Files
reverse-engineering-anything/tests/boundary/browser/cdpBrowserProvider.network.test.ts
T
morlutoandCursor Agent ae0f725fad fix(browser): preserve authorized redirect hops (#986)
* fix(browser): preserve authorized redirect hops

* fix(browser): compare redirect semantics without event times

* fix(browser): classify missing redirect predecessors

* fix(browser): distinguish malformed redirect URLs

* fix(browser): preserve evidence on malformed redirect envelopes

* fix(browser): freeze evidence after malformed redirect

* docs: regenerate catalogs after main integration

* fix(browser): account for skipped redirect body shapes

* fix(browser): mark skipped redirect response shapes unavailable

When a malformed redirect keeps a JSON predecessor, record that its response body shape was not captured.

---------

Co-authored-by: Cursor Agent <cursoragent@cursor.com>
2026-10-08 01:08:31 +08:00

118 lines
4.2 KiB
TypeScript

import { expect, it } from "vitest";
import { CdpBrowserProvider } from "../../../src/browser/CdpBrowserProvider.js";
import { inspectWebPageInputSchema } from "../../../src/domain/browserObservation.js";
import { startFakeCdpBrowser } from "../../fixtures/fakeCdpBrowser.js";
import { describeBrowser, trackBrowser } from "./cdpBrowserProvider.support.js";
describeBrowser("CdpBrowserProvider: network 1", () => {
it("retains same-origin redirect hops on the one final request", async () => {
const browser = await startFakeCdpBrowser({ redirectWithinOrigin: true });
trackBrowser(browser);
const result = await new CdpBrowserProvider().inspectPage(
inspectWebPageInputSchema.parse({
cdp_endpoint: browser.endpoint,
allowed_origins: [browser.allowedOrigin],
target_id: "allowed-page",
observation_ms: 0,
}),
);
if (!result.ok) throw result.error;
expect(result.value.network.requests).toHaveLength(1);
expect(result.value.network.requests[0]).toMatchObject({
request_id: "request-1",
url: `${browser.allowedOrigin}/redirected?token=final-secret`,
status: 200,
redirects: [
{
url: `${browser.allowedOrigin}/api?token=network-secret`,
response_url: `${browser.allowedOrigin}/api?token=network-secret`,
method: "POST",
resource_type: "Fetch",
status: 301,
mime_type: "text/plain",
encoded_data_length: 23,
request_timestamp: 7,
redirect_event_timestamp: 8,
},
{
url: `${browser.allowedOrigin}/intermediate`,
response_url: `${browser.allowedOrigin}/intermediate`,
method: "GET",
resource_type: "Fetch",
status: 302,
mime_type: "text/plain",
encoded_data_length: 27,
request_timestamp: 8,
redirect_event_timestamp: 9,
},
],
});
expect(JSON.stringify(result.value.network.requests)).not.toContain(
"redirect-header-secret",
);
expect(result.value.completeness.excluded).not.toContainEqual({
section: "network_requests",
reason: "invalid_protocol_value",
count: expect.any(Number),
});
});
it("drops network evidence when a request redirects outside the approved origin", async () => {
const browser = await startFakeCdpBrowser({
redirectToDisallowedOrigin: true,
});
trackBrowser(browser);
const result = await new CdpBrowserProvider().inspectPage(
inspectWebPageInputSchema.parse({
cdp_endpoint: browser.endpoint,
allowed_origins: [browser.allowedOrigin],
target_id: "allowed-page",
observation_ms: 0,
}),
);
if (!result.ok) throw result.error;
expect(result.value.network.requests).toEqual([]);
});
it("does not retain excluded prior-hop data when a redirect returns in scope", async () => {
const browser = await startFakeCdpBrowser({
redirectFromDisallowedOrigin: true,
});
trackBrowser(browser);
const result = await new CdpBrowserProvider().inspectPage(
inspectWebPageInputSchema.parse({
cdp_endpoint: browser.endpoint,
allowed_origins: [browser.allowedOrigin],
target_id: "allowed-page",
observation_ms: 0,
}),
);
if (!result.ok) throw result.error;
expect(result.value.network.requests).toHaveLength(1);
expect(result.value.network.requests[0]).toMatchObject({
url: `${browser.allowedOrigin}/returned`,
redirects: [],
});
const output = JSON.stringify(result.value.network.requests);
expect(output).not.toContain("private.example.test");
expect(output).not.toContain("redirect-header-secret");
expect(output).not.toContain("redirect-body-secret");
expect(result.value.completeness.policy_filtered_sections).toContain(
"network_requests",
);
expect(result.value.completeness.status).toBe("policy_filtered");
expect(result.value.completeness.unavailable_sections).not.toContain(
"network_requests",
);
expect(result.value.completeness.excluded).not.toContainEqual({
section: "network_requests",
reason: "invalid_protocol_value",
count: expect.any(Number),
});
});
});