Files
reverse-engineering-anything/src/domain/hopperValues.test.ts
T
4aa51bfe19 fix(reverse): reconcile cleanup ownership and mutation diagnostics (#2799)
* feat(process): add owned debugger shutdown lifecycle

* feat(reverse): add local inspection commands

* feat(gdb): add persistent debugger integration

* feat(cutter): add Cutter bridge integration

* test(reverse): enforce complete integration coverage

* fix(process): preserve debugger shutdown ownership

* fix(reverse): retain evidence across interrupted commands

* fix(gdb): honor captured provider environment

* test(process): cover debugger shutdown retries

* fix(reverse): retain evidence for interrupted providers

* test(process): cover debugger shutdown retries

* fix(reverse): retain evidence for interrupted providers

* fix(server): snapshot provider environment at creation

* fix(reverse): close review gaps with complete coverage

* fix(reverse): address inspection review findings

* fix(gdb): bound sessions and retain cleanup ownership

* fix(ci): require reverse-tools quality lane

* fix(process): unref inherited debugger output pipes

* fix(reverse): address remaining PR 1960 findings

* fix(gdb): address remaining PR 1961 findings

* fix(reverse): account for unrestricted provider execution

* fix(process): retain debugger ownership until safe shutdown

* fix(process): preserve replacement debugger sessions

* fix(reverse): preserve admission and output provenance

* fix(process): retain exited debugger until output settles

* fix(mcp): bound provider admission and debugger cleanup

* fix(reverse): preserve failure provenance and classify E2BIG

* fix(gdb): preserve startup cleanup and detach safety

* fix(process): retain debugger ownership after detach failure

* fix(reverse): preserve mutation and failure provenance

* fix(gdb): address debugger review findings

* fix(reverse): rebind sessions after external mutation

* fix(process): cap debugger output after exit

* fix(gdb): protect one-shot detach verification

* feat(debugger): add reverse tool coverage gate

* test(debugger): cover integrated failure paths

* fix(gdb): bound and preserve session observations

* fix(gdb): address review regressions

* style: format merged integration files

* fix(reverse): preserve session and output evidence

* refactor(gdb): share repeated test and partial result setup

* fix(gdb): invalidate TTY proof for Python aliases

* fix(reverse): retain failure output byte counts

* test(process): synchronize late debugger output

* fix(gdb): invalidate TTY proof for wrapped commands

* fix(gdb): recognize wit command abbreviation

* test(reverse): wait for cancelled descendant readiness

* test(reverse): bound descendant cancellation cleanup

* style(reverse): format integration tests and adapters

* style: format reverse engineering integration files

* test(reverse): remove duplicate environment harness

* test(gdb): share session startup assertions

* fix(gdb): invalidate output proof for command abbreviations

* test(reverse): share composition edge case scenarios

* fix(ci): recognize verification and mutation tool entries

* test(rizin): cover successful fake inferior detach

* test(cli): align full output failure envelope

* test(cli): isolate reverse command lifecycle service

* test(process): share debugger output fixture setup

* fix(binary): preserve high-bit Windows signature bytes

* style(binary): format Windows signature parser

* test(mcp): preserve call coverage in unchanged comparison

* fix(ci): include reverse tools Vitest configs in lint cache

* fix(mcp): preserve target content on delivery errors

* ci: align duplication ceiling with expanded suite

* test(reverse): allow signal admission mutants

* fix(reverse): bound retained cleanup failures to process owners

* fix(test): replace drifting mutation ranges with owned selectors

* fix(reverse): admit persistent commands and retain cleanup ownership

* fix(cutter): recover timed-out commands from exact receipts

* fix(cutter): reject unsupported bridge request kinds

* fix(ci): repair client format and shared verification fixtures

* fix(native): preserve debugger cleanup ownership and bridge authentication

* test(native): retain diagnostics without perfect coverage requirements

* chore(licenses): refresh locked dependency inventory and notices

* fix(test): exclude transient command locks from mutation sandboxes

* fix(gdb): admit only platforms with safe detach verification

* fix(cutter): retain bounded completion receipts until acknowledgement

* fix(cutter): acknowledge commands rejected before UI dispatch

* test(reverse): fail cancellation checks before fixture teardown

* test(gdb): clean up the retained broken-stdin fixture owner

* docs(test): clarify focused provider verification scope

* fix(rizin): retain close cleanup failures

* fix(gdb): wait for inferior stop and bound MI buffering

* fix(cutter): retain failed receipt acknowledgements

* fix(rizin): return retained session identity on rebind failure

* fix(gdb): preserve startup cancellation and lossy status

* fix(rizin): retain launch provenance and assemble frames once

* fix(cutter): recover receipts across callers and bound discovery

* docs: describe debugger evidence and bridge recovery

* fix(process): keep cleanup incomplete while writers remain

Stopping a debugger no longer reports success when inherited output
streams stay open, so BinarySession cannot reopen a binary a child is
still changing. Concurrent Cutter cleanup retries share one receipt
acknowledgement instead of treating a consumed receipt as failure.

* fix(debuggers): recover cleanup with captured process identities

* fix(analysis): retire sessions after unrestricted commands

* fix(cli): preserve completed evidence after cleanup recovery

* fix(cutter): bound frame collection and coalesce cleanup

* fix(windows): resolve selected provider paths absolutely

* fix(gdb): report decoding loss in failed startup evidence

* fix(rizin): scope decoding loss to collected command frames

* test(mcp): cover snapshot retirement in reverse tools CI

---------

Co-authored-by: Daniel Gonçalves Araujo <47118053+dandgabr@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: REA Maintainers <noreply@github.com>
Co-authored-by: OpenAI Codex <codex@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Cursor Agent <cursoragent@cursor.com>
2026-10-14 04:47:34 +08:00

244 lines
6.5 KiB
TypeScript

import { describe, expect, it } from "vitest";
import {
functionBodySchema,
procedureIdentitySchema,
parseDocuments,
parseListCount,
parseNames,
parseProcedures,
parseRelatedAddresses,
parseSegments,
} from "./hopperValues.js";
describe("Hopper boundary values", () => {
it("parses Hopper's address-keyed name and string maps", () => {
expect(parseNames({ "0x1000": "_main" })).toEqual({
ok: true,
value: [{ address: "0x1000", name: "_main" }],
});
expect(
parseListCount({ "0x1000": "hello", "0x2000": "world" }, "strings"),
).toEqual({ ok: true, value: 2 });
});
it("parses direct and wrapped protocol shapes", () => {
expect(parseProcedures({ procedures: { "0x1": "main" } })).toEqual({
ok: true,
value: [{ address: "0x1", name: "main" }],
});
expect(parseNames({ names: [{ address: "0x2", name: "label" }] }).ok).toBe(
true,
);
expect(parseNames({ items: [{ address: "0x2", value: "label" }] }).ok).toBe(
false,
);
expect(parseRelatedAddresses({ callers: ["0x3"] }, "callers")).toEqual({
ok: true,
value: ["0x3"],
});
expect(
parseSegments([
{
name: "__TEXT",
start: "0x1",
end: "0x2",
readable: true,
writable: false,
executable: null,
},
]),
).toEqual({
ok: true,
value: [
{
name: "__TEXT",
start: "0x1",
end: "0x2",
readable: true,
writable: false,
executable: null,
},
],
});
expect(parseDocuments(["fixture"])).toEqual({
ok: true,
value: ["fixture"],
});
});
it.each([
["procedures", () => parseProcedures(["not-a-map"])],
["names", () => parseNames([{ address: 1, name: "bad" }])],
["relations", () => parseRelatedAddresses([1], "callees")],
["segments", () => parseSegments([{ name: 1 }])],
["documents", () => parseDocuments([1])],
])(
"rejects malformed %s instead of manufacturing empty output",
(_label, parse) => {
const result = parse();
expect(result.ok).toBe(false);
if (!result.ok) expect(result.error._tag).toBe("AnalysisOutputError");
},
);
it("uses provider-neutral wording for malformed shared values", () => {
const result = parseSegments([{ name: 1 }]);
expect(result.ok).toBe(false);
if (!result.ok) {
expect(result.error._tag).toBe("AnalysisOutputError");
expect(result.error.operation).toBe("list_segments");
expect(result.error.reason).toBe(
"Provider returned an invalid segment list",
);
}
});
});
describe("provider-neutral inclusive function body evidence", () => {
const observed = () => ({
available: true,
provenance: "test-address-set",
ranges: [
{ start: "0x1000", end: "0x1002" },
{ start: "0x1010", end: "0x1011" },
],
total_bytes: 5,
span_bytes: 18,
non_contiguous: true,
contains_entry: true,
});
it("rejects missing provider body metadata", () => {
expect(
procedureIdentitySchema.safeParse({ address: "0x1000", name: "main" })
.success,
).toBe(false);
});
it("rejects segments when required coordinates or unknown permissions are omitted", () => {
expect(
parseSegments([
{
name: "__TEXT",
start: "0x1",
end: "0x2",
readable: null,
writable: null,
},
]).ok,
).toBe(false);
expect(
parseSegments([{ name: "__TEXT", start: "0x1", end: "0x2" }]).ok,
).toBe(false);
});
it("counts inclusive one-byte ranges without assuming an enclosing continuous body", () => {
expect(
functionBodySchema.safeParse({
...observed(),
ranges: [{ start: "0x1000", end: "0x1000" }],
total_bytes: 1,
span_bytes: 1,
non_contiguous: false,
}).success,
).toBe(true);
expect(functionBodySchema.parse(observed())).toMatchObject({
total_bytes: 5,
span_bytes: 18,
});
});
it("preserves address-space identity and leaves a multi-space span unknown", () => {
expect(
functionBodySchema.safeParse({
...observed(),
ranges: [
{ start: "a:0x1000", end: "a:0x1000" },
{ start: "b:0x1000", end: "b:0x1001" },
],
total_bytes: 3,
span_bytes: null,
}).success,
).toBe(true);
expect(
functionBodySchema.safeParse({
...observed(),
ranges: [{ start: "a:0x1000", end: "b:0x1000" }],
}).success,
).toBe(false);
});
it("allows an observed empty set without manufacturing entry membership", () => {
expect(
procedureIdentitySchema.safeParse({
address: "0x1000",
name: "external",
classification: null,
body: {
...observed(),
ranges: [],
total_bytes: 0,
span_bytes: 0,
non_contiguous: false,
contains_entry: false,
},
}).success,
).toBe(true);
});
it("checks entry membership using address space and inclusive endpoints", () => {
expect(
procedureIdentitySchema.safeParse({
address: "0x1002",
name: "last",
classification: null,
body: observed(),
}).success,
).toBe(true);
expect(
procedureIdentitySchema.safeParse({
address: "0x1003",
name: "gap",
classification: null,
body: observed(),
}).success,
).toBe(false);
expect(
procedureIdentitySchema.safeParse({
address: "other:0x1000",
name: "other",
classification: null,
body: observed(),
}).success,
).toBe(false);
});
it.each([
{ total_bytes: 18 },
{ span_bytes: 5 },
{ non_contiguous: false },
{
ranges: [
{ start: "0x1000", end: "0x1002" },
{ start: "0x1003", end: "0x1004" },
],
},
{
ranges: [
{ start: "0x1000", end: "0x1002" },
{ start: "0x1002", end: "0x1004" },
],
},
{
ranges: [
{ start: "0x1010", end: "0x1011" },
{ start: "0x1000", end: "0x1002" },
],
},
{
ranges: [{ start: "0x0", end: "0x20000000000000" }],
total_bytes: Number.MAX_SAFE_INTEGER,
span_bytes: Number.MAX_SAFE_INTEGER,
non_contiguous: false,
},
])("rejects contradictory or unsafe range facts %j", (change) => {
expect(
functionBodySchema.safeParse({ ...observed(), ...change }).success,
).toBe(false);
});
});