A tighter inherited RLIMIT_CPU is kept, and that death had no reply. The decoder records the installed ceiling, and SIGXCPU becomes a CPU resource constraint that names it.
A tighter RLIMIT_FSIZE was installed, but the reply check still used the
requested budget. A reply under that budget could exceed the inherited
limit and truncate. The effective cap now bounds the write, and a reply
that does not fit returns a fixed file-size limit. Tests also keep a
higher hard limit distinct from the new soft limit.
setrlimit ran before the shutdown guard and asked for hard limits the
process may not raise. A tighter inherited hard limit then left mitmdump
running until the capture timeout.
* fix(capture): end special-scheme URL authorities at a backslash
The native mitmproxy adapter removed transport userinfo with
`^(...//)[^/?#]*@`, so the authority ran to the last "@" before "/", "?"
or "#". For `https://example.test\part@tail` it treated
`example.test\part` as userinfo, reported `https://tail` as the
Location, and withdrew the original bytes as a transport credential.
WHATWG URL parsing, used by the shared TypeScript owner
(recordedTransportUrl.ts) and by HAR captures, ends a special-scheme or
scheme-relative authority at a backslash, so that "@" is ordinary path
text.
Locate the authority with the same boundary rule before removing
userinfo. Bytes are handled as Latin-1 text so unrelated bytes stay
identical. Userinfo before the backslash is still removed and redacted.
Add source unit tests for the adapter projection to test:python.
Fixes#2671
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(capture): skip special-scheme leading slashes before userinfo
Ending the authority at a backslash exposed a credential: for
`https://\user:pass@host/path`, WHATWG parsing skips every leading "/"
or "\" after a special scheme (and in scheme-relative references), so
`user:pass` is userinfo, but the new boundary stopped at the first
backslash and found no "@". The same applied to `https:\\user:pass@host`
and `https:user:pass@host`.
Start the authority after that whole slash run for non-file special
schemes and scheme-relative references. File URLs keep their "//"
boundary because they carry no userinfo. Load the adapter in tests with
fresh mitmproxy stand-ins scoped to its import instead of leaving them
in sys.modules.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(capture): parse URL controls and mixed network authorities
* fix(capture): distinguish native paths and URL base authorities
* fix(capture): preserve file-relative path evidence after separators
* fix(comparison): recheck historical calls-only changes (#2223)
* fix(comparison): preserve incomplete function call evidence
Keep missing, unknown, partial and unresolved call relationships unknown in function comparisons and reconstruction claims. Aggregate IDA caller and callee coverage without overwriting uncertainty.
Validate with 144 focused tests, typecheck/lint, docs checks and test discovery. Real providers were not verified; the full headless IDA session suite requires unavailable Windows native controls.
* fix(comparison): recheck historical calls-only changes
---------
Co-authored-by: morluto <76467478+morluto@users.noreply.github.com>
* fix(android): make DEX descriptor pattern portable
* fix(ci): isolate Linux Hopper process fixture inventory
* fix(capture): remove empty URL userinfo markers
* test(capture): cover empty URL userinfo markers
* test(ci): isolate Hopper process inventory fixtures
* fix(ci): declare process inventory callback
* test(ci): isolate alternate launcher process fixture
* fix(capture): keep URLs that WHATWG rejects instead of redacting userinfo
File URLs cannot carry userinfo (an "@" in a file host fails the parse),
and a special authority whose host or port WHATWG rejects fails the whole
URL. Neither has credentials, so the bridge now keeps their source text
and byte sidecar. Checked against Node's URL over 30,000 spellings: no
under-redaction, over-redaction 20,540 -> 5,865 (remaining: empty
userinfo, IPv4 range, IDNA, non-special and baseless references).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(capture): strip trailing URL whitespace and validate IP hosts and ports
The previous host check counted trailing C0 controls and spaces, which
WHATWG strips, so `https://user:pw@host ` kept its password. Trailing
C0/space is now removed from the parse view (raw offsets are unchanged).
Special hosts now also follow the WHATWG IPv4 parser (ends-in-a-number,
hex/octal parts, range) and IPv6 literal syntax (zone IDs rejected), and
ports are bounded lexically before int(), which raised ValueError past
4300 digits on Python 3.11+ and failed the whole capture.
Node URL differential over 126,000 spellings: under-redaction 8,084 -> 0,
ValueError 2,550 -> 0; remaining special-scheme over-redaction is IDNA
and the pinned empty-userinfo case. Cost: +0.6 us per URL.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(capture): redact userinfo before hosts that need Unicode mapping
A non-ASCII special host may map under UTS #46 to an accepted host
(fullwidth digits, ideographic full stops, ignored code points), so
treat it as accepted instead of running the ASCII IPv4 check on it.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: morluto <76467478+morluto@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Lucien <164857476+dakjdakd@users.noreply.github.com>
* fix(domain): preserve prototype-named JSON members through Evidence boundaries
Zod's z.json() record projection drops own __proto__ members as a
prototype-pollution guard, so provider replies carrying them lost evidence
before hashing/serialization and CLI/MCP output. The shared schema now
validates with z.json() as before, then rebuilds the value keeping
prototype-named own members as ordinary data properties (__proto__ via
Object.defineProperty, so the prototype is never mutated).
parseHarJson no longer rejects __proto__ members; the explicit unsupported
case from #992 is replaced with a preservation regression, and the
inspect_web_network_capture contract text is updated to match.
Fixes#1036
* fix(domain): bound JSON depth and oversized payloads at parsing boundaries
jsonValueSchema re-walked hostile input through z.json()'s recursive core, so a deeply nested payload from an MCP tool argument, inline evidence, provider result, or keyed archive threw RangeError: Maximum call stack size exceeded instead of a validation issue. The schema now runs an iterative depth guard first and keeps z.json() for full JSON semantics behind it, which also turns cyclic values into validation errors. The 1000-edge limit stays far below the range where the recursive core overflows its stack (measured between 2000 and 3000 on Node 24) while leaving room for legitimately deep target-derived trees such as compiled NIB view hierarchies, and the guard narrows with a typed record check instead of any or unchecked casts. The non-recursive JSON Schema advertisement stays intact on both the public and standard projection paths. Two payload sizes get explicit budgets tied to their producer constraints: web text artifacts reject beyond the 16 MiB source budget the web tooling already advertises, and native UI screenshot base64 beyond the 64 MiB helper output budget. Regenerated product catalog, skill catalog digest, and completion-ledger manifest follow the schema-boundary change.
* fix(validation): preserve depth diagnostics across process inputs
---------
Co-authored-by: DeryFerd <deryferdikao125@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: N0zoM1z0 <1705004398@qq.com>