Files
reverse-engineering-anything/scripts/verify-http3-network-captures.mjs
T
morluto 1f24b3fa57 feat(evidence)!: name the Evidence subject by its target identity (format revision 2) (#11416)
* feat(evidence)!: name the Evidence subject by its target identity (format revision 2)

The Evidence subject carries subject.identity (kind, sha256, format,
architecture, selection) and the Evidence ID commits to it, so raw/DOL
entry points and ESP flash offsets of the same bytes are different
subjects. Every record declares evidence_format: 2; revision 1 bundles,
standalone records and snapshots are refused with the recreate guidance.
binaryTargetIdentity is the one projection of an open target, used by
Evidence and snapshot comparison.

BREAKING CHANGE: Evidence format revision 2. Evidence IDs commit to the
subject's target identity (subject.identity, including the raw/DOL entry
point or ESP flash offsets), and every record declares evidence_format: 2.
Evidence bundles, records and analysis snapshots from earlier releases are
refused; recreate the observations with this release.

* refactor(analysis-view): read parent subjects through the Evidence identity accessors (#11423)

Analysis views compare their parent's file identity (evidenceFileTarget)
and take path and digest from evidenceSubjectTarget instead of reading
the subject's digest, format and architecture members, which duplicate
subject.identity until they are removed. A counted guard
(evidence-subject-declaration-read) keeps new direct reads out and
records the 20 remaining files.

* fix(evidence): carry format refusals through Evidence readers and bind target selections

- safeParseEvidence/safeParseImmutableEvidence return the format refusal as
  an expected failure; every consumer maps it to the one integrity refusal
  with the recreate guidance. An unmarked object is an earlier record only
  when it has every member records have always carried.
- ArtifactProvider inventory roots and provider subjects that name the
  target's own bytes carry the target's selection (ESP flash offsets).
- Snapshot rows bind only Evidence whose identity, selection included,
  matches the snapshot target.
- Entry-point selections use the raw-binary entry point form.

* fix(evidence): refuse unauthenticated or earlier-format records instead of reading them as absent

- recognizeEvidence (evidenceValidation) replaces tryParseEvidence: input
  without an evidence_id is not Evidence (ok(undefined)); a record that names
  one but fails authentication or is from another format revision is an
  EvidenceIntegrityError carrying the recreate guidance, never undefined.
- Direct analysis retains that refusal as a secondary failure instead of
  silently skipping source capture; cleanup projection, source-closure
  annotation and the flutter, debugger and release-exposure recoveries use
  the same owner (the last three previously read the unauthenticated schema).
- A desktop capture.json from an earlier format is refused with the recreate
  guidance instead of "not desktop application capture Evidence".

* fix(evidence): advertise revision 2 ledger examples and rank delivery omissions by serialized size

- The obligation ledger and reconstruction coverage examples named
  evidence_format 1, which revision 2 refuses; they now use
  EVIDENCE_FORMAT_REVISION.
- MCP delivery chose which unretained recovery to omit by a parsed-storage
  lower bound clipped at the response budget. Once revision 2 subjects made
  the source record's estimate cross the budget, both candidates tied at the
  clip and the smaller source was omitted ahead of the larger completed
  observation. Candidates are now ranked by serialized size, which is what
  the budget counts.

* refactor(native): compare function snapshots by their Evidence target identity (#11450)

Function snapshots carry the subject's file target identity instead of the
duplicated subject declaration. Call paths and function comparisons compare
targets through sameTargetIdentity, so the same bytes opened at a different
raw entry point or ESP flash offset no longer count as one coordinate space:
build_call_path refuses the mix, and compare_functions no longer matches
entries by address across selections. Structural candidates and native
function matching read the architecture and digest through
evidenceFileTarget.

Refs #11417

* refactor(artifacts): compare artifact and WASM summaries by their Evidence target identity (#11461)

Artifact comparison authenticates a summary against its retained inventory
through sameTargetIdentity and rebinds the alias with the whole target,
selection included, so a flash-selected inventory summary taken under an
alias path is no longer refused. WASM comparison, the analysis view
artifact projection and the inventory root check read the digest, format
and display path through the Evidence identity accessors.

Refs #11417

* refactor(evidence): read record subjects through the identity accessors in JS, managed, ledger and bundle readers (#11470)

JavaScript application graphs, runtime reconciliation, managed inspection
and native verification sources, the record summary filter, the ledger's
residual-unknown target and bundle scope selection read the subject digest,
format and display path through evidenceFileTarget and
evidenceSubjectDisplay. No comparison changes: each reader matches one
record's facts against its own payload or a caller filter.

Refs #11417

* refactor(evidence)!: name the Evidence subject only by its target identity (#11497)

* refactor(evidence)!: name the Evidence subject only by its target identity

The subject keeps `identity` and the display facts `name` and `local_path`.
The duplicated `digest`, `format` and `architecture` members are removed; the
format-owned declaration now validates the identity itself. Readers the type
checker found move to the owner accessors; untyped reads in verify scripts,
the efficiency harness and test matchers move to `subject.identity`. The
`evidence-subject-declaration-read` text guard and its baseline are deleted.

Fixes #11473
Refs #11417

BREAKING CHANGE: the Evidence subject no longer has `digest`, `format` or
`architecture`; read `subject.identity.sha256`, `subject.identity.format` and
`subject.identity.architecture`. A record that still carries them is refused.

* test(evidence): give the Flutter verifier fixture the identity subject and check the DOL declaration without the ID

* test(evidence): drop the removed subject members from the declaration matrix and tamper fixtures

* feat(evidence)!: give every Evidence record an explicit subject identity (#11536)

* feat(evidence)!: give every Evidence record an explicit subject identity

A producer that cannot name a file passes an `unknown` target identity
with a closed reason (derived-from-linked-evidence, not-observed,
unsupported-subject) instead of no subject. The subject is non-null;
unknown subjects have no display facts. The generic missing-subject
limitation and `subjectUnavailableReason` are removed; producer-specific
explanations are ordinary limitations. Comparison identity requires the
derived unknown, and null-subject consumers ask the owner accessors.

Refs #11417

BREAKING CHANGE: every Evidence record has a subject. A record without a
file target names `subject.identity` `{ "kind": "unknown", "reason": … }`
with `name` and `local_path` null, instead of `subject: null` and the
limitation "Artifact identity is unavailable for this observation.".
Their Evidence IDs change.

* fix(evidence): name explicit unknown subjects in JavaScript callers and keep a managed graph's file subject

The verification scripts are not type-checked, so five createEvidence
callers still passed undefined (or a missing first target) after the subject
became required. They now pass unknownTarget("not-observed").

A managed application graph chose the first present input subject. Every
subject is now present, so an unknown artifact subject hid a file subject on
the member or boundary Evidence. The graph now takes the first input subject
that names a file.

* test(evidence): assert the subject kind instead of a presence the type now guarantees

Every Evidence record has a subject after this change, so test guards and
assertions that checked it for null always passed. Each now checks that the
fixture subject names a file, or is removed where a later fileIdentity,
fileSubjectTarget or fileSubjectDisplay call already requires that. Non-null
assertions on Evidence subjects are removed; analysis-view inputs, whose
subject is optional, keep an undefined check.

* test(evidence): expect the Evidence subject format under its identity

Two boundary tests still matched subject.format, which slice 2e moved into
subject.identity. toMatchObject is not type-checked against the Evidence
shape, so they failed only when run (the signature test on macOS).
2026-11-16 06:28:01 +08:00

414 lines
12 KiB
JavaScript

#!/usr/bin/env node
import { canonicalOutputSchema } from "./lib/canonical-output-schema.mjs";
import assert from "node:assert/strict";
import { createHash } from "node:crypto";
import { readFile, writeFile } from "node:fs/promises";
import { isAbsolute, join } from "node:path";
import { fileURLToPath } from "node:url";
import { Client } from "@modelcontextprotocol/client";
import { StdioClientTransport } from "@modelcontextprotocol/client/stdio";
import { Ajv2020 } from "ajv/dist/2020.js";
import { runOwnedCommand } from "../dist/process/OwnedCommand.js";
import { toolContract } from "../dist/contracts/toolContracts.js";
import { createVerifierRun, completeVerifierRun } from "./lib/verifier-run.mjs";
import {
bytes,
byCase,
verifyNormalRecords,
requireHttp3,
verifyConcurrency,
} from "./lib/http3-capture-assertions.mjs";
import {
attemptAll,
describeError,
prepareAttempt,
publishAttempt,
finishProducerGroups,
} from "./lib/http3-verifier-lifecycle.mjs";
import {
requireMcpEvidenceBundle,
requireMcpOutput,
} from "./lib/mcp-verifier-results.mjs";
const root = process.argv[2];
const inspectExisting = process.argv[3] === "--inspect-existing";
const mitmdump = process.env.REA_MITMDUMP_COMMAND;
const python = process.env.REA_HTTP3_PYTHON_COMMAND;
assert.equal(
process.platform,
"linux",
"HTTP/3 native verification requires Linux",
);
assert.ok(
root && isAbsolute(root),
"Select an absolute, new evidence directory",
);
assert.ok(
mitmdump && isAbsolute(mitmdump),
"Select caller-supplied mitmdump 12.2.3",
);
if (!inspectExisting)
assert.ok(
python && isAbsolute(python),
"Select a Python environment with aioquic 1.2.0",
);
const run = createVerifierRun();
const cwd = fileURLToPath(new URL("..", import.meta.url));
const entrypoint = fileURLToPath(new URL("./rea.mjs", import.meta.url));
const environment = Object.fromEntries(
Object.entries(process.env).filter(([, value]) => typeof value === "string"),
);
const client = new Client({
name: "real-http3-capture-verifier",
version: "1",
});
const transport = new StdioClientTransport({
command: process.execPath,
args: [entrypoint, "mcp"],
env: environment,
stderr: "pipe",
});
const contract = toolContract("inspect_web_network_capture");
const maxMcpStderrBytes = 64 * 1024;
let mcpStderr = Buffer.alloc(0);
transport.stderr?.on("data", (chunk) => {
mcpStderr = Buffer.concat([mcpStderr, chunk]);
if (mcpStderr.length > maxMcpStderrBytes)
mcpStderr = mcpStderr.subarray(-maxMcpStderrBytes);
});
const checks = [];
const retainedEvidence = [];
const originals = new Map();
let directory;
let captureRoot = join(root, "captures");
let primaryError;
let verifier;
let producerAudit;
let cleanupFailures = [];
let validateOutput;
const digest = (bytes) => createHash("sha256").update(bytes).digest("hex");
const readJson = async (path) => JSON.parse(await readFile(path, "utf8"));
const readLines = async (path) =>
(await readFile(path, "utf8"))
.trim()
.split("\n")
.filter(Boolean)
.map(JSON.parse);
async function cli(input, name) {
const command = await runOwnedCommand(
{
command: process.execPath,
arguments: [
entrypoint,
"inspect-web-network-capture",
input.capture_path,
input.format,
"--json",
],
cwd,
hostEnvironment: environment,
runId: run.run_id,
},
{
timeoutMs: 40_000,
diagnosticBytes: 8 * 1024 * 1024,
},
);
assert.notEqual(command.diagnosticTruncated, true);
await writeFile(
join(directory, `${name}.cli.stdout.json`),
command.stdout.text,
);
await writeFile(
join(directory, `${name}.cli.stderr.log`),
command.stderr.text,
);
const value = JSON.parse(command.stdout.text);
return contract.outputSchema.parse(value);
}
async function mcp(input, name) {
const reply = await client.callTool({
name: contract.name,
arguments: input,
});
await writeFile(
join(directory, `${name}.mcp.reply.json`),
JSON.stringify(reply, null, 2),
);
const evidence = requireMcpOutput(reply, contract.name, contract);
assert.ok(
validateOutput(reply.structuredContent),
JSON.stringify(validateOutput.errors),
);
retainedEvidence.push(evidence);
return evidence;
}
async function inspect(name) {
const input = {
capture_path: join(captureRoot, `${name}.mitm`),
format: "mitmproxy",
};
const cliResult = await cli(input, name);
const mcpResult = await mcp(input, name);
assert.deepEqual(cliResult.normalized_result, mcpResult.normalized_result);
for (const evidence of [cliResult, mcpResult]) {
assert.equal(evidence.authority, "historical-reference");
assert.equal(evidence.confidence, "observed");
assert.equal(evidence.provider.version, "12.2.3");
assert.equal(evidence.normalized_result.runtime_attribution, "unknown");
assert.deepEqual(evidence.provider, evidence.normalized_result.decoder);
assert.equal(
evidence.subject.identity.sha256,
digest(await readFile(input.capture_path)),
);
}
checks.push({
case: name,
outcome: "passed",
records: mcpResult.normalized_result.records.length,
});
return mcpResult.normalized_result;
}
try {
({ directory, captureRoot } = await prepareAttempt(
root,
inspectExisting,
run,
));
if (!inspectExisting) {
const produced = await runOwnedCommand(
{
command: python,
arguments: [
fileURLToPath(new URL("./fixtures/http3-lab.py", import.meta.url)),
"--mitmdump",
mitmdump,
"--output",
captureRoot,
],
cwd,
hostEnvironment: environment,
runId: run.run_id,
},
{ timeoutMs: 120_000, diagnosticBytes: 1024 * 1024 },
);
await writeFile(
join(directory, "producer.stdout.log"),
produced.stdout.text,
);
await writeFile(
join(directory, "producer.stderr.log"),
produced.stderr.text,
);
}
const manifest = await readJson(join(captureRoot, "manifest.json"));
assert.equal(manifest.aioquic, "1.2.0");
assert.equal(manifest.profile, "http3-minimal-v1");
await client.connect(transport);
const advertised = (await client.listTools()).tools.find(
(tool) => tool.name === contract.name,
);
assert.ok(advertised, "Missing named advertised schema");
const ajv = new Ajv2020({ strict: false, validateFormats: false });
assert.ok(ajv.validateSchema(advertised.inputSchema));
assert.ok(ajv.validateSchema(canonicalOutputSchema(advertised.name)));
validateOutput = ajv.compile(canonicalOutputSchema(advertised.name));
const inputValidator = ajv.compile(advertised.inputSchema);
assert.ok(
inputValidator({
capture_path: join(captureRoot, "normal.mitm"),
format: "mitmproxy",
}),
);
assert.equal(
inputValidator({
capture_path: join(captureRoot, "normal.mitm"),
format: "mitmproxy",
stream_id: 0,
}),
false,
);
await writeFile(
join(directory, "advertised-tool.json"),
JSON.stringify(advertised, null, 2),
);
for (const name of ["normal", "fallback"])
originals.set(name, await readFile(join(captureRoot, `${name}.mitm`)));
const normal = await inspect("normal");
assert.equal(normal.total_records, 4);
const finalProducer = (
await readLines(join(captureRoot, "normal.producer.jsonl"))
).filter((event) => ["response", "error"].includes(event.event));
verifyNormalRecords(normal, manifest, finalProducer);
const orders = verifyConcurrency(normal, manifest);
assert.equal(
(await readJson(join(captureRoot, "curl.json"))).http_version,
"3",
);
assert.deepEqual(
await readFile(join(captureRoot, "curl.body")),
bytes(byCase(normal, "curl"), "/response/content"),
);
checks.push({
case: "concurrency-bytes",
outcome: "passed",
parallel_streams: 3,
orders,
});
const fallback = await inspect("fallback");
assert.equal(fallback.total_records, 1);
const record = byCase(fallback, "fallback");
assert.throws(
() => requireHttp3(record),
{ code: "ERR_ASSERTION" },
"The same positive HTTP/3 check must reject the fallback record",
);
assert.equal(record.reported.client_conn.transport_protocol, "tcp");
assert.equal(record.reported.server_conn.transport_protocol, "tcp");
assert.equal(record.reported.request.http_version, "HTTP/2.0");
assert.equal(record.reported.response.http_version, "HTTP/1.1");
assert.equal(record.reported.server_conn.alpn, "http/1.1");
assert.equal(
(await readJson(join(captureRoot, "fallback.json"))).http_version,
"2",
);
checks.push({
case: "fallback-detected",
outcome: "passed",
client_http: "2",
origin_http: "1.1",
});
const bundleReply = await client.callTool({
name: "get_evidence_bundle",
arguments: {},
});
const bundle = requireMcpEvidenceBundle(bundleReply);
const records = bundle.records;
for (const evidence of retainedEvidence) {
const retained = records.find(
(record) => record.evidence_id === evidence.evidence_id,
);
assert.deepEqual(
retained,
evidence,
`MCP must retain the complete Evidence for ${evidence.evidence_id}`,
);
}
await writeFile(
join(directory, "session-bundle.reply.json"),
JSON.stringify(bundleReply, null, 2),
);
checks.push({
case: "mcp-session-retention",
outcome: "passed",
records: retainedEvidence.length,
});
} catch (error) {
primaryError = error;
} finally {
cleanupFailures = await attemptAll([
["client-close", () => client.close()],
["transport-close", () => transport.close()],
[
"producer-groups",
async () => {
if (!inspectExisting) {
producerAudit = await finishProducerGroups(captureRoot, run.run_id);
assert.deepEqual(producerAudit.failures ?? [], []);
for (const [, observation] of producerAudit.observation)
assert.equal(
observation.state,
"empty",
JSON.stringify(observation),
);
}
},
],
...[...originals].map(([name, original]) => [
`input-immutability-${name}`,
async () => {
assert.deepEqual(
await readFile(join(captureRoot, `${name}.mitm`)),
original,
);
},
]),
[
"mcp-stderr-diagnostics",
async () => {
if (directory)
await writeFile(join(directory, "mcp.stderr.log"), mcpStderr);
},
],
[
"failed-command-diagnostics",
async () => {
if (directory && primaryError?.snapshot) {
await writeFile(
join(directory, "failed-command.stdout.log"),
primaryError.snapshot.stdout.text,
);
await writeFile(
join(directory, "failed-command.stderr.log"),
primaryError.snapshot.stderr.text,
);
}
},
],
[
"final-lineage",
async () => {
verifier = await completeVerifierRun(run);
assert.equal(verifier.process_lineage.status, "verified");
assert.deepEqual(verifier.process_lineage.descendants, []);
},
],
]);
}
const report = {
run_id: run.run_id,
input_mode: inspectExisting ? "existing-captures" : "producer-attempt",
status: primaryError || cleanupFailures.length ? "failed" : "passed",
finished_at: new Date().toISOString(),
...(primaryError
? {
error: describeError(primaryError),
mcp_stderr_log: "mcp.stderr.log",
}
: {}),
cleanup_failures: cleanupFailures,
checks,
verifier,
producer_audit: producerAudit,
scope:
"Linux reverse HTTP/3 capture verification for mitmproxy 12.2.3, aioquic 1.2.0 and guest cURL",
limitations: [
...(inspectExisting
? [
"Existing capture producer provenance was not authenticated by this attempt.",
]
: []),
"No local/WireGuard, browser, QUIC v2, migration, 0-RTT, mTLS or replay claim.",
"No HAR, interruption, certificate-failure or body-completeness coverage in this profile.",
],
};
if (directory) {
try {
await publishAttempt(root, directory, report);
} catch (error) {
console.error("Could not publish this attempt's result:", error);
primaryError ??= error;
}
}
if (primaryError) throw primaryError;
if (cleanupFailures.length)
throw new AggregateError(cleanupFailures, "HTTP/3 verifier cleanup failed");
console.log(JSON.stringify(report, null, 2));