Files
reverse-engineering-anything/bridge/cutter/rea_bridge.py
T
47353e494d feat(config): make the bridge request ceiling configurable (#6376)
* fix(reconstruction): dedupe residual unknown ids with uniqueSorted

Current main calls uniqueBy, which is not defined, so typecheck fails.
Residual unknown ids are strings, and the adjacent lists already use
uniqueSorted.

Co-authored-by: morluto <morluto@users.noreply.github.com>

* feat(config): make the bridge request ceiling configurable

REA_BRIDGE_MAX_REQUEST_BYTES replaces the hard-coded 16 MiB Hopper and
Cutter request payload ceiling. The default stays 16777216 bytes. Values
outside 7464 to 268435456 bytes are configuration_invalid.

Part of #6176.

Co-authored-by: morluto <morluto@users.noreply.github.com>

* fix(cutter): keep cleanup ownership when a sent command's reply is oversized

An authenticated command may already have changed the Cutter document
when its reply exceeds the frame ceiling. Return the existing unknown
execution, with the ceiling diagnostic in the message, so receipt
cleanup still waits. A frame that overflows before the command is sent
remains a resource constraint.

Co-authored-by: morluto <morluto@users.noreply.github.com>

* style: format the bridge request ceiling sources

oxfmt --check failed on the five files that set and test
REA_BRIDGE_MAX_REQUEST_BYTES. Formatting only; an oversized Cutter
reply still stays an unknown execution.

Co-authored-by: morluto <morluto@users.noreply.github.com>

* fix(cutter): exclude the LF from the response frame budget

REA_BRIDGE_MAX_REQUEST_BYTES counts payload bytes. The Cutter response
reader and authenticated encoder were reserving one byte for the
terminating LF, so an exact-limit response was rejected. A reply that
exceeds the ceiling after the command was sent still stays an unknown
execution.

Co-authored-by: morluto <morluto@users.noreply.github.com>

* fix(bridge): measure escaped JSON before allocating the request

A command of U+0001 characters can expand sixfold. JSON.stringify of
that expansion can throw past Node's string ceiling before the payload
check. Count the escaped size within REA_BRIDGE_MAX_REQUEST_BYTES
first and refuse it as a resource constraint.

Co-authored-by: morluto <morluto@users.noreply.github.com>

* fix(config): derive the bridge request maximum from JSON expansion

A 256 MiB ceiling still lets a shorter U+0001 command expand past Node's
536870888-character string limit. The maximum is now
floor((536870888 - 296) / 7) = 76695798, the longest such command whose
authenticated frame fits in one string. Requests are still measured
before JSON.stringify.

Co-authored-by: morluto <morluto@users.noreply.github.com>

* fix(bridge): size the Cutter frame deadline and send the measured Hopper payload

The authenticated Cutter command is encoded after the challenge, so a
one-second read rejected an in-budget frame. That read now allows one
second per mebibyte of the ceiling and never waits longer than 25
seconds. Hello stays at one second. Hopper writes the payload it already
measured instead of serializing the same request again.

Co-authored-by: morluto <morluto@users.noreply.github.com>

* fix(config): bound the bridge request maximum by the serialized string

The ceiling already measures escaped JSON, so dividing Node's string limit by the seven-byte expansion rejected encoded payloads that still fit. The maximum is 536870887, one byte under that string ceiling, leaving room for the framing LF.

Co-authored-by: morluto <morluto@users.noreply.github.com>

* fix(hopper): serialize a bridge request when it reaches the wire

The queue kept each encoded frame, plus the caller's params, until Hopper finished the active request. A raised ceiling made a few waiting calls enough to exhaust the heap. The FIFO now keeps the params, and the frame is encoded only for the request being written.

Co-authored-by: morluto <morluto@users.noreply.github.com>

* fix(cutter): hash the bridge proof prefix and payload separately

An exact-limit Cutter frame plus the HMAC prefix exceeds Node's single-string ceiling, so the client threw before sending an admitted command. The prefix and payload are now separate HMAC updates, including the response proof.

Co-authored-by: morluto <morluto@users.noreply.github.com>

* fix(cutter): keep recovery fields when a status path exceeds the frame

A long current_file made the status reply miss the ceiling, and the fallback then dropped session_id and the completion receipts. The status now omits the path and version and still returns the session, connection proof, and up to 64 receipts. That required recovery frame is smaller than the 7464 floor.

Co-authored-by: morluto <morluto@users.noreply.github.com>

* fix(cutter): report an unknown path when status identity does not fit

A bounded status kept the new document generation and omitted the path, so the client filled in the descriptor's older path. The observed path is sent when it fits. When it does not, current_file is null and is not replaced with that stale path.

Co-authored-by: morluto <morluto@users.noreply.github.com>

* fix(cutter): count structured replies by their encoded JSON size

The response guard charged 16 bytes per primitive and two bytes per list slot, so a dense array under the configured ceiling was replaced with output_truncated. Numbers, booleans, null, and container punctuation now use their JSON lengths.

Co-authored-by: morluto <morluto@users.noreply.github.com>

* fix(cutter): stream authenticated responses in bounded chunks

A fitting reply was signed from retained raw bytes, escaped bytes, and a
joined frame, so a ceiling near 512 MiB could exhaust Cutter before send.
Measure and sign JSON pieces, then write the same frame in 64 KiB chunks.

Co-authored-by: morluto <morluto@users.noreply.github.com>

* fix(bridge): keep Cutter admission from stalling or hiding sessions

Read an unauthenticated frame off the accept loop. A command reply that
does not fit keeps completion and generation and reports an oversized path
as null. Discovery reports a ceiling mismatch instead of an absent session.
The maximum HMAC proof is opt-in, and both bridges reject non-ASCII digits.

Co-authored-by: morluto <morluto@users.noreply.github.com>

* fix(cutter): bound frame scans and client response copies

Search only newly read bytes for the framing LF. Unescape each socket
chunk into one response string, check the proof, and then parse it.

Co-authored-by: morluto <morluto@users.noreply.github.com>

* fix(cutter): keep completion, admission, and dense replies bounded

Report completed_connection only through connections that have
terminated. Cap connection threads and keep the listener up if one
fails to start. Batch scalar JSON and fail discovery when any ceiling
mismatches.

Co-authored-by: morluto <morluto@users.noreply.github.com>

* fix(cutter): hash requests in parts and scan escapes once

Update the client-proof prefix and request separately. Stop the response
decoder at the first quote or backslash instead of rescanning the tail.

Co-authored-by: morluto <morluto@users.noreply.github.com>

* fix(cutter): confirm live ceiling mismatches and omitted output

A stale descriptor from a previous ceiling is not a discovery mismatch
until its hello proves a live authenticated bridge. A response discarded
for the frame ceiling after dispatch reports output_truncated.

Co-authored-by: morluto <morluto@users.noreply.github.com>

* test(cutter): close the unauthenticated ceiling-mismatch fixture

The listener that fails the hello proof is destroyed after its challenge
so discovery cleanup does not wait on that socket.

Co-authored-by: morluto <morluto@users.noreply.github.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Cursor Agent <cursoragent@cursor.com>
Co-authored-by: morluto <morluto@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-10-23 06:11:21 +08:00

1331 lines
57 KiB
Python

"""REA's experimental local bridge plugin for Cutter.
Install this file in Cutter's user plugin directory. The bridge is REA-owned
IPC, not an upstream Cutter transport. It binds to loopback and requires a
per-process random token stored in a user-only descriptor file.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import json
import hashlib
import hmac
import os
import re
import secrets
import socket
import stat
import tempfile
import threading
import time
import uuid
from pathlib import Path
from typing import Any
if os.name == "nt":
import ctypes
from ctypes import wintypes
import cutter
try:
from PySide6.QtCore import QCoreApplication, QObject, Signal
except ImportError:
from PySide2.QtCore import QCoreApplication, QObject, Signal
# Request and response frame budget in bytes, excluding the trailing LF.
# REA_BRIDGE_MAX_REQUEST_BYTES selects it. Unset stays 16777216.
# 7464 is the authenticated frame of the largest bounded symbol name.
# The 64-receipt recovery status is smaller with current_file null. A path
# that fits is kept. A path that does not fit is null, not the descriptor path.
# 536870887 is Node's 536870888-character string ceiling minus the framing LF.
# The ceiling is the encoded payload; JSON expansion is measured before it.
# A fitting response is signed from bounded JSON pieces and written in 64 KiB
# chunks, so this maximum does not retain several copies of the frame.
_BRIDGE_MAX_REQUEST_BYTES_SETTING = "REA_BRIDGE_MAX_REQUEST_BYTES"
DEFAULT_BRIDGE_MAX_REQUEST_BYTES = 16 * 1024 * 1024
MINIMUM_BRIDGE_MAX_REQUEST_BYTES = 7464
MAXIMUM_BRIDGE_MAX_REQUEST_BYTES = 536870887
# The outer authenticated frame around the escaped JSON payload, excluding LF.
_AUTHENTICATED_PREFIX = b'{"response":"'
_AUTHENTICATED_PROOF_MARK = b'","proof":"'
_PROOF_HEX_LENGTH = 64
_AUTHENTICATED_FRAME_OVERHEAD = (
len(_AUTHENTICATED_PREFIX)
+ len(_AUTHENTICATED_PROOF_MARK)
+ _PROOF_HEX_LENGTH
+ len(b'"}')
)
_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_BUFFER_BYTES = 64 * 1024
# Raw JSON is produced in pieces no larger than this many characters.
# One character expands to at most six JSON bytes (\u00XX) before the outer
# string escape, so a piece stays far below the frame ceiling.
_JSON_CHUNK_CHARS = 64 * 1024
# Fixed admission cap. It does not follow REA_BRIDGE_MAX_REQUEST_BYTES.
# A further accept is closed. Starting a worker must not stop the listener.
MAX_CONNECTION_WORKERS = 8
def _close_socket(connection: socket.socket) -> None:
try:
connection.close()
except OSError:
pass
def _bridge_max_request_bytes_constraint():
return (
"REA_BRIDGE_MAX_REQUEST_BYTES must be a positive decimal integer "
"from %d to %d bytes; the default is %d bytes (16 MiB). "
"A value below %d bytes cannot carry the largest admitted "
"symbol-name command, and a larger value is refused so the encoded "
"payload plus its framing LF stays one string under Node's "
"single-string ceiling."
% (
MINIMUM_BRIDGE_MAX_REQUEST_BYTES,
MAXIMUM_BRIDGE_MAX_REQUEST_BYTES,
DEFAULT_BRIDGE_MAX_REQUEST_BYTES,
MINIMUM_BRIDGE_MAX_REQUEST_BYTES,
)
)
def _parse_bridge_max_request_bytes(raw):
"""Refuse a non-decimal or out-of-range ceiling. Never fall back."""
constraint = _bridge_max_request_bytes_constraint()
if isinstance(raw, bool):
raise RuntimeError(constraint)
if isinstance(raw, int):
value = raw
elif isinstance(raw, str):
# ASCII digits only. str.isdigit() accepts numerals such as U+0668
# that the TypeScript setting rejects.
if re.fullmatch(r"[1-9][0-9]*", raw) is None:
raise RuntimeError(constraint)
value = int(raw)
else:
raise RuntimeError(constraint)
if (
value < MINIMUM_BRIDGE_MAX_REQUEST_BYTES
or value > MAXIMUM_BRIDGE_MAX_REQUEST_BYTES
):
raise RuntimeError(constraint)
return value
def _resolve_bridge_max_request_bytes():
"""Prefer an injected global, then the process environment, then 16 MiB."""
injected = globals().get(_BRIDGE_MAX_REQUEST_BYTES_SETTING)
if injected is not None:
return _parse_bridge_max_request_bytes(injected), "setting"
raw = os.environ.get(_BRIDGE_MAX_REQUEST_BYTES_SETTING)
if raw is None:
return DEFAULT_BRIDGE_MAX_REQUEST_BYTES, "default"
return _parse_bridge_max_request_bytes(raw), "setting"
MAX_FRAME_BYTES, BRIDGE_MAX_REQUEST_BYTES_SOURCE = (
_resolve_bridge_max_request_bytes()
)
def _bridge_max_request_bytes_recovery():
return (
"The effective REA_BRIDGE_MAX_REQUEST_BYTES value is %d bytes "
"(source %s; default %d, floor %d, maximum %d). "
"Set REA_BRIDGE_MAX_REQUEST_BYTES in the environment that starts REA "
"to a decimal integer from %d to %d, then restart REA. "
"Restart Hopper or Cutter from that same environment so the bridge "
"uses this ceiling."
% (
MAX_FRAME_BYTES,
BRIDGE_MAX_REQUEST_BYTES_SOURCE,
DEFAULT_BRIDGE_MAX_REQUEST_BYTES,
MINIMUM_BRIDGE_MAX_REQUEST_BYTES,
MAXIMUM_BRIDGE_MAX_REQUEST_BYTES,
MINIMUM_BRIDGE_MAX_REQUEST_BYTES,
MAXIMUM_BRIDGE_MAX_REQUEST_BYTES,
)
)
def _frame_limit_exceeded():
return ValueError(
"frame-limit-exceeded: Bridge request exceeds the %d-byte payload limit. %s"
% (MAX_FRAME_BYTES, _bridge_max_request_bytes_recovery())
)
SOCKET_TIMEOUT_SECONDS = 20
AUTH_FRAME_TIMEOUT_SECONDS = 1
# The client request deadline. The authenticated frame read may use up to
# this long; it does not grow past it when the byte ceiling is raised.
REQUEST_DEADLINE_SECONDS = 25
def _authenticated_frame_timeout_seconds():
"""Time to hash and transfer one maximum-sized authenticated frame.
The hello frame stays at one second. The following command frame is
built only after that challenge, so its read budget follows the
configured payload size, at one second per mebibyte, and never exceeds
the 25 second client deadline.
"""
mebibytes = (MAX_FRAME_BYTES + (1024 * 1024) - 1) // (1024 * 1024)
return min(
REQUEST_DEADLINE_SECONDS,
max(AUTH_FRAME_TIMEOUT_SECONDS, mebibytes),
)
MAX_DESCRIPTOR_BYTES = 64 * 1024
MAX_COMPLETION_RECEIPTS = 64
def _windows_api() -> tuple[Any, Any]:
kernel32 = ctypes.WinDLL("kernel32", use_last_error=True)
advapi32 = ctypes.WinDLL("advapi32", use_last_error=True)
kernel32.GetCurrentProcess.restype = wintypes.HANDLE
kernel32.LocalFree.argtypes = [wintypes.HLOCAL]
kernel32.LocalFree.restype = wintypes.HLOCAL
kernel32.CloseHandle.argtypes = [wintypes.HANDLE]
kernel32.CloseHandle.restype = wintypes.BOOL
kernel32.GetFileAttributesW.argtypes = [wintypes.LPCWSTR]
kernel32.GetFileAttributesW.restype = wintypes.DWORD
kernel32.CreateDirectoryW.argtypes = [wintypes.LPCWSTR, wintypes.LPVOID]
kernel32.CreateDirectoryW.restype = wintypes.BOOL
kernel32.CreateFileW.argtypes = [wintypes.LPCWSTR, wintypes.DWORD, wintypes.DWORD,
wintypes.LPVOID, wintypes.DWORD, wintypes.DWORD, wintypes.HANDLE]
kernel32.CreateFileW.restype = wintypes.HANDLE
kernel32.WriteFile.argtypes = [wintypes.HANDLE, wintypes.LPVOID, wintypes.DWORD,
ctypes.POINTER(wintypes.DWORD), wintypes.LPVOID]
kernel32.WriteFile.restype = wintypes.BOOL
kernel32.FlushFileBuffers.argtypes = [wintypes.HANDLE]
kernel32.FlushFileBuffers.restype = wintypes.BOOL
kernel32.MoveFileExW.argtypes = [wintypes.LPCWSTR, wintypes.LPCWSTR, wintypes.DWORD]
kernel32.MoveFileExW.restype = wintypes.BOOL
kernel32.DeleteFileW.argtypes = [wintypes.LPCWSTR]
kernel32.DeleteFileW.restype = wintypes.BOOL
advapi32.OpenProcessToken.argtypes = [wintypes.HANDLE, wintypes.DWORD, ctypes.POINTER(wintypes.HANDLE)]
advapi32.OpenProcessToken.restype = wintypes.BOOL
advapi32.GetTokenInformation.argtypes = [wintypes.HANDLE, ctypes.c_int, wintypes.LPVOID,
wintypes.DWORD, ctypes.POINTER(wintypes.DWORD)]
advapi32.GetTokenInformation.restype = wintypes.BOOL
advapi32.ConvertSidToStringSidW.argtypes = [wintypes.LPVOID, ctypes.POINTER(wintypes.LPWSTR)]
advapi32.ConvertSidToStringSidW.restype = wintypes.BOOL
advapi32.GetNamedSecurityInfoW.argtypes = [wintypes.LPWSTR, ctypes.c_int, wintypes.DWORD,
ctypes.POINTER(wintypes.LPVOID), ctypes.POINTER(wintypes.LPVOID),
ctypes.POINTER(wintypes.LPVOID), ctypes.POINTER(wintypes.LPVOID),
ctypes.POINTER(wintypes.LPVOID)]
advapi32.GetNamedSecurityInfoW.restype = wintypes.DWORD
advapi32.GetSecurityDescriptorControl.argtypes = [wintypes.LPVOID, ctypes.POINTER(wintypes.WORD),
ctypes.POINTER(wintypes.DWORD)]
advapi32.GetSecurityDescriptorControl.restype = wintypes.BOOL
advapi32.EqualSid.argtypes = [wintypes.LPVOID, wintypes.LPVOID]
advapi32.EqualSid.restype = wintypes.BOOL
advapi32.GetAclInformation.argtypes = [wintypes.LPVOID, wintypes.LPVOID, wintypes.DWORD, ctypes.c_int]
advapi32.GetAclInformation.restype = wintypes.BOOL
advapi32.GetAce.argtypes = [wintypes.LPVOID, wintypes.DWORD, ctypes.POINTER(wintypes.LPVOID)]
advapi32.GetAce.restype = wintypes.BOOL
advapi32.IsValidSid.argtypes = [wintypes.LPVOID]
advapi32.IsValidSid.restype = wintypes.BOOL
advapi32.GetLengthSid.argtypes = [wintypes.LPVOID]
advapi32.GetLengthSid.restype = wintypes.DWORD
advapi32.ConvertStringSecurityDescriptorToSecurityDescriptorW.argtypes = [
wintypes.LPCWSTR, wintypes.DWORD, ctypes.POINTER(wintypes.LPVOID), ctypes.POINTER(wintypes.DWORD),
]
advapi32.ConvertStringSecurityDescriptorToSecurityDescriptorW.restype = wintypes.BOOL
return kernel32, advapi32
def _windows_user_sid_text() -> str:
kernel32, advapi32 = _windows_api()
token = wintypes.HANDLE()
if not advapi32.OpenProcessToken(kernel32.GetCurrentProcess(), 0x0008, ctypes.byref(token)):
raise ctypes.WinError(ctypes.get_last_error())
try:
required = wintypes.DWORD()
advapi32.GetTokenInformation(token, 1, None, 0, ctypes.byref(required))
if required.value == 0:
raise ctypes.WinError(ctypes.get_last_error())
buffer = ctypes.create_string_buffer(required.value)
if not advapi32.GetTokenInformation(token, 1, buffer, required, ctypes.byref(required)):
raise ctypes.WinError(ctypes.get_last_error())
class SID_AND_ATTRIBUTES(ctypes.Structure):
_fields_ = [("Sid", wintypes.LPVOID), ("Attributes", wintypes.DWORD)]
class TOKEN_USER(ctypes.Structure):
_fields_ = [("User", SID_AND_ATTRIBUTES)]
sid = ctypes.cast(buffer, ctypes.POINTER(TOKEN_USER)).contents.User.Sid
text = wintypes.LPWSTR()
if not advapi32.ConvertSidToStringSidW(sid, ctypes.byref(text)):
raise ctypes.WinError(ctypes.get_last_error())
try:
return text.value
finally:
kernel32.LocalFree(text)
finally:
kernel32.CloseHandle(token)
def _verify_windows_private_path(path: Path, directory: bool) -> None:
kernel32, advapi32 = _windows_api()
attributes = kernel32.GetFileAttributesW(str(path))
if attributes == 0xFFFFFFFF:
raise ctypes.WinError(ctypes.get_last_error())
if attributes & 0x400 or bool(attributes & 0x10) != directory:
raise RuntimeError("Cutter bridge path is a reparse point or has the wrong object type")
class ACL_SIZE_INFORMATION(ctypes.Structure):
_fields_ = [("AceCount", wintypes.DWORD), ("AclBytesInUse", wintypes.DWORD), ("AclBytesFree", wintypes.DWORD)]
class ACE_HEADER(ctypes.Structure):
_fields_ = [("AceType", wintypes.BYTE), ("AceFlags", wintypes.BYTE), ("AceSize", wintypes.WORD)]
class SID_HEADER(ctypes.Structure):
_fields_ = [("Revision", wintypes.BYTE), ("SubAuthorityCount", wintypes.BYTE),
("IdentifierAuthority", wintypes.BYTE * 6)]
class ACCESS_ALLOWED_ACE(ctypes.Structure):
_fields_ = [("Header", ACE_HEADER), ("Mask", wintypes.DWORD), ("SidStart", wintypes.DWORD)]
owner = wintypes.LPVOID()
dacl = wintypes.LPVOID()
descriptor = wintypes.LPVOID()
result = advapi32.GetNamedSecurityInfoW(
str(path), 1, 0x1 | 0x4, ctypes.byref(owner), None, ctypes.byref(dacl), None, ctypes.byref(descriptor),
)
if result != 0:
raise ctypes.WinError(result)
try:
control = wintypes.WORD()
revision = wintypes.DWORD()
if not advapi32.GetSecurityDescriptorControl(descriptor, ctypes.byref(control), ctypes.byref(revision)):
raise ctypes.WinError(ctypes.get_last_error())
if not control.value & 0x1000 or not dacl:
raise RuntimeError("Cutter bridge ACL must be present and protected from inheritance")
token = wintypes.HANDLE()
if not advapi32.OpenProcessToken(kernel32.GetCurrentProcess(), 0x0008, ctypes.byref(token)):
raise ctypes.WinError(ctypes.get_last_error())
try:
required = wintypes.DWORD()
advapi32.GetTokenInformation(token, 1, None, 0, ctypes.byref(required))
token_user = ctypes.create_string_buffer(required.value)
if not advapi32.GetTokenInformation(token, 1, token_user, required, ctypes.byref(required)):
raise ctypes.WinError(ctypes.get_last_error())
class SID_AND_ATTRIBUTES(ctypes.Structure):
_fields_ = [("Sid", wintypes.LPVOID), ("Attributes", wintypes.DWORD)]
class TOKEN_USER(ctypes.Structure):
_fields_ = [("User", SID_AND_ATTRIBUTES)]
current_sid = ctypes.cast(token_user, ctypes.POINTER(TOKEN_USER)).contents.User.Sid
if not advapi32.EqualSid(owner, current_sid):
raise RuntimeError("Cutter bridge path owner does not match the current user")
finally:
kernel32.CloseHandle(token)
info = ACL_SIZE_INFORMATION()
if not advapi32.GetAclInformation(dacl, ctypes.byref(info), ctypes.sizeof(info), 2) or info.AceCount != 2:
raise RuntimeError("Cutter bridge ACL must allow only the current user and SYSTEM")
expected_user = _windows_user_sid_text()
user_allowed = False
system_allowed = False
for index in range(info.AceCount):
ace_pointer = wintypes.LPVOID()
if not advapi32.GetAce(dacl, index, ctypes.byref(ace_pointer)):
raise ctypes.WinError(ctypes.get_last_error())
header = ctypes.cast(ace_pointer, ctypes.POINTER(ACE_HEADER)).contents
if header.AceType != 0 or header.AceSize < ctypes.sizeof(ACE_HEADER) + ctypes.sizeof(wintypes.DWORD) + ctypes.sizeof(SID_HEADER):
raise RuntimeError("Cutter bridge ACL contains a malformed or unsupported ACE")
ace_address = ctypes.cast(ace_pointer, ctypes.c_void_p).value
if ace_address is None:
raise RuntimeError("Cutter bridge ACL returned a null ACE")
sid_pointer = ctypes.c_void_p(ace_address + ctypes.sizeof(ACE_HEADER) + ctypes.sizeof(wintypes.DWORD))
sid_header = ctypes.cast(sid_pointer, ctypes.POINTER(SID_HEADER)).contents
sid_size = ctypes.sizeof(SID_HEADER) + sid_header.SubAuthorityCount * ctypes.sizeof(wintypes.DWORD)
if sid_size > header.AceSize - ctypes.sizeof(ACE_HEADER) - ctypes.sizeof(wintypes.DWORD) or not advapi32.IsValidSid(sid_pointer) or advapi32.GetLengthSid(sid_pointer) != sid_size:
raise RuntimeError("Cutter bridge ACL contains an invalid SID")
ace = ctypes.cast(ace_pointer, ctypes.POINTER(ACCESS_ALLOWED_ACE)).contents
sid_text = wintypes.LPWSTR()
if ace.Mask != 0x001F01FF or ace.Header.AceFlags != 0x03:
raise RuntimeError("Cutter bridge ACL contains an unsupported ACE")
if not advapi32.ConvertSidToStringSidW(sid_pointer, ctypes.byref(sid_text)):
raise ctypes.WinError(ctypes.get_last_error())
try:
if sid_text.value == expected_user:
user_allowed = True
elif sid_text.value == "S-1-5-18":
system_allowed = True
else:
raise RuntimeError("Cutter bridge ACL allows an unrelated principal")
finally:
kernel32.LocalFree(sid_text)
if not user_allowed or not system_allowed:
raise RuntimeError("Cutter bridge ACL must allow only the current user and SYSTEM")
finally:
kernel32.LocalFree(descriptor)
def _windows_security_attributes() -> tuple[Any, Any]:
kernel32, advapi32 = _windows_api()
sid = _windows_user_sid_text()
sddl = f"O:{sid}G:{sid}D:P(A;OICI;FA;;;{sid})(A;OICI;FA;;;SY)"
descriptor = wintypes.LPVOID()
if not advapi32.ConvertStringSecurityDescriptorToSecurityDescriptorW(sddl, 1, ctypes.byref(descriptor), None):
raise ctypes.WinError(ctypes.get_last_error())
class SECURITY_ATTRIBUTES(ctypes.Structure):
_fields_ = [("nLength", wintypes.DWORD), ("lpSecurityDescriptor", wintypes.LPVOID), ("bInheritHandle", wintypes.BOOL)]
attributes = SECURITY_ATTRIBUTES(ctypes.sizeof(SECURITY_ATTRIBUTES), descriptor, False)
return kernel32, (descriptor, attributes)
def _ensure_windows_bridge_directory(directory: Path) -> None:
directory.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
if not directory.exists():
kernel32, (descriptor, attributes) = _windows_security_attributes()
try:
if not kernel32.CreateDirectoryW(str(directory), ctypes.byref(attributes)):
error = ctypes.get_last_error()
if error != 183:
raise ctypes.WinError(error)
finally:
kernel32.LocalFree(descriptor)
_verify_windows_private_path(directory, True)
def _ensure_posix_bridge_directory(directory: Path) -> None:
directory.mkdir(mode=0o700, parents=True, exist_ok=True)
if not hasattr(os, "O_NOFOLLOW") or not hasattr(os, "O_DIRECTORY"):
raise RuntimeError("Cutter bridge directory requires no-follow directory handles")
descriptor = os.open(directory, os.O_RDONLY | os.O_DIRECTORY | os.O_NOFOLLOW)
try:
directory_info = os.fstat(descriptor)
if directory_info.st_uid != os.getuid():
raise RuntimeError("Cutter bridge directory must be owned by the current user")
os.fchmod(descriptor, 0o700)
directory_info = os.fstat(descriptor)
if stat.S_IMODE(directory_info.st_mode) != 0o700:
raise RuntimeError("Cutter bridge directory must have mode 0700")
finally:
os.close(descriptor)
def _write_windows_descriptor(directory: Path, destination: Path, payload: bytes) -> None:
if len(payload) > MAX_DESCRIPTOR_BYTES:
raise RuntimeError("Cutter bridge descriptor exceeds its byte limit")
kernel32, (security_descriptor, attributes) = _windows_security_attributes()
temporary = directory / f".{destination.name}.{uuid.uuid4().hex}.tmp"
handle = wintypes.HANDLE()
try:
handle = kernel32.CreateFileW(str(temporary), 0x40000000 | 0x00020000 | 0x00040000,
0x1 | 0x2 | 0x4, ctypes.byref(attributes), 1, 0x80, None)
if handle == wintypes.HANDLE(-1).value:
raise ctypes.WinError(ctypes.get_last_error())
_verify_windows_private_path(temporary, False)
if payload:
data = ctypes.create_string_buffer(payload)
written = wintypes.DWORD()
if not kernel32.WriteFile(handle, data, len(payload), ctypes.byref(written), None) or written.value != len(payload):
raise ctypes.WinError(ctypes.get_last_error())
if not kernel32.FlushFileBuffers(handle):
raise ctypes.WinError(ctypes.get_last_error())
kernel32.CloseHandle(handle)
handle = wintypes.HANDLE()
if not kernel32.MoveFileExW(str(temporary), str(destination), 0x1 | 0x8):
raise ctypes.WinError(ctypes.get_last_error())
finally:
if handle and handle != wintypes.HANDLE(-1).value:
kernel32.CloseHandle(handle)
kernel32.DeleteFileW(str(temporary))
kernel32.LocalFree(security_descriptor)
def _bridge_directory() -> Path:
configured = os.environ.get("REA_CUTTER_BRIDGE_DIR")
if configured:
return Path(configured).expanduser()
local_app_data = os.environ.get("LOCALAPPDATA")
if os.name == "nt" and local_app_data:
return Path(local_app_data) / "REA" / "CutterBridge"
return Path.home() / ".cache" / "rea" / "cutter-bridge"
class _RequestDispatcher(QObject):
dispatch = Signal(object, object)
def __init__(self) -> None:
super().__init__()
self.dispatch.connect(self._handle)
self.generation = 0
self.completed_commands: dict[str, str] = {}
self._receipt_lock = threading.Lock()
self.current_file = self._read_current_file()
try:
value = QCoreApplication.applicationVersion()
self.cutter_version = value if isinstance(value, str) and value else None
except Exception:
self.cutter_version = None
@staticmethod
def _read_current_file() -> str | None:
try:
value = cutter.core().getConfig("file.path")
return value if isinstance(value, str) and value else None
except Exception:
return None
def _handle(self, request: dict[str, Any], reply: dict[str, Any]) -> None:
kind = request.get("kind")
request_id = request.get("request_id")
if kind in ("command", "ack"):
try:
valid_request_id = (
isinstance(request_id, str)
and str(uuid.UUID(request_id)) == request_id.lower()
)
except (ValueError, AttributeError):
valid_request_id = False
if not valid_request_id:
reply.update({
"ok": False,
"error": "invalid-command-request-id",
"execution_state": "not_started",
})
request["_event"].set()
return
if kind == "ack":
with self._receipt_lock:
acknowledged = self.completed_commands.pop(request_id, None) is not None
reply.update({"ok": True, "acknowledged": acknowledged})
request["_event"].set()
return
if request["_cancelled"].is_set():
reply.update({
"ok": False,
"error": "request-cancelled-before-execution",
"execution_state": "not_started",
})
if kind == "command":
self._record_command_completion(request_id, "not_started")
request["_event"].set()
return
self._refresh_document_identity()
if kind == "status":
with self._receipt_lock:
completed_commands = [
{"request_id": receipt_id, "execution_state": state}
for receipt_id, state in self.completed_commands.items()
]
reply.update({
"ok": True,
"session_id": request.get("session_id"),
"current_file": self.current_file,
"document_generation": self.generation,
"cutter_version": self.cutter_version,
"identity_status": "partial",
"completed_commands": completed_commands,
})
request["_event"].set()
return
if kind != "command":
reply.update({"ok": False, "error": "unsupported-request-kind"})
request["_event"].set()
return
if request.get("expected_generation") != self.generation:
reply.update({
"ok": False,
"error": "active-document-generation-changed",
"execution_state": "not_started",
})
self._record_command_completion(request_id, "not_started")
request["_event"].set()
return
command = request.get("command")
if not isinstance(command, str) or not command.strip():
reply.update({
"ok": False,
"error": "invalid-command",
"execution_state": "not_started",
})
self._record_command_completion(request_id, "not_started")
request["_event"].set()
return
reply["execution_state"] = "running"
try:
output = cutter.cmdj(command) if request.get("json") is True else cutter.cmd(command)
command_error = None
except Exception as error:
output = None
command_error = str(error)
self._refresh_document_identity()
if command_error is None:
reply.update({
"ok": True,
"output": output,
"current_file": self.current_file,
"document_generation": self.generation,
"cutter_version": self.cutter_version,
"identity_status": "partial",
"execution_state": "complete",
})
self._record_command_completion(request_id, "complete")
else:
reply.update({
"ok": False,
"error": command_error,
"current_file": self.current_file,
"document_generation": self.generation,
"cutter_version": self.cutter_version,
"identity_status": "partial",
"execution_state": "unknown",
"message": "The command raised an exception; it may have produced partial effects. Do not retry automatically.",
})
self._record_command_completion(request_id, "failed")
request["_event"].set()
def _record_command_completion(
self, request_id: str, execution_state: str
) -> None:
with self._receipt_lock:
if request_id in self.completed_commands or len(self.completed_commands) < MAX_COMPLETION_RECEIPTS:
self.completed_commands[request_id] = execution_state
def can_accept_command(self) -> bool:
with self._receipt_lock:
return len(self.completed_commands) < MAX_COMPLETION_RECEIPTS
def _refresh_document_identity(self) -> None:
current_file = self._read_current_file()
if current_file != self.current_file:
self.current_file = current_file
self.generation += 1
class _BridgeServer(threading.Thread):
def __init__(self, dispatcher: _RequestDispatcher) -> None:
super().__init__(name="rea-cutter-bridge", daemon=True)
self.dispatcher = dispatcher
self.server = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM)
self.server.setsockopt(socket.SOL_SOCKET, socket.SO_REUSEADDR, 1)
self.server.bind(("127.0.0.1", 0))
self.server.listen(8)
self.server.settimeout(0.5)
self.port = self.server.getsockname()[1]
self.session_id = str(uuid.uuid4())
self.token = secrets.token_urlsafe(32)
self.poisoned = False
self.connection_ordinal = 0
# The client proof is inside the authenticated frame, so that read
# cannot start after proof. It runs off the accept loop. One
# authenticated command still runs at a time. completed_connection
# is the longest prefix of these ordinals whose handlers have
# terminated, not "this status ordinal minus one".
self._command_lock = threading.Lock()
self._connections_lock = threading.Lock()
self._connections: set[socket.socket] = set()
self._workers: list[threading.Thread] = []
self._finished_through = 0
self._finished_ordinals: set[int] = set()
self.directory = _bridge_directory()
self.descriptor = self.directory / f"cutter-{os.getpid()}-{self.session_id}.json"
def publish(self) -> None:
if os.name == "nt":
_ensure_windows_bridge_directory(self.directory)
else:
_ensure_posix_bridge_directory(self.directory)
if os.name == "nt" and (self.directory.is_symlink() or not self.directory.is_dir()):
raise RuntimeError("Cutter bridge directory must be a real directory")
payload = {
"session_id": self.session_id,
"pid": os.getpid(),
"host": "127.0.0.1",
"port": self.port,
"token": self.token,
"document_generation": self.dispatcher.generation,
"current_file": self.dispatcher.current_file,
"cutter_version": self.dispatcher.cutter_version,
"identity_status": "partial",
"max_request_bytes": MAX_FRAME_BYTES,
}
if os.name == "nt":
_write_windows_descriptor(self.directory, self.descriptor, json.dumps(payload).encode("utf-8"))
return
descriptor, temporary_path = tempfile.mkstemp(prefix=f".{self.descriptor.name}.", dir=self.directory)
try:
os.fchmod(descriptor, 0o600)
descriptor_info = os.fstat(descriptor)
if descriptor_info.st_uid != os.getuid() or stat.S_IMODE(descriptor_info.st_mode) & 0o077:
raise RuntimeError("Cutter bridge descriptor must be owned by the current user with mode 0600")
with os.fdopen(descriptor, "w", encoding="utf-8") as stream:
stream.write(json.dumps(payload))
stream.flush()
os.fsync(stream.fileno())
os.replace(temporary_path, self.descriptor)
except Exception:
try:
os.close(descriptor)
except OSError:
pass
try:
os.unlink(temporary_path)
except OSError:
pass
raise
def run(self) -> None:
try:
self.publish()
except Exception:
self.server.close()
return
while True:
try:
connection, _ = self.server.accept()
except socket.timeout:
if getattr(self, "stopping", False):
break
continue
except OSError:
break
with self._connections_lock:
self._workers = [
worker for worker in self._workers if worker.is_alive()
]
at_capacity = len(self._workers) >= MAX_CONNECTION_WORKERS
if at_capacity:
_close_socket(connection)
continue
self.connection_ordinal += 1
connection_ordinal = self.connection_ordinal
worker = threading.Thread(
target=self._serve_connection,
args=(connection, connection_ordinal),
name="rea-cutter-bridge-connection",
daemon=True,
)
with self._connections_lock:
self._connections.add(connection)
self._workers.append(worker)
try:
worker.start()
except RuntimeError:
with self._connections_lock:
self._connections.discard(connection)
if worker in self._workers:
self._workers.remove(worker)
self._note_connection_finished(connection_ordinal)
_close_socket(connection)
with self._connections_lock:
workers = list(self._workers)
for worker in workers:
worker.join(timeout=1)
self.server.close()
try:
self.descriptor.unlink(missing_ok=True)
except OSError:
pass
def _serve_connection(self, connection: socket.socket, connection_ordinal: int) -> None:
try:
with connection:
connection.settimeout(AUTH_FRAME_TIMEOUT_SECONDS)
authenticated = False
try:
hello = self._receive_frame(connection)
if not isinstance(hello, dict) or hello.get("kind") != "rea-auth-v2" or not isinstance(hello.get("nonce"), str) or len(hello["nonce"]) != 64:
self._send(connection, {"ok": False, "error": "authentication-failed"})
return
client_nonce = hello["nonce"]
server_nonce = f"{connection_ordinal:016x}{secrets.token_hex(24)}"
server_proof = hmac.new(self.token.encode(), f"rea-cutter-server-v2:{self.session_id}:{client_nonce}:{server_nonce}".encode(), hashlib.sha256).hexdigest()
self._send(connection, {"session_id": self.session_id, "nonce": server_nonce, "proof": server_proof})
authenticated_frame = self._receive_frame(
connection, _authenticated_frame_timeout_seconds()
)
request_bytes = authenticated_frame.get("request") if isinstance(authenticated_frame, dict) else None
presented_proof = authenticated_frame.get("proof") if isinstance(authenticated_frame, dict) else None
if not isinstance(request_bytes, str) or not isinstance(presented_proof, str):
self._send(connection, {"ok": False, "error": "authentication-failed"})
return
# Update the prefix and the request separately. One joined
# preimage would retain another copy of a maximum-sized command.
expected_proof = hmac.new(self.token.encode(), digestmod=hashlib.sha256)
expected_proof.update(
f"rea-cutter-client-v2:{self.session_id}:{client_nonce}:{server_nonce}:".encode()
)
expected_proof.update(request_bytes.encode())
if not hmac.compare_digest(presented_proof, expected_proof.hexdigest()):
self._send(connection, {"ok": False, "error": "authentication-failed"})
return
request = json.loads(request_bytes)
if not isinstance(request, dict) or request.get("session_id") != self.session_id:
self._send(connection, {"ok": False, "error": "authentication-failed"})
return
authenticated = True
with self._command_lock:
connection.settimeout(SOCKET_TIMEOUT_SECONDS)
if self.poisoned and request.get("kind") not in ("status", "ack"):
self._send_authenticated(connection, {
"ok": False,
"error": "session-poisoned-after-ui-timeout",
"execution_state": "not_started",
}, client_nonce, server_nonce)
return
if (
request.get("kind") == "command"
and not self.dispatcher.can_accept_command()
):
self._send_authenticated(connection, {
"ok": False,
"error": "completion-receipt-capacity-exceeded",
"execution_state": "not_started",
}, client_nonce, server_nonce)
return
request["session_id"] = self.session_id
event = threading.Event()
cancelled = threading.Event()
reply: dict[str, Any] = {}
request["_event"] = event
request["_cancelled"] = cancelled
self.dispatcher.dispatch.emit(request, reply)
if not event.wait(SOCKET_TIMEOUT_SECONDS):
cancelled.set()
self.poisoned = True
self._send_authenticated(connection, {
"ok": False,
"error": "ui-thread-request-timeout",
"execution_state": "unknown",
"message": "The UI operation may still complete after this timeout; restart Cutter before issuing further commands.",
}, client_nonce, server_nonce)
else:
if request.get("kind") == "status" and reply.get("ok") is True:
reply["completed_connection"] = self._completion_watermark()
self._send_authenticated(connection, reply, client_nonce, server_nonce)
except socket.timeout:
if authenticated:
self._send_authenticated(connection, {
"ok": False,
"error": "request-timeout",
"execution_state": "unknown",
"message": "The command may have produced partial or persistent effects. Do not retry automatically.",
}, client_nonce, server_nonce)
except Exception as error:
self._send(connection, {"ok": False, "error": str(error)})
finally:
self._note_connection_finished(connection_ordinal)
with self._connections_lock:
self._connections.discard(connection)
def _note_connection_finished(self, ordinal: int) -> None:
"""Record one accepted connection as terminated.
The watermark is the longest prefix 1..W that has terminated. A later
status cannot report an earlier connection that is still reading or
still waiting to run.
"""
with self._connections_lock:
if ordinal <= self._finished_through or ordinal in self._finished_ordinals:
return
self._finished_ordinals.add(ordinal)
while self._finished_through + 1 in self._finished_ordinals:
self._finished_through += 1
self._finished_ordinals.discard(self._finished_through)
def _completion_watermark(self) -> str:
with self._connections_lock:
return f"{self._finished_through:016x}"
@staticmethod
def _receive_frame(
connection: socket.socket,
timeout_seconds: float = AUTH_FRAME_TIMEOUT_SECONDS,
) -> dict[str, Any]:
data = bytearray()
deadline = time.monotonic() + timeout_seconds
newline = -1
while newline < 0:
if len(data) > MAX_FRAME_BYTES:
raise _frame_limit_exceeded()
remaining = deadline - time.monotonic()
if remaining <= 0:
raise socket.timeout("authentication frame timed out")
connection.settimeout(remaining)
# MAX_FRAME_BYTES limits the JSON payload; the terminating LF is
# framing and may be the one byte beyond that payload budget.
part = connection.recv(min(65536, MAX_FRAME_BYTES + 1 - len(data)))
if not part:
raise ValueError("incomplete authentication frame")
scanned = len(data)
data.extend(part)
# The delimiter is one byte, so it cannot straddle a chunk.
# Search only the bytes just received.
newline = data.find(b"\n", scanned)
if newline > MAX_FRAME_BYTES:
raise _frame_limit_exceeded()
if newline != len(data) - 1:
raise ValueError("invalid framed request")
value = json.loads(bytes(data[:newline]))
return value if isinstance(value, dict) else {}
def _send_authenticated(self, connection: socket.socket, value: dict[str, Any], client_nonce: str, server_nonce: str) -> None:
if self._deliver_authenticated(connection, value, client_nonce, server_nonce):
return
# Keep the recovery payload. Include the observed path when it
# fits. An explicit null path means unknown, so the client does
# not pair this generation with the descriptor's older path.
bounded = self._bounded_status_response(value)
if bounded is not None:
observed_path = value.get("current_file")
if isinstance(observed_path, str) and observed_path:
with_path = dict(bounded)
with_path["current_file"] = observed_path
with_path.pop("message", None)
if self._deliver_authenticated(
connection, with_path, client_nonce, server_nonce
):
return
if self._deliver_authenticated(
connection, bounded, client_nonce, server_nonce
):
return
command = self._bounded_command_response(value)
if command is not None:
observed_path = value.get("current_file")
if isinstance(observed_path, str) and observed_path:
with_path = dict(command)
with_path["current_file"] = observed_path
with_path.pop("message", None)
if self._deliver_authenticated(
connection, with_path, client_nonce, server_nonce
):
return
if self._deliver_authenticated(
connection, command, client_nonce, server_nonce
):
return
value = self._truncated_response(value)
if self._deliver_authenticated(connection, value, client_nonce, server_nonce):
return
# This fixed-size fallback is checked through the same signed framing path.
self._deliver_authenticated(connection, {
"ok": False,
"error": "response-limit-exceeded",
"execution_state": value.get("execution_state", "unknown"),
"output": None,
"output_truncated": True,
"message": "The result exceeded the bridge frame limit; command completion state is preserved.",
}, client_nonce, server_nonce)
def _deliver_authenticated(
self, connection: socket.socket, value: dict[str, Any], client_nonce: str, server_nonce: str
) -> bool:
proof = self._authenticated_proof(value, client_nonce, server_nonce)
if proof is None:
return False
try:
self._write_authenticated_frame(connection, value, proof)
except OSError:
# A disconnected caller must not fall through to another payload.
pass
return True
def _authenticated_proof(
self, value: dict[str, Any], client_nonce: str, server_nonce: str
) -> str | None:
if not _within_response_limit(value):
return None
# The payload budget excludes the terminating LF. Fragments are
# measured and signed here, then discarded. The write pass encodes
# them again so a maximum-sized reply is not held in several copies.
frame_size = _AUTHENTICATED_FRAME_OVERHEAD
proof = hmac.new(self.token.encode(), digestmod=hashlib.sha256)
proof.update(
f"rea-cutter-response-v2:{self.session_id}:{client_nonce}:{server_nonce}:".encode()
)
for fragment in _response_fragments(value):
frame_size += len(_escape_json_fragment(fragment))
if frame_size > MAX_FRAME_BYTES:
return None
proof.update(fragment.encode("utf-8"))
return proof.hexdigest()
def _encode_authenticated_response(
self, value: dict[str, Any], client_nonce: str, server_nonce: str
) -> bytes | None:
"""Return one exact frame. The socket path writes the same pieces."""
proof = self._authenticated_proof(value, client_nonce, server_nonce)
if proof is None:
return None
return b"".join(self._iter_authenticated_frame(value, proof))
def _iter_authenticated_frame(self, value: dict[str, Any], proof: str):
yield _AUTHENTICATED_PREFIX
for fragment in _response_fragments(value):
yield _escape_json_fragment(fragment)
yield _AUTHENTICATED_PROOF_MARK + proof.encode("ascii") + b'"}\n'
def _write_authenticated_frame(
self, connection: socket.socket, value: dict[str, Any], proof: str
) -> None:
pending = bytearray()
for chunk in self._iter_authenticated_frame(value, proof):
pending.extend(chunk)
if len(pending) >= _AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_BUFFER_BYTES:
connection.sendall(pending)
pending.clear()
if pending:
connection.sendall(pending)
@staticmethod
def _bounded_status_response(value: dict[str, Any]) -> dict[str, Any] | None:
if "completed_commands" not in value and "completed_connection" not in value:
return None
bounded: dict[str, Any] = {
"ok": value.get("ok") is True,
"session_id": value.get("session_id"),
"document_generation": value.get("document_generation"),
"identity_status": value.get("identity_status", "partial"),
"completed_commands": value.get("completed_commands"),
"current_file": None,
"message": (
"current_file is unknown because the status frame exceeded "
"REA_BRIDGE_MAX_REQUEST_BYTES. Do not reuse an older descriptor "
"path with this document_generation."
),
}
if "completed_connection" in value:
bounded["completed_connection"] = value["completed_connection"]
return bounded
@staticmethod
def _bounded_command_response(value: dict[str, Any]) -> dict[str, Any] | None:
if "execution_state" not in value and "document_generation" not in value:
return None
bounded: dict[str, Any] = {
"ok": value.get("ok") is True,
"output": None,
"execution_state": value.get("execution_state", "unknown"),
"output_truncated": True,
"current_file": None,
"message": (
"current_file is unknown because the result frame exceeded "
"REA_BRIDGE_MAX_REQUEST_BYTES. The command completion state and "
"document_generation are preserved. Do not reuse an older "
"descriptor path with this document_generation."
),
}
generation = value.get("document_generation")
if isinstance(generation, int) and not isinstance(generation, bool):
bounded["document_generation"] = generation
if value.get("identity_status") == "partial":
bounded["identity_status"] = "partial"
if value.get("ok") is not True and isinstance(value.get("error"), str):
bounded["error"] = value["error"]
return bounded
@staticmethod
def _truncated_response(value: dict[str, Any]) -> dict[str, Any]:
response: dict[str, Any] = {
"ok": value.get("ok") is True,
"output": None,
"execution_state": value.get("execution_state", "unknown"),
"output_truncated": True,
"message": "The command result exceeded the bridge frame limit; completion state is preserved and output was omitted.",
}
for key in ("current_file", "document_generation", "cutter_version", "identity_status"):
if key in value:
response[key] = value[key]
if value.get("ok") is not True and isinstance(value.get("error"), str):
response["error"] = value["error"]
return response
@staticmethod
def _send(connection: socket.socket, value: dict[str, Any]) -> None:
if not _within_response_limit(value):
value = {
"ok": False,
"error": "response-limit-exceeded",
"execution_state": value.get("execution_state", "unknown"),
"output_truncated": True,
"message": "The command completed or may have completed, but its result exceeded the bridge response limit. Do not retry automatically.",
}
parts: list[bytes] = []
encoded_size = 0
for part in json.JSONEncoder(ensure_ascii=False).iterencode(value):
encoded_part = part.encode("utf-8")
encoded_size += len(encoded_part)
if encoded_size > MAX_FRAME_BYTES:
fallback = {
"ok": False,
"error": "response-limit-exceeded",
"execution_state": value.get("execution_state", "unknown"),
"output_truncated": True,
"message": "The command completed or may have completed, but its result exceeded the bridge response limit. Do not retry automatically.",
}
parts = [json.dumps(fallback, separators=(",", ":")).encode("utf-8")]
break
parts.append(encoded_part)
encoded = b"".join(parts)
try:
connection.sendall(encoded + b"\n")
except OSError:
# A disconnected caller must not terminate the bridge thread or
# prevent later commands from being served.
pass
def stop(self) -> None:
self.stopping = True
try:
self.server.close()
except OSError:
pass
with self._connections_lock:
connections = list(self._connections)
for connection in connections:
try:
connection.shutdown(socket.SHUT_RDWR)
except OSError:
pass
try:
connection.close()
except OSError:
pass
class ReaCutterPlugin(cutter.CutterPlugin):
name = "REA Local Bridge"
description = "Local REA analysis bridge for the active Cutter session"
version = "1.0"
author = "REA"
def __init__(self) -> None:
super().__init__()
self._dispatcher: _RequestDispatcher | None = None
self._bridge: _BridgeServer | None = None
def setupPlugin(self) -> None:
return
def setupInterface(self, main: Any) -> None:
self._dispatcher = _RequestDispatcher()
self._bridge = _BridgeServer(self._dispatcher)
self._bridge.start()
def terminate(self) -> None:
if self._bridge is not None:
self._bridge.stop()
self._bridge.join(timeout=2)
self._bridge = None
self._dispatcher = None
def create_cutter_plugin() -> ReaCutterPlugin:
return ReaCutterPlugin()
def _json_object_key(key: Any) -> str:
"""Match CPython's JSON object-key text before quoting."""
if isinstance(key, str):
return key
if key is True:
return "true"
if key is False:
return "false"
if key is None:
return "null"
if isinstance(key, int):
return str(key)
if isinstance(key, float):
return json.dumps(key, separators=(",", ":"))
raise TypeError("keys must be str, int, float, bool or None")
def _response_fragments(value: Any):
"""Yield compact JSON pieces whose concatenation is the encoded value.
String contents are sliced before encoding so a large output never becomes
one frame-sized fragment. Each piece is at most ``_JSON_CHUNK_CHARS``
characters, or the six-byte ``\\u00XX`` expansion of one such slice.
"""
if isinstance(value, str):
yield '"'
for start in range(0, len(value), _JSON_CHUNK_CHARS):
yield json.dumps(
value[start:start + _JSON_CHUNK_CHARS], ensure_ascii=False
)[1:-1]
yield '"'
return
if isinstance(value, dict):
yield "{"
first = True
for key, item in value.items():
if not first:
yield ","
first = False
yield from _response_fragments(_json_object_key(key))
yield ":"
yield from _response_fragments(item)
yield "}"
return
if isinstance(value, (list, tuple)):
yield from _list_fragments(value)
return
token = _scalar_token(value)
if token is None:
raise TypeError("response value is not JSON")
yield token
def _scalar_token(value: Any) -> str | None:
"""Compact JSON for one scalar. None means the value needs structure."""
if type(value) is int:
return str(value)
if value is None:
return "null"
if value is True:
return "true"
if value is False:
return "false"
if isinstance(value, float):
return json.dumps(value, separators=(",", ":"))
return None
def _list_fragments(value: list[Any] | tuple[Any, ...]):
"""Encode a list, batching scalars into bounded pieces.
One ``json.dumps`` per number makes a dense array miss the client
deadline. A batch is at most ``_JSON_CHUNK_CHARS`` of compact JSON.
"""
yield "["
first = True
batch: list[str] = []
batch_len = 0
def flush_batch() -> str | None:
nonlocal first, batch, batch_len
if not batch:
return None
piece = ",".join(batch)
batch = []
batch_len = 0
if first:
first = False
return piece
return "," + piece
for item in value:
token = _scalar_token(item)
if token is None:
emitted = flush_batch()
if emitted is not None:
yield emitted
if first:
first = False
else:
yield ","
yield from _response_fragments(item)
continue
extra = len(token) if not batch else len(token) + 1
if batch and batch_len + extra > _JSON_CHUNK_CHARS:
emitted = flush_batch()
if emitted is not None:
yield emitted
extra = len(token)
batch.append(token)
batch_len += extra
emitted = flush_batch()
if emitted is not None:
yield emitted
yield "]"
def _escape_json_fragment(fragment: str) -> bytes:
"""Escape one raw JSON piece for the outer response string."""
return json.dumps(fragment, ensure_ascii=False)[1:-1].encode("utf-8")
def _within_response_limit(value: Any) -> bool:
pending = [value]
seen: set[int] = set()
size = 0
while pending:
current = pending.pop()
if isinstance(current, str):
size += 2
if len(current) > MAX_FRAME_BYTES - size:
return False
if current.isascii():
size += len(current)
else:
# Count UTF-8 bytes without allocating a copy of the whole output.
try:
size += sum(
len(current[start:start + 65536].encode("utf-8"))
for start in range(0, len(current), 65536)
)
except UnicodeEncodeError:
# Unencodable output also needs the signed omission fallback.
return False
size += current.count('"') + current.count("\\")
# A short escape is two JSON bytes and was already counted as one.
# Other controls expand to a six-byte \\u00XX sequence.
size += sum(
1 if ord(character) in (0x08, 0x09, 0x0A, 0x0C, 0x0D) else 5
for character in current
if ord(character) < 0x20
)
elif isinstance(current, dict):
identity = id(current)
if identity in seen:
return False
seen.add(identity)
count = len(current)
# Braces, one colon per entry, and commas between entries.
# Keys and values are counted when they are visited.
size += 2 + count + max(0, count - 1)
if size > MAX_FRAME_BYTES:
return False
pending.extend(current.keys())
pending.extend(current.values())
elif isinstance(current, (list, tuple)):
identity = id(current)
if identity in seen:
return False
seen.add(identity)
count = len(current)
# Brackets and commas between items. Each item is counted below.
size += 2 + max(0, count - 1)
if size > MAX_FRAME_BYTES:
return False
pending.extend(current)
elif current is None:
size += 4
elif current is True:
size += 4
elif current is False:
size += 5
elif isinstance(current, int):
size += len(str(current))
elif isinstance(current, float):
size += len(json.dumps(current, separators=(",", ":")))
else:
try:
size += len(
json.dumps(current, ensure_ascii=False, separators=(",", ":"))
)
except (TypeError, ValueError):
return False
if size > MAX_FRAME_BYTES:
return False
return True