feat(evm): inspect offline bytecode interfaces through EVMole (#1051)

* feat(evm): inspect offline bytecode interfaces through evmole

* fix(evm): distinguish unsupported bytecode targets

* style(evm): format verifier string-prefix checks

docs/evm-bytecode.md

@@ -0,0 +1,84 @@
+# Offline EVM bytecode
+
+`inspect_evm_interface` / `inspect-evm-interface` infers interface candidates
+from one explicitly selected local bytecode carrier. The capability is general:
+contract investigation, compatibility, audit and CTF showcases use the same
+portable primitive. It does not require an active native binary target.
+
+```sh
+rea inspect-evm-interface ./runtime.hex hex --json
+rea inspect-evm-interface ./runtime.bin raw --json
+```
+
+```json
+{
+  "name": "inspect_evm_interface",
+  "arguments": { "path": "/artifacts/runtime.hex", "encoding": "hex" }
+}
+```
+
+Initial real verification covers flat legacy bytecode on Linux x64 and unchanged
+bundled EVMole 0.9.3. EOF-style EF00 containers return `unsupported_target`,
+with the selected path and format reason. Provider/configuration failures retain
+their distinct unavailable-provider or capability classification.
+The host must already provide util-linux `prlimit`, normally `/usr/bin/prlimit`;
+`REA_EVM_PRLIMIT_COMMAND` can select another absolute executable. REA installs
+no system tools and changes no user configuration. [Upstream provenance and
+license](../third_party/evmole/README.md) are packaged.
+
+## Evidence semantics
+
+- `encoding` is required: raw bytes or UTF-8 hex, with optional `0x` prefix and
+  outer ASCII whitespace. Odd hex, interior separators, BOM, non-ASCII whitespace
+  and invalid UTF-8 are rejected. Empty bytecode is valid and has unknown coverage.
+- Carrier SHA-256 identifies the exact original file, including prefix/casing
+  and whitespace. Decoded-byte SHA-256 identifies actual selected EVM bytes.
+  Neither digest is the Ethereum Keccak code hash.
+- Full bytecode, upstream function offsets and original producer representation
+  are returned inline. Offsets are byte positions in decoded bytecode.
+- Upstream also returns terminal metadata during selector recovery. Its reported
+  values remain in `raw_result`; integer precision and non-text-key coverage are
+  unknown in the JS binding. Full bytecode retains the original encoded metadata.
+- Selectors, argument strings and state mutability are **inferences**. Function
+  names/signatures are not looked up. Optimized code may produce different
+  mutability candidates; recovered types are not a verified source ABI.
+- Runtime/init-code identity, deployed authenticity, hardfork and discovery
+  completeness remain unknown. Empty candidates do not prove no callable interface.
+- Analysis is offline: no target runtime execution, implicit chain/RPC/explorer
+  lookup, wallet action, transaction broadcast or network request.
+
+## Resource and lifecycle limits
+
+Inputs are limited to 4 MiB, complete replies to 16 MiB and combined diagnostic
+output to 1 MiB. An owned worker has a 256 MiB JavaScript heap, 3 GiB virtual
+address-space limit, 30 CPU seconds and a 30-second command deadline. Virtual
+address space differs from resident memory. The worker retains inherited tighter
+soft/hard limits, reports its configured soft limits inline and leaves hard limits
+unchanged. WASM trap reservations are disabled
+so the engine can run within that virtual limit; actual memory is not equated to
+its 3 GiB allowance. Limits fail without partial success. Stable snapshots,
+private files and owned processes are cleaned independently of caller cancellation.
+Invalid-input, unsupported, cancellation, timeout and malformed-reply failures
+retain bounded stdout/stderr under `details.captured_output`, including whether
+diagnostic output was truncated. Cleanup failures preserve the
+original error projection and any captured output.
+Successful results expose `diagnostics.truncated` from the supervisor as well.
+Excess diagnostic output fails the complete-output contract even when the worker
+has written a valid reply.
+SIGXCPU retains a CPU resource diagnostic and CPU-specific guidance. Observed
+file-size write failures (EFBIG) and SIGXFSZ likewise retain a file-size resource
+diagnostic. Exact signal/write causes remain unknown. Configured
+soft limits are reported separately from unknown effective limits; the received
+signal alone does not establish its exact cause.
+Reserved file-size exits require a matching private marker written by the
+worker's EFBIG branch. Bare launcher exits or unwritable markers retain process
+diagnostics with the resource cause unverified.
+
+Source/metadata, proxy resolution, storage/CFG and fork-explicit execution/traces
+remain separate increments under #972, with materially different result or
+execution authority. This primitive makes no deployment or runtime behavior claim.
+
+The real verification lane traces representative raw/hex CLI workflows and checks
+that only declared Node/prlimit launchers and process ownership inspection run.
+Socket traces permit local stdio socket pairs and reject attempted network requests.
+These observations verify those fixtures; they are not a general network sandbox.