ childPid }) => childPid !== undefined && psPids.has(childPid))
-      .map(({ parentPid }) => findGroup(parentPid)),
-  );
-
-  const ownershipReads = [];
-  const pidPrefix = `/proc/${sentinelPid}/`;
-  for (const trace of traces) {
-    const isPsProcess = psPids.has(trace.pid);
-    const isOwnershipProcessThread = psParentGroups.has(findGroup(trace.pid));
-    const pidReads = trace.text
-      .split("\n")
-      .filter((line) => line.includes(pidPrefix));
-    for (const line of pidReads) {
-      const psAllowedPath = new RegExp(
-        `/proc/${sentinelPid}/(?:stat|status|cmdline|wchan|environ)"`,
-        "u",
-      ).test(line);
-      const ownershipThreadPath = new RegExp(
-        `/proc/${sentinelPid}/(?:stat|status)"`,
-        "u",
-      ).test(line);
-      const psRead = isPsProcess && psAllowedPath;
-      const ownershipThreadRead =
-        isOwnershipProcessThread && ownershipThreadPath;
+    for (const line of trace.text.split("\n")) {
+      if (!/execve(?:at)?\(/u.test(line)) continue;
+      const match = /^execve\("([^"]+)"/u.exec(line);
+      assert.notEqual(match, null, `Unresolved executable identity: ${line}`);
       assert.ok(
-        psRead || ownershipThreadRead,
-        `Historical PID caused a provider lookup in trace.${trace.pid}: ${line}`,
+        / = (?:0|-1 [A-Z]+)/u.test(line),
+        `Incomplete execution observation: ${line}`,
       );
-      ownershipReads.push(line);
+      executions.push({
+        pid: trace.pid,
+        path: match[1],
+        line,
+        succeeded: line.endsWith(" = 0"),
+        ownershipInventory:
+          psExecutables.has(match[1]) && line.includes(ownershipPsArguments),
+      });
     }
   }
-  return ownershipReads;
+  const psProcesses = new Set(
+    executions
+      .filter(
+        ({ succeeded, ownershipInventory }) => succeeded && ownershipInventory,
+      )
+      .map(({ pid }) => pid),
+  );
+  const psParentGroups = new Set(
+    cloneEvents
+      .filter(({ childPid }) => psProcesses.has(childPid))
+      .map(({ parentPid }) => findGroup(parentPid)),
+  );
+  const nodeGroups = new Set(
+    executions
+      .filter(({ path, succeeded }) => succeeded && path === nodeExecutable)
+      .map(({ pid }) => findGroup(pid)),
+  );
+  const replaced = new Set(
+    executions
+      .filter(({ path, succeeded }) => succeeded && path !== nodeExecutable)
+      .map(({ pid }) => pid),
+  );
+  const ownershipThreads = new Set(
+    traces
+      .filter(
+        ({ pid }) =>
+          nodeGroups.has(findGroup(pid)) &&
+          psParentGroups.has(findGroup(pid)) &&
+          !replaced.has(pid),
+      )
+      .map(({ pid }) => pid),
+  );
+  return { ownershipThreads, psProcesses, executions };
 };
diff --git a/scripts/verify/recorded-crash/trace-policy.d.mts b/scripts/verify/recorded-crash/trace-policy.d.mts
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..1f39deb219
--- /dev/null
+++ b/scripts/verify/recorded-crash/trace-policy.d.mts
@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+export interface SyscallTrace {
+  readonly pid: number;
+  readonly text: string;
+}
+export const historicalPidTraceContract: {
+  readonly checked_paths: readonly string[];
+  readonly pid_syscalls: readonly string[];
+  readonly unverified: readonly string[];
+};
+export function assertHistoricalPidAccess(input: {
+  readonly trace: SyscallTrace;
+  readonly historicalPid: number;
+  readonly ownershipThreads: ReadonlySet<number>;
+  readonly liveCollision: boolean;
+  readonly psInventory: boolean;
+}): readonly string[];
diff --git a/scripts/verify/recorded-crash/trace-policy.mjs b/scripts/verify/recorded-crash/trace-policy.mjs
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..faf4c71f28
--- /dev/null
+++ b/scripts/verify/recorded-crash/trace-policy.mjs
@@ -0,0 +1,202 @@
+import assert from "node:assert/strict";
+import { posix } from "node:path";
+
+// This owner supplies both tracer selection and target interpretation. Kinds
+// describe syscall argument semantics, never catalog positions or output PIDs.
+const pidTargetKinds = new Map([
+  ...[
+    "prlimit64",
+    "sched_getaffinity",
+    "sched_setaffinity",
+    "sched_getparam",
+    "sched_setparam",
+    "sched_getscheduler",
+    "sched_setscheduler",
+    "sched_getattr",
+    "sched_setattr",
+    "sched_rr_get_interval",
+    "getpgid",
+    "getsid",
+    "get_robust_list",
+    "migrate_pages",
+    "move_pages",
+    "pidfd_open",
+    "tkill",
+    "rt_sigqueueinfo",
+  ].map((name) => [name, "pid"]),
+  ...["tgkill", "rt_tgsigqueueinfo", "setpgid", "kcmp"].map((name) => [
+    name,
+    "pair",
+  ]),
+  ...["getpriority", "setpriority"].map((name) => [name, "priority"]),
+  ...["ioprio_get", "ioprio_set"].map((name) => [name, "ioprio"]),
+  ...[
+    "pidfd_send_signal",
+    "pidfd_getfd",
+    "process_madvise",
+    "process_mrelease",
+  ].map((name) => [name, "pidfd"]),
+  ...["capget", "capset"].map((name) => [name, "capability"]),
+  ["kill", "signal-group"],
+  ["wait4", "pid-group"],
+  ["waitid", "wait-selector"],
+]);
+
+export const historicalPidTraceContract = Object.freeze({
+  checked_paths: Object.freeze(["absolute-proc-paths", "decoded-fd-paths"]),
+  pid_syscalls: Object.freeze([...pidTargetKinds.keys()]),
+  unverified: Object.freeze([
+    "legacy-cwd-relative-paths",
+    "symlink-path-aliases",
+    "same-node-thread-stat-status-purpose",
+    "other-pid-directed-syscalls",
+  ]),
+});
+
+const readPid = (value) => {
+  const match = /^(-?\d+)(?=[),]|$)/u.exec(value ?? "");
+  const pid = match === null ? NaN : Number(match[1]);
+  return Number.isSafeInteger(pid) ? pid : null;
+};
+const readPidfd = (value) => {
+  const match = /^\d+<pid:(\d+)>$/u.exec(value ?? "");
+  return match === null ? null : readPid(match[1]);
+};
+
+const historicalPidTarget = (line, pid) => {
+  const call = /^(\w+)\((.*)$/u.exec(line);
+  const kind = call === null ? undefined : pidTargetKinds.get(call[1]);
+  if (kind === undefined) return "unselected";
+  const args = call[2].split(", ", 3);
+  const match = (...targets) =>
+    targets.includes(pid)
+      ? "historical"
+      : targets.includes(null)
+        ? "unresolved"
+        : "other";
+  switch (kind) {
+    case "pid":
+      return match(readPid(args[0]));
+    case "pair":
+      return match(readPid(args[0]), readPid(args[1]));
+    case "pidfd":
+      return match(readPidfd(args[0]));
+    case "pid-group":
+    case "signal-group": {
+      const target = readPid(args[0]);
+      if (target === null) return "unresolved";
+      return target === pid ||
+        target === -pid ||
+        (kind === "signal-group" && target === -1)
+        ? "historical"
+        : "other";
+    }
+    case "priority":
+    case "ioprio": {
+      const prefix = kind === "priority" ? "PRIO_" : "IOPRIO_WHO_";
+      if (args[0] === `${prefix}USER`) return "other";
+      if (![`${prefix}PROCESS`, `${prefix}PGRP`].includes(args[0]))
+        return "unresolved";
+      return match(readPid(args[1]));
+    }
+    case "wait-selector":
+      if (args[0] === "P_ALL") return "other";
+      if (args[0] === "P_PIDFD") return match(readPidfd(args[1]));
+      if (!["P_PID", "P_PGID"].includes(args[0])) return "unresolved";
+      return match(readPid(args[1]));
+    case "capability": {
+      const header = /^\{[^}]*\bpid=(-?\d+)(?=[,}])/u.exec(call[2]);
+      return match(header === null ? null : readPid(header[1]));
+    }
+    default:
+      return "unresolved";
+  }
+};
+
+const readsMetadata = (line, root, names) => {
+  const path = `${root}/(?:${names.join("|")})`;
+  return (
+    new RegExp(
+      `^openat\\([^,]+, "${path}", O_RDONLY(?:\\|O_CLOEXEC)?\\)`,
+      "u",
+    ).test(line) ||
+    new RegExp(
+      `^statx\\(\\d+<${path}>, "", [^,]*\\bAT_EMPTY_PATH\\b`,
+      "u",
+    ).test(line) ||
+    new RegExp(`^fstat(?:64)?\\(\\d+<${path}>,`, "u").test(line)
+  );
+};
+
+/** Check resolved PID references; cwd-relative legacy paths remain unqualified. */
+export function assertHistoricalPidAccess({
+  trace,
+  historicalPid,
+  ownershipThreads,
+  liveCollision,
+  psInventory,
+}) {
+  const root = `/proc/${historicalPid}`;
+  const pathReference = new RegExp(`${root}(?=[/">]|$)`, "u");
+  const referencesHistoricalPath = (line) => {
+    if (pathReference.test(line)) return true;
+    // strace prints the ASCII /proc, PID and dot segments literally. Keep the
+    // original line as evidence while recognizing lexical path aliases too.
+    for (const quoted of line.matchAll(/"((?:[^"\\]|\\.)*)"/gu))
+      if (
+        quoted[1].startsWith("/proc/") &&
+        pathReference.test(posix.normalize(quoted[1]))
+      )
+        return true;
+    // -yy owns the current dirfd identity, including descriptor reuse. Resolve
+    // each FD/path argument pair, not just openat: failed readlinkat, statx and
+    // newfstatat attempts have no returned descriptor to reveal their target.
+    for (const relative of line.matchAll(
+      /(?:\(|, )(?:-?\d+|AT_FDCWD)<(\/[^>]*)>, ("(?:[^"\\]|\\.)*")/gu,
+    )) {
+      // strace prints ASCII separators, dot segments, /proc and decimal PIDs
+      // literally. Other C-escaped bytes remain opaque path components; JSON
+      // decoding would incorrectly reject valid non-ASCII caller paths.
+      const pathname = relative[2].slice(1, -1);
+      const path = posix.resolve(relative[1], pathname);
+      if (path === root || path.startsWith(`${root}/`)) return true;
+    }
+    return false;
+  };
+  const accesses = [];
+  for (const line of trace.text.split("\n")) {
+    const target = historicalPidTarget(line, historicalPid);
+    if (
+      target !== "historical" &&
+      target !== "unresolved" &&
+      !referencesHistoricalPath(line)
+    )
+      continue;
+    const ownershipMetadata =
+      ownershipThreads.has(trace.pid) &&
+      readsMetadata(line, root, ["stat", "status"]);
+    const psMetadata =
+      psInventory &&
+      (readsMetadata(line, root, [
+        "stat",
+        "status",
+        "cmdline",
+        "wchan",
+        "environ",
+      ]) ||
+        // procps reads the PID directory's UID without opening a directory FD.
+        new RegExp(
+          `^newfstatat\\([^,]+, "${root}", .*?, (?:0|AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW)\\)`,
+          "u",
+        ).test(line));
+    assert.ok(
+      liveCollision &&
+        target !== "historical" &&
+        target !== "unresolved" &&
+        (ownershipMetadata || psMetadata),
+      `${target === "unresolved" ? "Unresolved process target in" : "Historical PID caused a"} non-inventory lookup in trace ${trace.pid}: ${line}`,
+    );
+    accesses.push(line);
+  }
+  return accesses;
+}
diff --git a/scripts/verify/recorded-crash/trace.mjs b/scripts/verify/recorded-crash/trace.mjs
index 44ef4f9632..34735737b6 100644
--- a/scripts/verify/recorded-crash/trace.mjs
+++ b/scripts/verify/recorded-crash/trace.mjs
@@ -3,7 +3,12 @@ import { readdir, readFile, realpath } from "node:fs/promises";
 import { fileURLToPath } from "node:url";
 import { isAbsolute, join, resolve } from "node:path";
 import { runOwnedCommand } from "../../../dist/process/OwnedCommand.js";
-import { assertHistoricalPidReadsAreOwnershipOnly } from "./trace-ownership.mjs";
+import { parseEvidence } from "../../../dist/domain/evidence.js";
+import {
+  assertHistoricalPidAccess,
+  historicalPidTraceContract,
+} from "./trace-policy.mjs";
+import { collectOwnershipTraceFacts } from "./trace-ownership.mjs";
 
 /** Check attempted syscalls, including failed attempts, on a recorded PID that collides with an owned live sentinel. */
 export async function verifyCoreInspectionTrace({
@@ -13,6 +18,7 @@ export async function verifyCoreInspectionTrace({
   core,
   sentinel,
   runId,
+  historicalPid = sentinel.pid,
 }) {
   const gdb = await realpath(environment.REA_PWNDBG_GDB);
   const python = await realpath(environment.REA_PWNTOOLS_PYTHON);
@@ -31,7 +37,8 @@ export async function verifyCoreInspectionTrace({
   const observations = [];
   for (const mode of ["cli", "mcp"]) {
     sentinel.assertAlive();
-    const prefix = join(root, `inspection-${mode}.trace`);
+    const traceName = `inspection-${historicalPid}-${mode}.trace.`;
+    const prefix = join(root, traceName.slice(0, -1));
     const invocation =
       mode === "cli"
         ? [
@@ -45,17 +52,19 @@ export async function verifyCoreInspectionTrace({
             fileURLToPath(new URL("./trace-client.mjs", import.meta.url)),
             entrypoint,
             core,
+            String(historicalPid),
           ];
-    await runOwnedCommand(
+    const result = await runOwnedCommand(
       {
         command: environment.REA_VERIFY_STRACE_COMMAND,
         arguments: [
           "-ff",
           "-qq",
+          "-yy",
           "-s",
           "8192",
           "-e",
-          "trace=%process,%network,%file,ptrace,process_vm_readv,process_vm_writev",
+          `trace=%process,%signal,%network,%file,ptrace,process_vm_readv,process_vm_writev,${historicalPidTraceContract.pid_syscalls.join(",")}`,
           "-o",
           prefix,
           process.execPath,
@@ -68,23 +77,45 @@ export async function verifyCoreInspectionTrace({
       },
       { timeoutMs: 90_000, diagnosticBytes: 1024 * 1024 },
     );
+    if (mode === "cli") {
+      const report = parseEvidence(
+        JSON.parse(result.stdout.text),
+      ).normalized_result;
+      assert.ok(
+        report.threads.some(
+          (thread) => thread.historical_pid === historicalPid,
+        ),
+        "CLI must decode the selected historical-PID control before its trace qualifies",
+      );
+    }
     const executions = [];
+    const ownershipReads = [];
     let gdbObserved = false;
-    const traces = await Promise.all(
-      (await readdir(root))
-        .filter((file) => file.startsWith(`inspection-${mode}.trace.`))
-        .map(async (file) => ({
-          file,
-          pid: Number(file.slice(`inspection-${mode}.trace.`.length)),
-          text: await readFile(join(root, file), "utf8"),
-        })),
-    );
-    const ownershipReads = assertHistoricalPidReadsAreOwnershipOnly({
+    const traces = [];
+    for (const file of await readdir(root)) {
+      if (!file.startsWith(traceName)) continue;
+      const pid = Number(file.slice(traceName.length));
+      assert.ok(Number.isSafeInteger(pid) && pid > 0);
+      const text = await readFile(join(root, file), "utf8");
+      // Retain only execution/thread evidence across files, not all raw traces.
+      const inventory = text
+        .split("\n")
+        .filter((line) =>
+          /^(?:execve|clone|fork|vfork|<\.\.\. (?:clone|fork|vfork))/u.test(
+            line,
+          ),
+        )
+        .join("\n");
+      traces.push({ pid, text: inventory, file });
+    }
+    const ownershipFacts = collectOwnershipTraceFacts({
       traces,
-      sentinelPid: sentinel.pid,
+      nodeExecutable: process.execPath,
       psExecutables: psPaths,
     });
-    for (const { file, text } of traces) {
+    for (const trace of traces) {
+      const { file } = trace;
+      const text = await readFile(join(root, file), "utf8");
       // Keep the source executable present: GDB 16 otherwise silently hides a
       // core-only violation when its automatic executable lookup finds nothing.
       const recordedExecutable = JSON.stringify(join(root, "fixture-program"));
@@ -92,6 +123,15 @@ export async function verifyCoreInspectionTrace({
         !text.split("\n").some((line) => line.includes(recordedExecutable)),
         `Inspection attempted access to the recorded executable: ${file}`,
       );
+      ownershipReads.push(
+        ...assertHistoricalPidAccess({
+          trace: { pid: trace.pid, text },
+          historicalPid,
+          ownershipThreads: ownershipFacts.ownershipThreads,
+          liveCollision: historicalPid === sentinel.pid,
+          psInventory: ownershipFacts.psProcesses.has(trace.pid),
+        }),
+      );
       assert.ok(
         !/\bptrace\(/u.test(text),
         `Inspection attempted ptrace: ${file}`,
@@ -106,48 +146,40 @@ export async function verifyCoreInspectionTrace({
         ),
         `Inspection attempted an Internet socket: ${file}`,
       );
-      for (const line of text.split("\n")) {
-        if (!/execve(?:at)?\(/u.test(line)) continue;
-        const match = /^execve\("([^"]+)"/u.exec(line);
-        assert.notEqual(match, null, `Unresolved executable identity: ${line}`);
-        assert.ok(
-          / = (?:0|-1 [A-Z]+)/u.test(line),
-          `Incomplete execution observation: ${line}`,
+    }
+    for (const execution of ownershipFacts.executions) {
+      const { line } = execution;
+      const executable = await realpath(execution.path).catch(
+        () => execution.path,
+      );
+      const ownership = execution.ownershipInventory;
+      const iconv =
+        iconvPaths.has(execution.path) && line.includes('["iconv", "-l"]');
+      const version =
+        gitPaths.has(execution.path) &&
+        line.includes(
+          "[" +
+            [
+              "git",
+              "--git-dir",
+              join(plugin, ".git"),
+              "rev-parse",
+              "--short",
+              "HEAD",
+            ]
+              .map((argument) => JSON.stringify(argument))
+              .join(", ") +
+            "]",
         );
-        const executable = await realpath(match[1]).catch(() => match[1]);
-        const ownership =
-          psPaths.has(match[1]) &&
-          line.includes(
-            '["ps", "-axo", "pid=,ppid=,pgid=,uid=,stat=,command="]',
-          );
-        const iconv =
-          iconvPaths.has(match[1]) && line.includes('["iconv", "-l"]');
-        const version =
-          gitPaths.has(match[1]) &&
-          line.includes(
-            "[" +
-              [
-                "git",
-                "--git-dir",
-                join(plugin, ".git"),
-                "rev-parse",
-                "--short",
-                "HEAD",
-              ]
-                .map((argument) => JSON.stringify(argument))
-                .join(", ") +
-              "]",
-          );
-        assert.ok(
-          [process.execPath, python, gdb].includes(executable) ||
-            ownership ||
-            iconv ||
-            version,
-          `Unexpected attempted host execution: ${line}`,
-        );
-        if (executable === gdb) gdbObserved = true;
-        executions.push(executable);
-      }
+      assert.ok(
+        [process.execPath, python, gdb].includes(executable) ||
+          ownership ||
+          iconv ||
+          version,
+        `Unexpected attempted host execution: ${line}`,
+      );
+      if (executable === gdb) gdbObserved = true;
+      executions.push(executable);
     }
     assert.ok(gdbObserved, "Trace must include the actual core-only GDB stage");
     assert.ok(executions.includes(python));
@@ -155,7 +187,7 @@ export async function verifyCoreInspectionTrace({
     observations.push({
       mode,
       executions,
-      historical_pid: sentinel.pid,
+      historical_pid: historicalPid,
       sentinel: "still-alive",
       ownership_process_table_reads: ownershipReads,
     });
diff --git a/src/domain/stringPatterns.test.ts b/src/domain/stringPatterns.test.ts
index 4410ad7b95..4dd634d7a7 100644
--- a/src/domain/stringPatterns.test.ts
+++ b/src/domain/stringPatterns.test.ts
@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
+import { Ajv2020 } from "ajv/dist/2020.js";
 import { expect, it } from "vitest";
 import { z } from "zod";
 
@@ -136,3 +137,20 @@ it("advertises every portable base64 constraint and keeps large inputs stack-saf
   }
   expect(isCanonicalBase64(encoded)).toBe(true);
 });
+
+it("validates complete projected canonical schemas at the encoded-input budget", () => {
+  const projected = z.toJSONSchema(canonicalBase64Schema, {
+    target: "draft-2020-12",
+  });
+  const validate = new Ajv2020({ strict: true }).compile(projected);
+  const encoded = Buffer.alloc(24 * 1024 * 1024 - 3, 0x81).toString("base64");
+  for (const { value, expected } of [
+    { value: encoded, expected: true },
+    { value: `${encoded.slice(0, -1)}!`, expected: false },
+    { value: `${encoded.slice(0, -3)}R==`, expected: false },
+    { value: `${encoded}A`, expected: false },
+  ]) {
+    expect(canonicalBase64Schema.safeParse(value).success).toBe(expected);
+    expect(validate(value)).toBe(expected);
+  }
+});
diff --git a/src/process/LinuxProcessStat.test.ts b/src/process/LinuxProcessStat.test.ts
index d8544528bb..d922714e1c 100644
--- a/src/process/LinuxProcessStat.test.ts
+++ b/src/process/LinuxProcessStat.test.ts
@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ const statRecord = (
     readonly pid?: string;
     readonly command?: string;
     readonly state?: string;
+    readonly flags?: string;
     readonly parentPid?: string;
     readonly processGroupId?: string;
     readonly sessionId?: string;
@@ -20,6 +21,7 @@ const statRecord = (
     options.sessionId ?? "19",
   ];
   while (fields.length < 19) fields.push("0");
+  fields[6] = options.flags ?? "0";
   fields.push(options.startTime ?? "987654");
   return `${options.pid ?? "42"} (${options.command ?? "worker"}) ${fields.join(" ")}`;
 };
@@ -56,3 +58,38 @@ it("distinguishes zombie lifecycle and rejects malformed or missing identity fie
     undefined,
   );
 });
+
+it.each(["R", "S", "D"])(
+  "retains PF_EXITING separately from terminal state %s",
+  (state) => {
+    expect(
+      parseLinuxProcessStat(statRecord({ state, flags: "4194316" }))?.lifecycle,
+    ).toBe("exiting");
+    expect(
+      parseLinuxProcessStat(statRecord({ state, flags: "4194312" }))?.lifecycle,
+    ).toBe("non-zombie");
+  },
+);
+
+it.each(["Z", "X", "x"])(
+  "recognizes terminal native state %s independently of flags",
+  (state) => {
+    expect(
+      parseLinuxProcessStat(statRecord({ state, flags: "invalid" }))?.lifecycle,
+    ).toBe(state === "Z" ? "zombie" : "dead");
+  },
+);
+
+it.each(["invalid", "-1", "4.1", "9007199254740992"])(
+  "preserves identity and relations with unknown flags %s",
+  (flags) => {
+    expect(parseLinuxProcessStat(statRecord({ flags }))).toEqual({
+      pid: 42,
+      startTime: "987654",
+      lifecycle: undefined,
+      parentPid: 17,
+      processGroupId: 18,
+      sessionId: 19,
+    });
+  },
+);
diff --git a/src/process/LinuxProcessStat.ts b/src/process/LinuxProcessStat.ts
index 93e56647c1..d255b74936 100644
--- a/src/process/LinuxProcessStat.ts
+++ b/src/process/LinuxProcessStat.ts
@@ -1,8 +1,10 @@
+import type { ProcessLifecycle } from "./ProcessLifecycle.js";
+
 /** Native process facts parsed from one Linux `/proc/<pid>/stat` record. */
 export interface LinuxProcessStat {
   readonly pid: number;
   readonly startTime: string;
-  readonly lifecycle: "non-zombie" | "zombie";
+  readonly lifecycle: ProcessLifecycle | undefined;
   readonly parentPid: number;
   readonly processGroupId: number;
   readonly sessionId: number;
@@ -58,10 +60,28 @@ export const parseLinuxProcessStat = (
   )
     return undefined;
 
+  // Field 9 is task flags. PF_EXITING can precede state Z and procfs token
+  // access can already fail during that interval. Neither proves terminal exit.
+  const flagsText = fields[6];
+  const flags =
+    flagsText !== undefined && /^\d+$/u.test(flagsText)
+      ? Number(flagsText)
+      : Number.NaN;
+  const lifecycle: ProcessLifecycle | undefined =
+    state === "Z"
+      ? "zombie"
+      : state === "X" || state === "x"
+        ? "dead"
+        : !Number.isSafeInteger(flags)
+          ? undefined
+          : (flags & 0x00000004) !== 0
+            ? "exiting"
+            : "non-zombie";
+
   return {
     pid,
     startTime,
-    lifecycle: state === "Z" ? "zombie" : "non-zombie",
+    lifecycle,
     parentPid,
     processGroupId,
     sessionId,
diff --git a/src/process/ProcessLifecycle.ts b/src/process/ProcessLifecycle.ts
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..9c0d0f52e1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/process/ProcessLifecycle.ts
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+import type { ProcessIdentityObservation } from "./ProcessOwnership.js";
+
+/** Native lifecycle is independent of ownership, token readability and ps text. */
+export type ProcessLifecycle = "non-zombie" | "exiting" | "zombie" | "dead";
+
+export type ProcessLifecycleObservation =
+  | { readonly state: "observed"; readonly lifecycle: ProcessLifecycle }
+  | { readonly state: "unavailable"; readonly reason: string };
+
+export const PROCESS_CLEANUP_VERIFICATION_GRACE_MS = 1_000;
+export const PROCESS_CLEANUP_VERIFICATION_INTERVAL_MS = 25;
+
+export const processIdentityHasExited = (
+  identity: ProcessIdentityObservation | undefined,
+): boolean =>
+  identity?.state === "absent" ||
+  (identity?.state === "readable" &&
+    identity.lifecycle?.state === "observed" &&
+    (identity.lifecycle.lifecycle === "zombie" ||
+      identity.lifecycle.lifecycle === "dead"));
+
+export const processIdentityIsExiting = (
+  identity: ProcessIdentityObservation | undefined,
+): boolean =>
+  identity?.state === "readable" &&
+  identity.lifecycle?.state === "observed" &&
+  identity.lifecycle.lifecycle === "exiting";
diff --git a/src/process/ProcessOwnership.exiting.test.ts b/src/process/ProcessOwnership.exiting.test.ts
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..c6db1232b4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/process/ProcessOwnership.exiting.test.ts
@@ -0,0 +1,179 @@
+import { expect, it, vi } from "vitest";
+import {
+  cleanupOwnedProcessGroup,
+  type ProcessIdentityObservation,
+  type ProcessOwnershipHost,
+  type ProcessTableEntry,
+} from "./ProcessOwnership.js";
+import {
+  readProcessOwnershipFacts,
+  settleExitingProcessIdentities,
+} from "./ProcessOwnershipObservation.js";
+import { processIdentityHasExited } from "./ProcessLifecycle.js";
+
+const row: ProcessTableEntry = {
+  pid: 910,
+  parentPid: 17,
+  processGroupId: 910,
+  state: "R",
+  command: "[MainThread]",
+};
+const identity = (
+  lifecycle: "non-zombie" | "exiting" | "zombie" | "dead",
+  generation = "start:1",
+): ProcessIdentityObservation => ({
+  state: "readable",
+  identity: generation,
+  lifecycle: { state: "observed", lifecycle },
+  relation: {
+    state: "observed",
+    parentPid: row.parentPid,
+    processGroupId: row.processGroupId,
+  },
+});
+const hostWith = (
+  observe: () => ProcessIdentityObservation,
+): ProcessOwnershipHost => ({
+  listProcesses: vi.fn(async () => [row]),
+  environment: async () => ({}),
+  processIdentities: vi.fn(
+    async (rows: readonly ProcessTableEntry[]) =>
+      new Map(rows.map(({ pid }) => [pid, observe()])),
+  ),
+  runTokens: vi.fn(
+    async (rows: readonly ProcessTableEntry[]) =>
+      new Map(
+        rows.map(({ pid }) => [
+          pid,
+          { state: "unavailable" as const, reason: "EACCES" },
+        ]),
+      ),
+  ),
+  signalGroup: vi.fn(),
+});
+
+it.each(["zombie", "dead", "absent"] as const)(
+  "settles exiting token reads only after a fresh native %s observation",
+  async (terminal) => {
+    let reads = 0;
+    const host = hostWith(() =>
+      ++reads < 3
+        ? identity("exiting")
+        : terminal === "absent"
+          ? { state: "absent", reason: "not-in-snapshot" }
+          : identity(terminal),
+    );
+    const facts = await readProcessOwnershipFacts([row], host);
+    expect(processIdentityHasExited(facts[0]?.identityAfter)).toBe(true);
+    expect(facts[0]?.token).toEqual({ state: "unavailable", reason: "EACCES" });
+    expect(host.processIdentities).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(3);
+    expect(host.runTokens).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
+    expect(host.listProcesses).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+    expect(host.signalGroup).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+  },
+);
+
+it("keeps unconfirmed exit explicit at the bounded deadline", async () => {
+  const host = hostWith(() => identity("exiting"));
+  const result = await cleanupOwnedProcessGroup(
+    {
+      runId: "run",
+      leaderPid: row.pid,
+      processGroupId: row.processGroupId,
+      expectedCommand: "/exact/node",
+    },
+    host,
+  );
+  expect(result).toMatchObject({
+    cleaned: false,
+    reason: "owned launcher exit could not be confirmed",
+  });
+  expect(host.signalGroup).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+});
+
+it("settles launcher exit before comparing a stale command display", async () => {
+  let reads = 0;
+  const host = hostWith(() =>
+    ++reads === 1 ? identity("exiting") : identity("zombie"),
+  );
+  await expect(
+    cleanupOwnedProcessGroup(
+      {
+        runId: "run",
+        leaderPid: row.pid,
+        processGroupId: row.processGroupId,
+        expectedCommand: "/exact/node",
+      },
+      host,
+    ),
+  ).resolves.toMatchObject({ cleaned: true, signaled: false });
+  expect(host.signalGroup).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+});
+
+it("stops at PID reuse and preserves the changed generation", async () => {
+  let reads = 0;
+  const host = hostWith(() =>
+    ++reads < 3 ? identity("exiting") : identity("exiting", "start:2"),
+  );
+  const facts = await readProcessOwnershipFacts([row], host);
+  expect(facts[0]).toMatchObject({
+    state: "replaced",
+    identityBefore: { identity: "start:1" },
+    identityAfter: { identity: "start:2" },
+  });
+  expect(host.processIdentities).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(3);
+  expect(host.signalGroup).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+});
+
+it("preserves unknown exit evidence without inferring terminal absence", async () => {
+  const host = hostWith(() => ({
+    state: "unavailable",
+    reason: "native identity denied",
+  }));
+  const result = await settleExitingProcessIdentities(
+    [row],
+    host,
+    new Map([[row.pid, identity("exiting")]]),
+  );
+  expect(result.get(row.pid)).toEqual({
+    state: "unavailable",
+    reason: "native identity denied",
+  });
+  expect(processIdentityHasExited(result.get(row.pid))).toBe(false);
+});
+
+it("refreshes only selected exiting PIDs and preserves other native observations", async () => {
+  const other = { ...row, pid: 911 };
+  const host = hostWith(() => identity("zombie"));
+  const initial = new Map([
+    [row.pid, identity("exiting")],
+    [other.pid, identity("non-zombie")],
+  ]);
+  const result = await settleExitingProcessIdentities(
+    [row, other],
+    host,
+    initial,
+  );
+  expect(host.processIdentities).toHaveBeenCalledExactlyOnceWith(
+    [row],
+    undefined,
+    undefined,
+  );
+  expect(result.get(other.pid)).toBe(initial.get(other.pid));
+  expect(host.listProcesses).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+});
+
+it("preserves caller cancellation during native exit settlement", async () => {
+  const abort = new AbortController();
+  const reason = new Error("caller cancelled exit observation");
+  const host = hostWith(() => identity("exiting"));
+  const pending = settleExitingProcessIdentities(
+    [row],
+    host,
+    new Map([[row.pid, identity("exiting")]]),
+    abort.signal,
+  );
+  abort.abort(reason);
+  await expect(pending).rejects.toBe(reason);
+  expect(host.processIdentities).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+});
diff --git a/src/process/ProcessOwnership.finalSweep.test.ts b/src/process/ProcessOwnership.finalSweep.test.ts
index 6ed2491fc4..2f3d5036a1 100644
--- a/src/process/ProcessOwnership.finalSweep.test.ts
+++ b/src/process/ProcessOwnership.finalSweep.test.ts
@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
 import { afterEach, expect, it, vi } from "vitest";
 import {
   cleanupOwnedProcessGroup,
+  verifyNoTokenOwnedProcesses,
   type ProcessOwnershipHost,
   type ProcessRunTokenObservation,
   type ProcessTableEntry,
@@ -353,3 +354,41 @@ it("retries a moved token-owned helper group without signaling a released peer a
   expect(signalGroups).toEqual([100, 200, 300]);
   expect(owner.evidenceOwner.candidates).toEqual([]);
 });
+
+it("settles transient token reads without borrowing the application timer", async () => {
+  const fixture = makeHost(() => undefined);
+  let reads = 0;
+  const host: ProcessOwnershipHost = {
+    ...fixture.host,
+    runTokens: async (entries) => {
+      reads += 1;
+      return new Map(
+        entries.map(({ pid }) => [
+          pid,
+          reads === 1
+            ? {
+                state: "unavailable" as const,
+                reason: "environment_errno_EACCES",
+              }
+            : { state: "readable" as const, runId: undefined },
+        ]),
+      );
+    },
+  };
+  const applicationTimer = vi
+    .spyOn(globalThis, "setTimeout")
+    .mockImplementation(() => {
+      throw new Error(
+        "application timer must not mediate native ownership retries",
+      );
+    });
+  try {
+    await expect(
+      verifyNoTokenOwnedProcesses("sweep-run", host),
+    ).resolves.toEqual({ cleaned: true, signaled: false });
+    expect(reads).toBe(2);
+    expect(applicationTimer).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+  } finally {
+    applicationTimer.mockRestore();
+  }
+});
diff --git a/src/process/ProcessOwnership.identity.test.ts b/src/process/ProcessOwnership.identity.test.ts
index 5b5c69f988..28d4ce9e4f 100644
--- a/src/process/ProcessOwnership.identity.test.ts
+++ b/src/process/ProcessOwnership.identity.test.ts
@@ -20,6 +20,52 @@ const observedIdentity = (entry: ProcessTableEntry, identity: string) => ({
   },
 });
 
+it.each([undefined, "run-token"])(
+  "validates a current generation with token %s when its baseline identity was unknown",
+  async (runId) => {
+    const row: ProcessTableEntry = {
+      pid: 909,
+      parentPid: 1,
+      processGroupId: 909,
+      state: "S",
+      command: "foreign-process",
+    };
+    const environment = vi.fn(() =>
+      Promise.resolve(runId === undefined ? {} : { REA_PROCESS_RUN_ID: runId }),
+    );
+    const signalGroup = vi.fn();
+    const host: ProcessOwnershipHost = {
+      listProcesses: () => Promise.resolve([row]),
+      environment,
+      processIdentities: (entries) =>
+        Promise.resolve(
+          new Map(
+            entries.map((entry) => [
+              entry.pid,
+              observedIdentity(entry, "current-start"),
+            ]),
+          ),
+        ),
+      signalGroup,
+    };
+
+    await expect(
+      verifyNoTokenOwnedProcesses("run-token", host, [
+        { pid: row.pid, identity: null },
+      ]),
+    ).resolves.toEqual(
+      runId === undefined
+        ? { cleaned: true, signaled: false }
+        : {
+            cleaned: false,
+            reason: "token-owned process remained after cleanup",
+          },
+    );
+    expect(environment).toHaveBeenCalledWith(row.pid);
+    expect(signalGroup).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+  },
+);
+
 describe("Linux process start identities", () => {
   itOnLinux("reads Linux process start identities from proc stat", async () => {
     const host = createSystemProcessOwnershipHost("linux", {});
diff --git a/src/process/ProcessOwnership.ts b/src/process/ProcessOwnership.ts
index a0c45fb571..95a80b22dc 100644
--- a/src/process/ProcessOwnership.ts
+++ b/src/process/ProcessOwnership.ts
@@ -1,12 +1,13 @@
 import { execFile } from "node:child_process";
 import { performance } from "node:perf_hooks";
-import { setTimeout as delay } from "node:timers/promises";
 import { promisify } from "node:util";
+import { setTimeout as delay } from "node:timers/promises";
 
 import {
   errorMessage,
   readNativeProcessIdentityMap,
   readProcessOwnershipFacts,
+  settleExitingProcessIdentities,
   systemProcessOwnershipHost as systemHost,
 } from "./ProcessOwnershipObservation.js";
 import { launcherIdentityFailure } from "./ProcessOwnershipIdentity.js";
@@ -15,10 +16,15 @@ import { readProcessRunTokens } from "./ProcessRunTokenObservations.js";
 import { compareUnicodeCodePoints } from "../domain/unicodeCodePointOrder.js";
 import { ProcessOwnershipEvidenceOwner } from "./ProcessOwnershipEvidence.js";
 
-const execFileAsync = promisify(execFile);
+import {
+  PROCESS_CLEANUP_VERIFICATION_GRACE_MS,
+  PROCESS_CLEANUP_VERIFICATION_INTERVAL_MS,
+  processIdentityHasExited,
+  processIdentityIsExiting,
+  type ProcessLifecycleObservation,
+} from "./ProcessLifecycle.js";
 
-const PROCESS_CLEANUP_VERIFICATION_GRACE_MS = 1_000;
-const PROCESS_CLEANUP_VERIFICATION_INTERVAL_MS = 25;
+const execFileAsync = promisify(execFile);
 
 /** Shared fields for a process group acquired by a resource owner. */
 interface OwnedProcessGroupFacts {
@@ -99,13 +105,7 @@ export type ProcessIdentityObservation =
     }
   | { readonly state: "unavailable"; readonly reason: string };
 
-/** Native lifecycle fact observed alongside (but independent of) start identity. */
-export type ProcessLifecycleObservation =
-  | {
-      readonly state: "observed";
-      readonly lifecycle: "non-zombie" | "zombie";
-    }
-  | { readonly state: "unavailable"; readonly reason: string };
+export type { ProcessLifecycleObservation } from "./ProcessLifecycle.js";
 
 /** Parent and process-group membership from the same native identity read. */
 export type ProcessNativeRelationObservation =
@@ -526,12 +526,7 @@ const readProcessRelationSnapshot = async (
   const failures: ProcessOwnershipValidationFailure[] = [];
   for (const process of processes) {
     const identity = identities.get(process.pid);
-    if (
-      identity?.state === "readable" &&
-      identity.lifecycle?.state === "observed" &&
-      identity.lifecycle.lifecycle === "zombie"
-    )
-      continue;
+    if (processIdentityHasExited(identity)) continue;
     if (
       identity?.state === "readable" &&
       identity.relation?.state === "observed"
@@ -554,8 +549,8 @@ const readProcessRelationSnapshot = async (
 };
 
 // A process-table read can race exit and retain the old state with an altered
-// command. Only a fresh table proving that PID is no longer live can settle
-// that mismatch; surviving group members still require normal token checks.
+// command. Native terminal facts can settle that mismatch; exit-in-progress
+// must be confirmed first. Surviving members still require normal token checks.
 const settleLauncherExit = async (
   ownership: OwnedProcessGroup,
   processes: readonly ProcessTableEntry[],
@@ -568,15 +563,32 @@ const settleLauncherExit = async (
   if (launcher === undefined) return processes;
   let identityCheckedLauncher = launcher;
   if (host.processIdentities !== undefined) {
-    const identities = await readNativeProcessIdentityMap([launcher], host);
+    const initialIdentities = await readNativeProcessIdentityMap(
+      [launcher],
+      host,
+    );
+    const identities = await settleExitingProcessIdentities(
+      [launcher],
+      host,
+      initialIdentities,
+    );
     const identity = identities.get(launcher.pid);
-    if (identity?.state === "absent")
-      return processes.filter(({ pid }) => pid !== launcher.pid);
+    const initialIdentity = initialIdentities.get(launcher.pid);
     if (
+      initialIdentity?.state === "readable" &&
       identity?.state === "readable" &&
-      identity.lifecycle?.state === "observed" &&
-      identity.lifecycle.lifecycle === "zombie"
+      initialIdentity.identity !== identity.identity
     )
+      return {
+        cleaned: false,
+        reason: "owned launcher identity changed while verifying exit",
+      };
+    if (processIdentityIsExiting(identity))
+      return {
+        cleaned: false,
+        reason: "owned launcher exit could not be confirmed",
+      };
+    if (processIdentityHasExited(identity))
       return processes.filter(({ pid }) => pid !== launcher.pid);
     if (
       identity?.state !== "readable" ||
@@ -965,14 +977,6 @@ const sanitizedTokenReadFailure = (diagnostic: string | undefined): string => {
   return "other_unavailable";
 };
 
-const processIdentityHasExited = (
-  identity: ProcessIdentityObservation,
-): boolean =>
-  identity.state === "absent" ||
-  (identity.state === "readable" &&
-    identity.lifecycle?.state === "observed" &&
-    identity.lifecycle.lifecycle === "zombie");
-
 const processOwnershipFailures = async (
   members: readonly ProcessTableEntry[],
   runId: string,
@@ -984,6 +988,15 @@ const processOwnershipFailures = async (
     const failures: ProcessOwnershipValidationFailure[] = [];
     for (const fact of facts) {
       if (processIdentityHasExited(fact.identityAfter)) continue;
+      if (processIdentityIsExiting(fact.identityAfter)) {
+        failures.push({
+          pid: fact.process.pid,
+          reason: "process-identity-unavailable",
+          diagnostic:
+            "native process exit could not be confirmed before signal",
+        });
+        continue;
+      }
       const relation =
         fact.identityAfter.state === "readable" &&
         fact.identityAfter.relation?.state === "observed"
@@ -1289,24 +1302,14 @@ const scanWithOwnershipEvidence = async (
     observationRows,
     host,
   );
-  const baselineIdentityFailures = new Map<
-    number,
-    ProcessOwnershipValidationFailure
-  >();
   const candidates = observationRows.filter((process) => {
     if (retainedPids.has(process.pid)) return true;
     if (!baseline.has(process.pid)) return true;
     const before = baseline.get(process.pid);
     const now = firstIdentities.get(process.pid);
     if (before === null || now?.state !== "readable") {
-      baselineIdentityFailures.set(process.pid, {
-        pid: process.pid,
-        reason: "process-identity-unavailable",
-        diagnostic: "process identity was unavailable during token validation",
-      });
-      // Keep the row in the owning fact pass. The failure is not evidence that
-      // the process is absent, and a related unknown generation must survive
-      // a later process-table omission.
+      // The baseline selects candidates; current native facts and retained
+      // ownership evidence decide identity, liveness and applicability.
       return true;
     }
     return now.identity !== before;
@@ -1328,7 +1331,8 @@ const scanWithOwnershipEvidence = async (
       .filter(
         ({ token, identityAfter }) =>
           token.state === "unavailable" &&
-          !processIdentityHasExited(identityAfter),
+          !processIdentityHasExited(identityAfter) &&
+          !processIdentityIsExiting(identityAfter),
       )
       .map(({ process }) => process);
     if (retryRows.length === 0) break;
@@ -1365,8 +1369,6 @@ const scanWithOwnershipEvidence = async (
     // token became unreadable while exiting. Unknown native state stays a
     // cleanup failure; table omission alone is never proof of exit.
     if (processIdentityHasExited(fact.identityAfter)) continue;
-    const baselineFailure = baselineIdentityFailures.get(fact.process.pid);
-    if (baselineFailure !== undefined) failures.push(baselineFailure);
     if (fact.state === "replaced")
       failures.push({
         pid: fact.process.pid,
diff --git a/src/process/ProcessOwnershipEvidence.ts b/src/process/ProcessOwnershipEvidence.ts
index 7f35d93a02..fd93b78042 100644
--- a/src/process/ProcessOwnershipEvidence.ts
+++ b/src/process/ProcessOwnershipEvidence.ts
@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
+import { processIdentityHasExited } from "./ProcessLifecycle.js";
 import type {
   ProcessIdentityObservation,
   ProcessNativeRelationObservation,
@@ -208,9 +209,7 @@ export class ProcessOwnershipEvidenceOwner {
           fact.identityAfter.state === "readable" &&
           fact.identityAfter.identity !== previous.identity) ||
         (fact.state === "same-generation" &&
-          fact.identityAfter.state === "readable" &&
-          fact.identityAfter.lifecycle?.state === "observed" &&
-          fact.identityAfter.lifecycle.lifecycle === "zombie")
+          processIdentityHasExited(fact.identityAfter))
       ) {
         this.#candidates.delete(pid);
         retiredPids.add(pid);
@@ -274,9 +273,7 @@ export class ProcessOwnershipEvidenceOwner {
         (retiredPids.has(pid) && fact.state !== "same-generation") ||
         fact.state === "absent" ||
         (fact.state === "same-generation" &&
-          fact.identityAfter.state === "readable" &&
-          fact.identityAfter.lifecycle?.state === "observed" &&
-          fact.identityAfter.lifecycle.lifecycle === "zombie")
+          processIdentityHasExited(fact.identityAfter))
       )
         continue;
       const identity = fact.identityAfter;
diff --git a/src/process/ProcessOwnershipObservation.ts b/src/process/ProcessOwnershipObservation.ts
index 01439da94f..ec1ae9ddb6 100644
--- a/src/process/ProcessOwnershipObservation.ts
+++ b/src/process/ProcessOwnershipObservation.ts
@@ -1,4 +1,12 @@
 import { readFile } from "node:fs/promises";
+import { performance } from "node:perf_hooks";
+import { setTimeout as delay } from "node:timers/promises";
+import {
+  processIdentityHasExited,
+  processIdentityIsExiting,
+  PROCESS_CLEANUP_VERIFICATION_GRACE_MS,
+  PROCESS_CLEANUP_VERIFICATION_INTERVAL_MS,
+} from "./ProcessLifecycle.js";
 import { parseLinuxProcessStat } from "./LinuxProcessStat.js";
 import { parseLinuxProcessEffectiveUid } from "./LinuxProcessStatus.js";
 import { AnalysisCapabilityUnavailableError } from "../domain/analysisErrorCore.js";
@@ -63,11 +71,7 @@ export const observeOwnedProcessGroups = async (
       if (retainedPids.has(process.pid)) return true;
       const identity = firstIdentities.get(process.pid);
       if (identity?.state === "readable") {
-        if (
-          identity.lifecycle?.state === "observed" &&
-          identity.lifecycle.lifecycle === "zombie"
-        )
-          return false;
+        if (processIdentityHasExited(identity)) return false;
         if (
           identity.relation?.state === "observed" &&
           groupIds.includes(identity.relation.processGroupId)
@@ -116,12 +120,7 @@ export const observeOwnedProcessGroups = async (
         fact.identityAfter.relation?.state === "observed"
           ? fact.identityAfter.relation.processGroupId
           : undefined;
-      if (
-        fact.identityAfter.state === "readable" &&
-        fact.identityAfter.lifecycle?.state === "observed" &&
-        fact.identityAfter.lifecycle.lifecycle === "zombie"
-      )
-        continue;
+      if (processIdentityHasExited(fact.identityAfter)) continue;
       const candidateGroups = groupIds.filter(
         (groupId) =>
           nativeGroupId === groupId ||
@@ -301,10 +300,7 @@ const observeNativeOwnedProcessLineage = async (
       ownership,
       `owned launcher identity could not be read: ${launcherIdentity?.reason ?? "identity observation was omitted"}`,
     );
-  if (
-    launcherIdentity.lifecycle?.state === "observed" &&
-    launcherIdentity.lifecycle.lifecycle === "zombie"
-  )
+  if (processIdentityHasExited(launcherIdentity))
     return unavailableLineage(ownership, "owned launcher is not live");
   const nativeLauncher = processWithNativeRelation(launcher, launcherIdentity);
   if (nativeLauncher === undefined)
@@ -318,12 +314,7 @@ const observeNativeOwnedProcessLineage = async (
 
   const nativeProcesses = processes.flatMap((process) => {
     const identity = initialIdentities.get(process.pid);
-    if (
-      identity?.state === "readable" &&
-      identity.lifecycle?.state === "observed" &&
-      identity.lifecycle.lifecycle === "zombie"
-    )
-      return [];
+    if (processIdentityHasExited(identity)) return [];
     const nativeProcess =
       identity?.state === "readable"
         ? processWithNativeRelation(process, identity)
@@ -371,11 +362,7 @@ const observeNativeOwnedProcessLineage = async (
         ownership,
         `process identity changed or became unavailable during lineage validation for PID ${String(member.pid)}`,
       );
-    if (
-      fact.identityAfter.state === "readable" &&
-      fact.identityAfter.lifecycle?.state === "observed" &&
-      fact.identityAfter.lifecycle.lifecycle === "zombie"
-    ) {
+    if (processIdentityHasExited(fact.identityAfter)) {
       if (member.pid === ownership.leaderPid)
         return unavailableLineage(
           ownership,
@@ -542,6 +529,55 @@ export const readNativeProcessIdentityMap = async (
 ): Promise<ReadonlyMap<number, ProcessIdentityObservation>> =>
   readIdentityFacts(processes, host, "before", signal);
 
+/**
+ * Wait only for positively observed native exit-in-progress. Never infer exit
+ * from EACCES or ps text, enumerate the process table, or follow a reused PID.
+ * A deadline, unavailable read or changed generation remains explicit evidence.
+ */
+export const settleExitingProcessIdentities = async (
+  processes: readonly ProcessTableEntry[],
+  host: ProcessOwnershipHost,
+  initial: ReadonlyMap<number, ProcessIdentityObservation>,
+  signal?: AbortSignal,
+): Promise<ReadonlyMap<number, ProcessIdentityObservation>> => {
+  signal?.throwIfAborted();
+  let pending = processes.filter(({ pid }) =>
+    processIdentityIsExiting(initial.get(pid)),
+  );
+  if (pending.length === 0) return initial;
+  const identities = new Map(initial);
+  const deadline = performance.now() + PROCESS_CLEANUP_VERIFICATION_GRACE_MS;
+  while (pending.length > 0) {
+    const remaining = deadline - performance.now();
+    if (remaining <= 0) break;
+    try {
+      await delay(
+        Math.min(PROCESS_CLEANUP_VERIFICATION_INTERVAL_MS, remaining),
+        undefined,
+        signal === undefined ? undefined : { signal },
+      );
+    } catch (cause: unknown) {
+      signal?.throwIfAborted();
+      throw cause;
+    }
+    const refreshed = await readNativeProcessIdentityMap(pending, host, signal);
+    for (const { pid } of pending)
+      identities.set(pid, identityFact(refreshed, pid, "after"));
+    pending = pending.filter(({ pid }) => {
+      const first = initial.get(pid);
+      const current = identities.get(pid);
+      return (
+        first?.state === "readable" &&
+        current?.state === "readable" &&
+        processIdentityIsExiting(current) &&
+        current.identity === first.identity
+      );
+    });
+  }
+  signal?.throwIfAborted();
+  return identities;
+};
+
 /**
  * Read identity, token, then identity for caller-provided rows. This owner
  * never enumerates the process table; a token is tied to a generation only
@@ -591,12 +627,11 @@ export const readProcessOwnershipFacts = async (
       .filter(({ pid }) => tokens.get(pid)?.state !== "readable")
       .map(({ pid }) => pid),
   );
-  const identityAfter = await readIdentityFacts(
+  const identityAfter = await settleExitingProcessIdentities(
     processes,
     host,
-    "after",
+    await readIdentityFacts(processes, host, "after", signal, effectiveUidPids),
     signal,
-    effectiveUidPids,
   );
   signal?.throwIfAborted();
   const facts = processes.map((process): ProcessOwnershipFact => {
@@ -741,10 +776,16 @@ export const createSystemProcessOwnershipHost = (
                 state: "readable" as const,
                 identity: `linux-starttime:${facts.startTime}`,
                 ...(effectiveUid === undefined ? {} : { effectiveUid }),
-                lifecycle: {
-                  state: "observed" as const,
-                  lifecycle: facts.lifecycle,
-                },
+                lifecycle:
+                  facts.lifecycle === undefined
+                    ? {
+                        state: "unavailable" as const,
+                        reason: "malformed_proc_flags",
+                      }
+                    : {
+                        state: "observed" as const,
+                        lifecycle: facts.lifecycle,
+                      },
                 relation: {
                   state: "observed" as const,
                   parentPid: facts.parentPid,
diff --git a/tests/boundary/filesystem/recordedCrashTraceClassifier.test.ts b/tests/boundary/filesystem/recordedCrashTraceClassifier.test.ts
index f03fbd5ba1..4a4e72b958 100644
--- a/tests/boundary/filesystem/recordedCrashTraceClassifier.test.ts
+++ b/tests/boundary/filesystem/recordedCrashTraceClassifier.test.ts
@@ -1,23 +1,43 @@
 import { expect, it } from "vitest";
 
-import { assertHistoricalPidReadsAreOwnershipOnly } from "../../../scripts/verify/recorded-crash/trace-ownership.mjs";
+import { collectOwnershipTraceFacts } from "../../../scripts/verify/recorded-crash/trace-ownership.mjs";
+import { assertHistoricalPidAccess } from "../../../scripts/verify/recorded-crash/trace-policy.mjs";
 
+const node = "/fixture/node";
+const nodeExec = 'execve("/fixture/node", ["node", "rea.mjs"], 0x7fff) = 0';
 const psExec =
   'execve("/usr/bin/ps", ["ps", "-axo", "pid=,ppid=,pgid=,uid=,stat=,command="], 0x7fff) = 0';
+const parent = (...events: readonly string[]) => ({
+  pid: 1200,
+  text: [nodeExec, ...events].join("\n"),
+});
+const check = (
+  traces: readonly { readonly pid: number; readonly text: string }[],
+) => {
+  const facts = collectOwnershipTraceFacts({
+    traces,
+    nodeExecutable: node,
+    psExecutables: new Set(["/usr/bin/ps"]),
+  });
+  return traces.flatMap((trace) =>
+    assertHistoricalPidAccess({
+      trace,
+      historicalPid: 4008,
+      ownershipThreads: facts.ownershipThreads,
+      liveCollision: true,
+      psInventory: facts.psProcesses.has(trace.pid),
+    }),
+  );
+};
 
 it("correlates the ps child trace with its parent identity read", () => {
-  const ownershipReads = assertHistoricalPidReadsAreOwnershipOnly({
-    sentinelPid: 4008,
-    psExecutables: new Set(["/usr/bin/ps"]),
-    traces: [
-      {
-        pid: 1200,
-        text: [
-          "vfork() = 1201",
-          "clone3({flags=CLONE_VM|CLONE_SIGHAND|CLONE_THREAD}, 88) = 1202",
-          'openat(AT_FDCWD, "/proc/4008/stat", O_RDONLY|O_CLOEXEC) = 21',
-        ].join("\n"),
-      },
+  expect(
+    check([
+      parent(
+        "vfork() = 1201",
+        "clone3({flags=CLONE_VM|CLONE_SIGHAND|CLONE_THREAD}, 88) = 1202",
+        'openat(AT_FDCWD, "/proc/4008/stat", O_RDONLY|O_CLOEXEC) = 21',
+      ),
       {
         pid: 1202,
         text: [
@@ -33,55 +53,34 @@ it("correlates the ps child trace with its parent identity read", () => {
           'openat(AT_FDCWD, "/proc/4008/cmdline", O_RDONLY) = 4',
         ].join("\n"),
       },
-    ],
-  });
-
-  expect(ownershipReads).toHaveLength(5);
+    ]),
+  ).toHaveLength(5);
 });
 
 it("joins unfinished and resumed CLONE_THREAD records", () => {
-  const ownershipReads = assertHistoricalPidReadsAreOwnershipOnly({
-    sentinelPid: 4008,
-    psExecutables: new Set(["/usr/bin/ps"]),
-    traces: [
-      {
-        pid: 1200,
-        text: [
-          "vfork() = 1201",
-          "clone3({flags=CLONE_VM|CLONE_SIGHAND|CLONE_THREAD, child_tid=0x3 <unfinished ...>",
-          "<... clone3 resumed>) = 1202",
-        ].join("\n"),
-      },
-      {
-        pid: 1202,
-        text: 'openat(AT_FDCWD, "/proc/4008/stat", O_RDONLY) = 3',
-      },
+  expect(
+    check([
+      parent(
+        "vfork() = 1201",
+        "clone3({flags=CLONE_VM|CLONE_SIGHAND|CLONE_THREAD, child_tid=0x3 <unfinished ...>",
+        "<... clone3 resumed>) = 1202",
+      ),
+      { pid: 1202, text: 'openat(AT_FDCWD, "/proc/4008/stat", O_RDONLY) = 3' },
       { pid: 1201, text: psExec },
-    ],
-  });
-
-  expect(ownershipReads).toHaveLength(1);
+    ]),
+  ).toHaveLength(1);
 });
 
-it("rejects provider-style reads outside the ps child and stat-only caller", () => {
-  const traces = [
-    {
-      pid: 1200,
-      text: [
+it("rejects provider-style reads outside the ps child and identity-only caller", () => {
+  expect(() =>
+    check([
+      parent(
         "vfork() = 1201",
         'openat(AT_FDCWD, "/proc/4008/cmdline", O_RDONLY) = 21',
-      ].join("\n"),
-    },
-    { pid: 1201, text: psExec },
-  ];
-
-  expect(() =>
-    assertHistoricalPidReadsAreOwnershipOnly({
-      traces,
-      sentinelPid: 4008,
-      psExecutables: new Set(["/usr/bin/ps"]),
-    }),
-  ).toThrow("Historical PID caused a provider lookup");
+      ),
+      { pid: 1201, text: psExec },
+    ]),
+  ).toThrow("non-inventory lookup");
 });
 
 it("does not trust a ps command with different arguments or failed exec", () => {
@@ -90,55 +89,83 @@ it("does not trust a ps command with different arguments or failed exec", () =>
     psExec.replace(" = 0", " = -1 EACCES"),
   ])
     expect(() =>
-      assertHistoricalPidReadsAreOwnershipOnly({
-        sentinelPid: 4008,
-        psExecutables: new Set(["/usr/bin/ps"]),
-        traces: [
-          {
-            pid: 1200,
-            text: `vfork() = 1201\nopenat(AT_FDCWD, "/proc/4008/stat", O_RDONLY) = 3`,
-          },
-          { pid: 1201, text },
-        ],
-      }),
-    ).toThrow("Historical PID caused a provider lookup");
+      check([
+        parent(
+          "vfork() = 1201",
+          'openat(AT_FDCWD, "/proc/4008/stat", O_RDONLY) = 3',
+        ),
+        { pid: 1201, text },
+      ]),
+    ).toThrow("non-inventory lookup");
 });
 
 it("allows only known procfs fields inside the exact ps child", () => {
   expect(() =>
-    assertHistoricalPidReadsAreOwnershipOnly({
-      sentinelPid: 4008,
-      psExecutables: new Set(["/usr/bin/ps"]),
-      traces: [
-        { pid: 1200, text: "vfork() = 1201" },
-        {
-          pid: 1201,
-          text: `${psExec}\nopenat(AT_FDCWD, "/proc/4008/exe", O_RDONLY) = 3`,
-        },
-      ],
-    }),
-  ).toThrow("Historical PID caused a provider lookup");
+    check([
+      parent("vfork() = 1201"),
+      {
+        pid: 1201,
+        text: `${psExec}\nopenat(AT_FDCWD, "/proc/4008/exe", O_RDONLY) = 3`,
+      },
+    ]),
+  ).toThrow("non-inventory lookup");
 });
 
 it("does not grant the ownership process thread permit to a forked child", () => {
   for (const field of ["stat", "status"])
     expect(() =>
-      assertHistoricalPidReadsAreOwnershipOnly({
-        sentinelPid: 4008,
-        psExecutables: new Set(["/usr/bin/ps"]),
-        traces: [
-          {
-            pid: 1200,
-            text: ["vfork() = 1201", "clone3({flags=SIGCHLD}, 88) = 1203"].join(
-              "\n",
-            ),
-          },
-          { pid: 1201, text: psExec },
-          {
-            pid: 1203,
-            text: `openat(AT_FDCWD, "/proc/4008/${field}", O_RDONLY) = 3`,
-          },
-        ],
-      }),
-    ).toThrow("Historical PID caused a provider lookup");
+      check([
+        parent("vfork() = 1201", "clone3({flags=SIGCHLD}, 88) = 1203"),
+        { pid: 1201, text: psExec },
+        {
+          pid: 1203,
+          text: `openat(AT_FDCWD, "/proc/4008/${field}", O_RDONLY) = 3`,
+        },
+      ]),
+    ).toThrow("non-inventory lookup");
+});
+
+it("requires an observed Node execution as well as the inventory ps child", () => {
+  expect(() =>
+    check([
+      {
+        pid: 1200,
+        text: 'vfork() = 1201\nopenat(AT_FDCWD, "/proc/4008/stat", O_RDONLY) = 3',
+      },
+      { pid: 1201, text: psExec },
+    ]),
+  ).toThrow("non-inventory lookup");
+});
+
+it("refuses identity reads in an exec-replaced ownership thread", () => {
+  expect(() =>
+    check([
+      parent(
+        "vfork() = 1201",
+        "clone3({flags=CLONE_VM|CLONE_THREAD}, 88) = 1202",
+      ),
+      { pid: 1201, text: psExec },
+      {
+        pid: 1202,
+        text: 'execve("/fixture/gdb", ["gdb"], 0x7fff) = 0\nopenat(AT_FDCWD, "/proc/4008/stat", O_RDONLY) = 3',
+      },
+    ]),
+  ).toThrow("non-inventory lookup");
+});
+
+it("does not join unrelated groups through child-side clone returns", () => {
+  expect(() =>
+    check([
+      parent("vfork() = 1201", "clone3({flags=CLONE_VM|CLONE_THREAD}, 88) = 0"),
+      { pid: 1201, text: psExec },
+      {
+        pid: 1300,
+        text: [
+          nodeExec,
+          "clone3({flags=CLONE_VM|CLONE_THREAD}, 88) = 0",
+          'openat(AT_FDCWD, "/proc/4008/stat", O_RDONLY) = 3',
+        ].join("\n"),
+      },
+    ]),
+  ).toThrow("non-inventory lookup");
 });
diff --git a/tests/boundary/process/jadxIntegration.test.ts b/tests/boundary/process/jadxIntegration.test.ts
index e620fb13c8..3e452f8679 100644
--- a/tests/boundary/process/jadxIntegration.test.ts
+++ b/tests/boundary/process/jadxIntegration.test.ts
@@ -917,9 +917,21 @@ it("retains typed memory failure through failed cleanup and restores it after re
     "heap-failure",
     () => fails,
   );
+  const originalRootClose = PrivateRuntimeRoot.prototype.close;
+  const workspaceCloseCause = new Error("fixture workspace close failure");
+  let workspaceCloseFails = true;
+  let workspaceCloseAttempts = 0;
   const rootClose = vi
     .spyOn(PrivateRuntimeRoot.prototype, "close")
-    .mockRejectedValueOnce(new Error("fixture workspace close failure"));
+    .mockImplementation(function (this: PrivateRuntimeRoot) {
+      // Independent native helpers own their own roots. Keep the acquired
+      // Android workspace's failure active until the test explicitly clears it.
+      if (this.path === launches[0]?.cwd) {
+        workspaceCloseAttempts += 1;
+        if (workspaceCloseFails) return Promise.reject(workspaceCloseCause);
+      }
+      return originalRootClose.call(this);
+    });
   try {
     const result = await service.execute("inspect_android_package", {
       path: apk,
@@ -935,11 +947,14 @@ it("retains typed memory failure through failed cleanup and restores it after re
     });
     const workspace = launches[0]?.cwd;
     expect(failure.cleanupResources).toContain(workspace);
+    expect(workspaceCloseAttempts).toBe(0);
     fails = false;
     await expect(provider.close()).rejects.toMatchObject({
       cleanupIncomplete: true,
     });
     expect(failure.cleanupResources).toEqual([workspace]);
+    expect(workspaceCloseAttempts).toBeGreaterThan(0);
+    workspaceCloseFails = false;
     await provider.close();
     expect(failure.cleanupIncomplete).toBe(false);
     expect(failure.cleanupResources).toEqual([]);
@@ -955,6 +970,7 @@ it("retains typed memory failure through failed cleanup and restores it after re
     await verifyCleanup(launches);
   } finally {
     rootClose.mockRestore();
+    workspaceCloseFails = false;
     fails = false;
     await provider.close();
   }
diff --git a/tests/boundary/process/processBaselineAbsence.test.ts b/tests/boundary/process/processBaselineAbsence.test.ts
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..31ffe38160
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/boundary/process/processBaselineAbsence.test.ts
@@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
+import { randomUUID } from "node:crypto";
+
+import { expect, it } from "vitest";
+
+import { verifyNoTokenOwnedProcesses } from "../../../src/process/ProcessOwnership.js";
+import { createSystemProcessOwnershipHost } from "../../../src/process/ProcessOwnershipObservation.js";
+import {
+  spawnProviderProcessFixture,
+  stopProviderProcessFixture,
+  waitForProviderProcessReady,
+} from "../../fixtures/providerProcess.js";
+
+it.skipIf(process.platform !== "linux")(
+  "accepts native absence after a baseline process exits between table and identity reads",
+  async () => {
+    const child = spawnProviderProcessFixture("graceful");
+    const native = createSystemProcessOwnershipHost("linux", process.env);
+    try {
+      await waitForProviderProcessReady(child);
+      const baseline = await native.captureBaseline?.();
+      expect(baseline).toContainEqual({
+        pid: child.pid,
+        identity: expect.stringMatching(/^linux-starttime:\d+$/u),
+      });
+      const rows = (await native.listProcesses()).filter(
+        ({ pid }) => pid === child.pid,
+      );
+      expect(rows).toHaveLength(1);
+
+      await expect(
+        verifyNoTokenOwnedProcesses(
+          randomUUID(),
+          {
+            ...native,
+            listProcesses: async () => {
+              // Keep one real candidate row, then force the enumeration race
+              // before the unmodified native identity/token observer runs.
+              await stopProviderProcessFixture(child);
+              return rows;
+            },
+          },
+          baseline,
+        ),
+      ).resolves.toEqual({ cleaned: true, signaled: false });
+    } finally {
+      await stopProviderProcessFixture(child);
+      await native.close?.();
+    }
+  },
+);
diff --git a/tests/boundary/process/recordedCrashTracePolicy.test.ts b/tests/boundary/process/recordedCrashTracePolicy.test.ts
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..69db11fc48
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/boundary/process/recordedCrashTracePolicy.test.ts
@@ -0,0 +1,236 @@
+import { expect, it } from "vitest";
+import { assertHistoricalPidAccess } from "../../../scripts/verify/recorded-crash/trace-policy.mjs";
+
+const stat = 'openat(AT_FDCWD, "/proc/900/stat", O_RDONLY|O_CLOEXEC) = 22';
+
+const check = (pid: number, text: string, liveCollision = true) =>
+  assertHistoricalPidAccess({
+    trace: { pid, text },
+    historicalPid: 900,
+    ownershipThreads: new Set([100, 101]),
+    liveCollision,
+    psInventory: false,
+  });
+
+it("allows stat reads only in the supplied ownership thread set", () => {
+  expect(check(100, stat)).toEqual([stat]);
+  expect(check(101, stat)).toEqual([stat]);
+  expect(() => check(102, stat)).toThrow("non-inventory lookup");
+});
+
+it("permits the native descriptor metadata query used by Node's readFile", () => {
+  const metadata =
+    'statx(20</proc/900/stat>, "", AT_STATX_SYNC_AS_STAT|AT_EMPTY_PATH, STATX_ALL, {}) = 0';
+  expect(check(101, metadata)).toEqual([metadata]);
+  expect(() => check(101, metadata, false)).toThrow("non-inventory lookup");
+  expect(() => check(101, metadata.replace("/stat>", "/mem>"))).toThrow(
+    "non-inventory lookup",
+  );
+});
+
+it("permits procps UID metadata without granting a PID directory handle", () => {
+  const metadata =
+    'newfstatat(AT_FDCWD</tmp>, "/proc/900", {st_mode=S_IFDIR|0555}, 0) = 0';
+  const input = {
+    trace: { pid: 102, text: metadata },
+    historicalPid: 900,
+    ownershipThreads: new Set<number>(),
+    liveCollision: true,
+    psInventory: true,
+  };
+  expect(assertHistoricalPidAccess(input)).toEqual([metadata]);
+  expect(() =>
+    assertHistoricalPidAccess({ ...input, liveCollision: false }),
+  ).toThrow("non-inventory lookup");
+  expect(() =>
+    assertHistoricalPidAccess({ ...input, psInventory: false }),
+  ).toThrow("non-inventory lookup");
+  expect(() =>
+    assertHistoricalPidAccess({
+      ...input,
+      trace: {
+        pid: 102,
+        text: 'openat(AT_FDCWD, "/proc/900", O_RDONLY|O_DIRECTORY) = 5</proc/900>',
+      },
+    }),
+  ).toThrow("non-inventory lookup");
+});
+
+it.each(["mem", "maps", "environ", "exe", "root"])(
+  "rejects Node access to the live historical PID's %s",
+  (name) => {
+    expect(() => check(101, stat.replace("/stat", `/${name}`))).toThrow(
+      "non-inventory lookup",
+    );
+  },
+);
+
+it("rejects an unlisted historical PID lookup even from an observed inventory thread", () => {
+  expect(() => check(101, stat, false)).toThrow("non-inventory lookup");
+});
+
+it.each([
+  'openat(AT_FDCWD, "/proc/900", O_RDONLY|O_DIRECTORY|O_CLOEXEC) = 5</proc/900>',
+  'openat(5</proc/900>, "mem", O_RDONLY|O_CLOEXEC) = 6</proc/900/mem>',
+  'openat(5</proc/900>, "stat", O_RDONLY|O_CLOEXEC) = -1 EACCES (Permission denied)',
+  'openat(5</proc>, "900/mem", O_RDONLY) = -1 ENOENT (No such file or directory)',
+  'openat(5</proc>, "self/../900/mem", O_RDONLY) = -1 ENOENT (No such file or directory)',
+  'openat(AT_FDCWD, "/proc/./900", O_RDONLY|O_DIRECTORY) = -1 ENOENT (No such file or directory)',
+  'openat(AT_FDCWD, "/proc/self/../900/mem", O_RDONLY) = -1 ENOENT (No such file or directory)',
+  "kill(900, 0) = 0",
+  "kill(-900, SIGSTOP) = 0",
+  "kill(-1, SIGSTOP) = 0",
+  "tkill(900, SIGSTOP) = 0",
+  "tgkill(900, 901, SIGSTOP) = 0",
+  "tgkill(901, 900, SIGSTOP) = 0",
+  "rt_sigqueueinfo(900, SIGUSR1, {}) = 0",
+  "rt_tgsigqueueinfo(901, 900, SIGUSR1, {}) = 0",
+  "pidfd_open(900, 0) = 7<pid:900>",
+  "pidfd_send_signal(7<pid:900>, SIGSTOP, NULL, 0) = 0",
+  "pidfd_send_signal(7, SIGSTOP, NULL, 0) = 0",
+])("rejects historical PID directory/handle/control access: %s", (line) => {
+  for (const live of [true, false])
+    expect(() => check(101, line, live)).toThrow("non-inventory lookup");
+});
+
+it("keeps descriptor reuse and distinct PIDs separate and refuses ps writes", () => {
+  expect(check(101, 'openat(5</tmp>, "mem", O_RDONLY) = 6</tmp/mem>')).toEqual(
+    [],
+  );
+  expect(check(101, stat.replaceAll("900", "9000"))).toEqual([]);
+  expect(() =>
+    assertHistoricalPidAccess({
+      trace: { pid: 102, text: stat.replace("O_RDONLY", "O_WRONLY") },
+      historicalPid: 900,
+      ownershipThreads: new Set(),
+      liveCollision: true,
+      psInventory: true,
+    }),
+  ).toThrow("non-inventory lookup");
+});
+
+it.each([
+  'readlinkat(5</proc>, "900/exe", 0x1, 4096) = -1 EACCES (Permission denied)',
+  'newfstatat(5</proc>, "900/mem", 0x1, 0) = -1 EACCES (Permission denied)',
+  'statx(5</proc>, "900/mem", 0, STATX_ALL, 0x1) = -1 EACCES (Permission denied)',
+  'openat(5</tmp>, "../proc/900/mem", O_RDONLY) = -1 EACCES (Permission denied)',
+])("checks failed relative pathname operations beyond openat: %s", (line) => {
+  for (const live of [true, false])
+    expect(() => check(101, line, live)).toThrow("non-inventory lookup");
+});
+
+it.each([
+  "getpriority(PRIO_PROCESS, 900) = 20",
+  "setpriority(PRIO_PROCESS, 900, 0) = 0",
+  "getpriority(PRIO_PGRP, 900) = 20",
+  "setpriority(PRIO_PGRP, 900, 0) = 0",
+  "getpriority(0x3 /* unknown PRIO selector */, 900) = -1 EINVAL (Invalid argument)",
+])("rejects historical PID priority access: %s", (line) => {
+  for (const live of [true, false])
+    expect(() => check(101, line, live)).toThrow("non-inventory lookup");
+});
+
+it("keeps native priority UID selectors and distinct PIDs separate", () => {
+  expect(check(101, "getpriority(PRIO_USER, 900) = 20")).toEqual([]);
+  expect(check(101, "getpriority(PRIO_PROCESS, 9000) = 20")).toEqual([]);
+});
+
+it.each([
+  String.raw`openat(AT_FDCWD</fixture>, "/fixture/\345\267\245\345\205\267", O_RDONLY) = -1 ENOENT (No such file or directory)`,
+  String.raw`openat(5</fixture>, "\345\267\245\345\205\267", O_RDONLY) = -1 ENOENT (No such file or directory)`,
+])("preserves unrelated C-quoted pathname components: %s", (line) => {
+  expect(check(101, line)).toEqual([]);
+});
+
+it.each([
+  "getpgid(900) = 900",
+  "getsid(900) = 900",
+  "get_robust_list(900, [0x1], [24]) = 0",
+  "migrate_pages(900, 64, [1], [1]) = 0",
+  "move_pages(900, 0, NULL, NULL, NULL, 0) = 0",
+  "setpgid(0, 900) = 0",
+  "kcmp(901, 900, KCMP_FILE, 0, 0) = 0",
+  "wait4(900, NULL, WNOHANG, NULL) = -1 ECHILD (No child processes)",
+  "wait4(-900, NULL, WNOHANG, NULL) = -1 ECHILD (No child processes)",
+  "waitid(P_PID, 900, NULL, WNOHANG, NULL) = -1 ECHILD (No child processes)",
+  "waitid(P_PGID, 900, NULL, WNOHANG, NULL) = -1 ECHILD (No child processes)",
+  "waitid(P_PIDFD, 7<pid:900>, NULL, WNOHANG, NULL) = -1 ECHILD (No child processes)",
+  "capget({version=_LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION_3, pid=900}, NULL) = 0",
+  "capset({version=_LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION_3, pid=900}, NULL) = 0",
+  "process_madvise(7<pid:900>, [], 0, MADV_NORMAL, 0) = -1 EPERM (Operation not permitted)",
+  "process_mrelease(7<pid:900>, 0) = -1 EPERM (Operation not permitted)",
+])(
+  "rejects resolved PID resource, scheduler and metadata targets: %s",
+  (line) => {
+    for (const live of [true, false])
+      expect(() => check(101, line, live)).toThrow("non-inventory lookup");
+  },
+);
+
+it.each([
+  "prlimit64(0, RLIMIT_NOFILE, NULL, {rlim_cur=1024, rlim_max=4096}) = 0",
+  "sched_getaffinity(0, 8, [0]) = 8",
+  "sched_setscheduler(901, 900, {sched_priority=0}) = -1 EINVAL (Invalid argument)",
+  "sched_get_priority_max(900) = -1 EINVAL (Invalid argument)",
+  "getpgid(901) = 900",
+  "wait4(-1, NULL, WNOHANG, NULL) = 0",
+  "waitid(P_ALL, 900, NULL, WNOHANG, NULL) = 0",
+  "capget({version=_LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION_3, pid=0}, NULL) = 0",
+  "kcmp(901, 902, KCMP_FILE, 900, 0) = 0",
+])(
+  "keeps self, UID, policy and output values distinct from PID targets: %s",
+  (line) => {
+    expect(check(101, line)).toEqual([]);
+  },
+);
+
+it.each([
+  "sched_getaffinity(unknown, 8, [0]) = -1 EFAULT (Bad address)",
+  "capget(NULL, NULL) = -1 EFAULT (Bad address)",
+  "waitid(P_PIDFD, 7, NULL, WNOHANG, NULL) = -1 EBADF (Bad file descriptor)",
+  "ioprio_get(0x4 /* unknown selector */, 900) = -1 EINVAL (Invalid argument)",
+])("retains unresolved target facts: %s", (line) => {
+  for (const live of [true, false])
+    expect(() => check(101, line, live)).toThrow("Unresolved process target");
+});
+
+it.each([
+  "prlimit64(900, RLIMIT_NOFILE, NULL, {rlim_cur=1024, rlim_max=1024}) = 0",
+  "prlimit64(900, RLIMIT_NOFILE, {rlim_cur=1024, rlim_max=1024}, NULL) = 0",
+  "sched_setaffinity(900, 128, [0 1]) = 0",
+  "sched_getaffinity(900, 128, [0 1]) = 8",
+  "sched_setscheduler(900, SCHED_OTHER, {sched_priority=0}) = 0",
+  "sched_getscheduler(900) = SCHED_OTHER",
+  "sched_setparam(900, {sched_priority=0}) = 0",
+  "sched_getparam(900, {sched_priority=0}) = 0",
+  "sched_setattr(900, {size=56, sched_policy=SCHED_OTHER}, 0) = 0",
+  "sched_getattr(900, {size=56, sched_policy=SCHED_OTHER}, 56, 0) = 0",
+  "sched_rr_get_interval(900, {tv_sec=0, tv_nsec=0}) = 0",
+])("rejects historical PID resource and scheduler access: %s", (line) => {
+  for (const live of [true, false]) {
+    expect(() => check(101, line, live)).toThrow("non-inventory lookup");
+    expect(() =>
+      check(101, line.replace(/ = .*/u, " = -1 ESRCH (No such process)"), live),
+    ).toThrow("non-inventory lookup");
+  }
+  expect(check(101, line.replace("(900", "(9000"))).toEqual([]);
+  expect(check(101, line.replace("(900", "(0"))).toEqual([]);
+});
+
+it.each([
+  "ioprio_get(IOPRIO_WHO_PROCESS, 900) = IOPRIO_PRIO_VALUE(IOPRIO_CLASS_NONE, 0)",
+  "ioprio_set(IOPRIO_WHO_PROCESS, 900, IOPRIO_PRIO_VALUE(IOPRIO_CLASS_NONE, 0)) = 0",
+  "ioprio_get(IOPRIO_WHO_PGRP, 900) = 0",
+  "ioprio_set(IOPRIO_WHO_PGRP, 900, 0) = -1 ESRCH (No such process)",
+  "ioprio_get(PRIO_USER, 900) = -1 EINVAL (Invalid argument)",
+  "getpriority(IOPRIO_WHO_USER, 900) = -1 EINVAL (Invalid argument)",
+])("rejects historical PID I/O priority access: %s", (line) => {
+  for (const live of [true, false])
+    expect(() => check(101, line, live)).toThrow("non-inventory lookup");
+});
+
+it("keeps I/O priority UID selectors and distinct PID/self selectors separate", () => {
+  expect(check(101, "ioprio_get(IOPRIO_WHO_USER, 900) = 0")).toEqual([]);
+  expect(check(101, "ioprio_get(IOPRIO_WHO_PROCESS, 9000) = 0")).toEqual([]);
+  expect(check(101, "ioprio_get(IOPRIO_WHO_PROCESS, 0) = 0")).toEqual([]);
+});