CSP3 parsing keeps the first directive of each name in a policy and ignores
later repeats; Chrome reports "Ignoring duplicate Content-Security-Policy
directive". parseCsp flattened every policy's directives into one stream, so
a header such as `script-src 'self'; script-src 'unsafe-inline'` reported the
ignored `'unsafe-inline'` directive as declared and counted nonces and hashes
from it. Track directive names per policy so only the effective directive is
retained, while the same name in separate comma-separated or repeated-field
policies is still listed once per policy.
Parse shared request and response fields at the CDP boundary while preserving capture, session and runtime admission policies. Treat empty request IDs as unknown so unrelated events cannot be joined, and retain redirect occurrences and partial response evidence.
Validate 221 focused tests, fast checks, and real Chrome network and runtime verifiers.
CDP joins repeated response header field lines with LF. Only the Link projection split them, so a repeated Content-Security-Policy lost the first directive of each later policy, and a repeated Referrer-Policy reported no policy. Header normalization now keeps each field line, CSP parses every line and comma-separated policy, single-valued fields combine lines with a comma, and Link uses the shared lines.
Validate token items and their parameters before projecting exact declared policy tokens. Keep malformed and non-token values unknown; retain separate grammar for other policy headers.
Validation: real pinned Chrome public CLI baseline/candidate, 101 focused checks and 90 overlapping final checks, 834 upstream item-vector adaptations with two permitted refusals, check:fast and docs:check. Other browser/platform and policy-specific MCP delivery unverified; no performance measurement. Refs #4677.
Parse CDP repeated field lines independently before applying URI and quoted-parameter delimiters. Preserve declaration order and derive agent hints from retained links.
Validation: real pinned Chrome public CLI baseline and candidate each captured three responses per fixture; repeated Document links/hints restored and comma/single/Fetch controls unchanged. Three source controls failed before the fix. Sixty-one focused checks plus fifteen overlapping final network checks, check:fast and docs:check passed. No performance measurement or other browser/platform claim. Refs #4679.
* fix(browser): keep malformed Content-Length declarations unknown
Response metadata normalized Content-Length with Number(), truncation and
clamping, so "-5", "0x10", "1e3" and "+12" became observed lengths 0, 16,
1000 and 12. RFC 9110 section 8.6 defines the field as 1*DIGIT; any other
spelling declares no length. Parse only decimal digits within the safe
integer range and keep every other value null.
Fixes#2596
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* test(browser): cover the largest accepted Content-Length
Pin the safe-integer boundary beside the overflow case so a future change
cannot reject the largest representable declared length unnoticed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* refactor(schemas): share identifier and canonical base64 patterns
* test: hold the offset datetime schema to the validator it replaces
The module documents that its accepted set matches z.string().datetime({ offset: true }), and nothing in the suite checked that claim. Adds table-driven accept and reject cases (leap years including the 1900/2000 century pair, month, day, hour and offset ranges, fractional and omitted seconds, missing offset, basic format) plus a differential assertion that classifies every case exactly as the replaced validator does, and asserts the emitted pattern compiles under u and v while the replaced pattern does not compile under v.
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Co-authored-by: felipeatp <felipe.troncosopt@gmail.com>
* fix: emit v-mode-compatible patterns for tool schemas
Character classes in emitted patterns carried unescaped '-', '/' and '['. Annex-B and u-mode accept them, so REA's own Zod validation (u) and every u-based validator never saw a defect, but v-mode rejects ClassSetSyntaxCharacters and Ruby rejects [^s[]]. With 6.1.0 tools/list, 117 pattern fields across 11 tools were rejected under v.
The characters are escaped as \x2d, \x2f, \x5b and \x5d rather than \-/\//\[, because oxlint --fix removes an escaped '-' inside a character class as a useless escape, so an escape-only change does not survive the pre-commit hook. \x2d-style escapes are valid under Annex B, u and v, are matched identically, and are not useless-escape candidates.
22 pattern literals in 18 files are touched; no other token changes.
* fix: replace the Zod offset pattern and guard the advertised catalog
The offset datetime site projected Zod's offset class as [ +- ], which no escape in this repository's sources can reach, so evaluate_reconstruction_coverage stayed unreachable for exactly the clients this change targets. It now uses offsetDateTimeSchema in src/domain/offsetDateTime.ts: the same accepted set with the offset class escaped as [ +\x2d ].
Adds tests/boundary/mcp/advertisedPatternsVMode.test.ts, which performs the real tools/list projection, traverses every advertised input and output schema, compiles each pattern under v, and asserts the inventory it walked so a silent traversal collapse fails instead of passing vacuously.
Move the indexed sections walk shared by the browser fetcher and
the artifact reader into domain/sourceMapEnvelope with the
fetchers stricter offset validation as an option; both validators
keep their leaf strictness. Rename the browser CDP stringValue to
cdpStringValue across its 18 files, fold the fingerprint duplicate
into the static helper, and rename the version-keys shadow to
nonEmptyString.
* fix(browser): classify CSP host sources by their own origin
A Content-Security-Policy host-source without a scheme (for example
`cdn.example.com` or `*.trusted.test`) was resolved with
`new URL(token, baseUrl)`, so it became a page-relative path and was
reported as the observed page's own origin. Third-party script, style, and
connect sources were therefore misreported as approved origins, and a bare
`*` wildcard collapsed to the page origin as well.
Resolve host-sources per CSP3 \u00a72.3.1: a scheme-less source inherits the
protected resource's scheme, wildcard host/port sources stay classified as a
set of origins, and non-host tokens remain `other`. Keyword and scheme
sources are unchanged.
Adds boundary coverage for scheme-less host sources, wildcards, and scheme
inheritance against the approved-origin set.
* fix(browser): validate CSP host source syntax
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Co-authored-by: morluto <76467478+morluto@users.noreply.github.com>
* refactor(domain): split error taxonomy into thematic modules
Move each error family out of domain/errors.ts into its own module
(base, core, provider selection/adapter, browser observation,
artifact, evidence, unknown registry, hopper, configuration) and
relocate AnalysisErrorProjection to analysisErrorProjection.
Migrate all 162 importers to the owning modules and delete
errors.ts. No re-export shims; behavior is unchanged.
* refactor(runtime): name all silent catch causes without changing diagnostics
Bind cause in every bare catch and unhandled rejection across src/.
Real failures preserve the cause for logging; best-effort cleanup
carries an explicit comment. Caller-visible and Evidence strings are
byte-identical to before.
gensokyo-dev