The new inline-scripts CLI case asserted the external <script src> survived
by matching a "loads" edge on resolved_path alone. The fixture's package.json
also declares "main":"main.js", which produces its own "loads" edge with the
same resolved_path, so the assertion could pass through the package entrypoint
even if the HTML script edge regressed. Also require script_path === "main.js"
to pin the assertion to the HTML-derived edge, matching the reference-html case
in the same file. Tests-only.
The analyzer already reports valid HTML containing inline <script> bodies
through an explicit "parse-html-inline-scripts" unavailable scope, so an
application whose endpoints, storage, or imports live in inline scripts is
surfaced as not-analyzed rather than silently empty. That contract was asserted
only at the filesystem boundary (javascriptHtmlEntrypoints.test.ts); the public
CLI acceptance surface had no scenario proving it survives transport.
Add one acceptance case to the existing unavailable-HTML CLI suite. No source change.
No V8 8.8 through 11.7 producer runs in the test environment, so the
fixture is synthetic, as it already is for the narrow header: a real
cache without its build-constant word and its alignment word, which is
the container those releases define.
Cover the admitted layout through the parser and the public CLI, the
bit 31 module flag, a truncated six-word container, a container that
fits both layouts, and the word-table rule for a 24-byte header. The
short-header case now also covers the new 24-byte minimum.
The CLI case is the recorded lifecycle coverage of the provider, so its
new title is updated there as well.
* test(limits): reference limit constants instead of repeating their values
Point duplicated default literals at their owner constants and replace
recovery-wording locks with the setting name, units, and those constants.
Keep the single default pins that guard shipped values.
* test(limits): pin the shipped Ghidra value-flow defaults
Consumer checks follow the owner constants, so they no longer catch a
change to 3000, 64, or 12000. One owner pin keeps those shipped values.
Co-authored-by: morluto <morluto@users.noreply.github.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Cursor Agent <cursoragent@cursor.com>
Co-authored-by: morluto <morluto@users.noreply.github.com>
Drop recovery-sentence locks when a structured field or the owning
formatter already carries the fact, and own this batch's per-test
temporary directories through createTestTempDirectory. Keep setting
names, caller data, and prose that has no structured carrier.
Co-authored-by: Cursor Agent <cursoragent@cursor.com>
* fix(native): record inspected plist bytes and refuse files outside the bundle
An open app session keeps the executable as the Evidence subject for
inspect_plist, same as the other bundle-resource tools, but the result had
no digest of the plist bytes and any absolute path was sealed under that
subject. Record source_sha256 for the bytes read, and refuse a selection
that resolves outside the opened bundle.
Fixes#9479
* fix(native)!: scope plist selection to the opened bundle
BREAKING CHANGE: To inspect a plist outside an opened app bundle or resource root, open the plist as a separate target.
* fix(native): report plist snapshot filesystem effects
---------
Co-authored-by: Cursor Agent <cursoragent@cursor.com>
Co-authored-by: morluto <76467478+morluto@users.noreply.github.com>
* fix(v8): read the code cache header size from the container
V8 sizes the header with `kHeaderSize = POINTER_SIZE_ALIGN(kUnalignedHeaderSize)` and
`kUnalignedHeaderSize` is 28, so the header is padded *after* its words: a 64-bit producer writes
32 header bytes and a 32-bit one writes 28. The reader pinned 32 and required the declared payload
to equal `bytes.length - 32`, so every container from a 32-bit producer failed as "truncated or
corrupt".
Measured here on Node 24.22.1 (V8 in x64): take a real cache and drop the four alignment bytes at
offset 28. V8 loads it unchanged — `cachedDataRejected === false` — while the reader refused it:
before: Header declares a 392-byte payload but 388 bytes follow the 32-byte header
after: ACCEPT header_bytes=28 words=7 payload.offset=28
The payload-length word sits at byte 20 in both layouts, so the declared length already states how
much trailing padding the container carries. The header size is derived from it now: `28` and `32`
are admitted, the reported word table covers exactly the header the container holds (7 or 8 words),
and the schema requires that table to agree with `header_bytes`.
Nothing is loosened. A header that is neither 28 nor 32 bytes is still `malformed`, and the
16 existing cases pass unchanged — dropping only the derivation back to the constant fails exactly
the new narrow-header case.
`src/v8` — 26 passing. `npm run lint` and `tsc --noEmit` clean.
* fix(v8): refuse a wide cache that is only four bytes short
A review finding on the previous commit, and a real one: deriving the header size from the declared
payload length makes a 32-byte-header container truncated by four bytes resolve to 28, because
`bytes.length - declaredPayload` loses exactly those four bytes. The reader then accepted a
truncated cache and read its payload one word long.
The wide header's last word is `POINTER_SIZE_ALIGN` padding that V8 leaves zero, and a narrow
container has payload where that word sits. Measured on Node 24.22.1 across six different sources:
the padding word is always `0x00000000` and the first payload word is always non-zero. So the zero
word is the only evidence that separates the two, and it is now required to be non-zero for the
28-byte layout:
| container | before this commit | after |
| --- | --- | --- |
| real 32-byte header | accept | accept, `header_bytes=32` |
| real 28-byte header | accept | accept, `header_bytes=28` |
| 32-byte header truncated by 4 | **accept** | refused as `malformed` |
The guide also described one pinned 32-byte header; it now describes both layouts, how the size is
resolved, and why an ambiguous container is refused.
`src/v8` — 27 passing. Removing the guard accepts the truncated container again.
* fix(v8): read the padding word through the header accessor
A Static checks finding: `verify/architecture-guards.mjs` counts raw Buffer reads in parser folders
and allows only a shrinking baseline, and the previous commit added one:
```
raw Buffer or DataView numeric read (use BinaryReader ...); new copies are not allowed:
src/v8/V8CodeCacheParser.ts: 2 (baseline 1)
```
The read is the narrow-header discriminator — the alignment word a 64-bit producer leaves zero at
offset 28. It now goes through the file's existing `field(index)` accessor instead of calling
`bytes.readUInt32LE` directly, so the count returns to the baseline while the check itself is
unchanged: `field(7)` is byte 28, and `V8_CODE_CACHE_NARROW_HEADER_BYTES / 4` spells that index.
`node scripts/verify/architecture-guards.mjs` — passed across 2 843 source files.
`src/v8` + `tests/boundary/rust` — 68 passing. `tsc --noEmit` 0 errors.
Setting the condition to `false` fails "refuses a wide container that is only four bytes short",
so the check is still load-bearing.
* fix(v8): ground the narrow-header rule in the producer, and test the word table
Two review findings.
**The rule was stated as measurement, not as format.** The previous comment justified the zero-word
discriminator with "measured on Node 24.22.1 every real payload begins with a non-zero word", which
makes support for other producers depend on one host. The producer zeroes that padding rather than
copying payload over it: `SerializedData::AllocateWithPayload` in `src/snapshot/snapshot-data.cc`
runs `std::fill_n(data_, header_size, 0)` before writing any header word, and
`kHeaderSize = POINTER_SIZE_ALIGN(kUnalignedHeaderSize)` in `src/snapshot/code-serializer.h` puts the
four padding bytes inside `header_size`. So a zero word at byte 28 is a fact about the producer, not
about one Node build.
The refusal is now worded as the reservation it is: a narrow container whose payload happened to
begin with four zero bytes would match the same test, and no reading of the header alone separates
the two cases. The message says both readings instead of asserting corruption.
**The word-table rule had no test that could fail.** `header.fields.length * 4 === header.header_bytes`
cannot disagree on a parsed container — the parser derives both from `payloadOffset` — so it is only
reachable through the schema, which is what a stored or projected report also goes through. The new
case builds four reports directly: seven words with 32 bytes and eight words with 28 are refused on
`header.fields`, while the two consistent pairs are accepted. Setting the rule to `false` fails it
with `7 words / 32 bytes: expected true to be false`.
`node scripts/verify/architecture-guards.mjs` — passed across 2 843 source files.
`src/v8` + `tests/boundary/rust` — 69 passing. `tsc --noEmit` 0 errors, `npm run lint` 0 errors.
* refactor(v8): share decoded code cache header words
* fix(v8): validate narrow header evidence without assuming runtime compatibility
---------
Co-authored-by: morluto <76467478+morluto@users.noreply.github.com>