Files
reverse-engineering-anything/src/browser/CdpPageCapture.ts
T
morluto abd36dd250 refactor(browser): parse Runtime and Debugger events once by registered schemas (#10742)
* refactor(browser): parse frame lifecycle events once by a registered event schema

CdpConnection admits each event through protocol/CdpEvents.ts, which parses
the five Page frame lifecycle events once into identity facts plus a frame
URL observation, like a frame-tree node. Screenshot, page capture, the
observation timeline, WebMCP, Electron inspection and the execution window
read those facts instead of re-parsing the raw payload; CdpFrameFacts no
longer carries the raw source record. Playwright CDP session subscriptions
name an event from Playwright's protocol table, and an architecture guard
counts the remaining raw event payload reads so they can only shrink.

* refactor(browser): parse Runtime and Debugger events once by registered schemas

Register Debugger.scriptParsed, Debugger.scriptFailedToParse,
Runtime.executionContextCreated, Runtime.executionContextDestroyed and
Runtime.consoleAPICalled. Script and context payloads carry both the
tolerant facts passive capture uses and the active runtime's strict
declaration, derived from one parse, plus the declaration's byte size for
the runtime retention budget. Page capture, Electron script capture, the
V8 Inspector provider and the runtime source inventory now read the
registered payload. The cdp-raw-event-params baseline drops from 20 to 7.

* refactor(browser): admit transport events through the registered-event owner

Remove the unused cdpFrameUrl wrapper; its fragment cases now exercise
observeCdpFrameUrl. Add a connection-level test that two subscribers share
one parsed payload and the raw params.

* fix(browser): report an unserializable event declaration's size instead of throwing

JSON.stringify can throw on a declaration JSON.parse accepted (nesting
deeper than the serializer's stack). The registry sized script and context
declarations inside the connection's WebSocket callback, so such an event
escaped as an uncaught exception. The size is now a Result; the runtime
source inventory raises the failure inside its own catch, as before.

* refactor(browser): parse Network events once by registered schemas (#10743)

* refactor(browser): parse Network events once by registered schemas

Register Network.requestWillBeSent, responseReceived, loadingFinished,
loadingFailed, webSocketCreated and webSocketFrameSent/Received. The
request payload carries the tolerant facts page capture and the timeline
read plus the active runtime's strict declaration. Page capture's network
and WebSocket handlers, the timeline's request tracking and the runtime
request inventory now read the registered payload. The
cdp-raw-event-params baseline drops from 7 to 5.

* refactor(browser): drop payload helpers the capture handlers no longer use

* refactor(browser): read every CDP event payload through the registry (#10745)

* refactor(browser): read every CDP event payload through the registry

Register Target.attachedToTarget, Target.detachedFromTarget,
Page.lifecycleEvent and WebMCP.toolsAdded/toolsRemoved, and carry a
requested navigation's reason and a commit's transition type in the
frame-event payload. The timeline no longer threads raw params into its
entries: each entry receives its timestamp, frame and loader identity
explicitly. WebMCP discovery, the service-worker policy blocker and the
target-event matcher read the registered payload. With no raw reads left,
the cdp-raw-event-params guard is enforced at zero instead of counted.

* refactor(browser): drop raw payload helpers the timeline and worker blocker no longer use

* refactor(browser): type Playwright CDP session events by the registry (#10751)

PlaywrightCdpSession.on subscribes only to registered events and hands
the listener the payload parsed by its registered schema, returning the
unsubscribe function. Private storage seeding reads registered payloads,
including the events of non-flat child sessions, and applies its strict
seeding policy to the parsed facts. Its local attach, detach, nested
message and pause schemas and the storage-only script/context schemas are
removed; Debugger.paused, Runtime.executionContextsCleared and
Target.receivedMessageFromTarget join the registry.

* test(browser): admit fake policy events through the event registry

The service-worker policy now reads event.registered, but the PlaywrightScenarioSession fake connection delivered raw events, so three detached-target tests never reached the policy. The fake now admits each event with receiveCdpEvent as CdpConnection does.

* fix(browser): fail the CDP session closed when an event listener throws (#10758)

* fix(browser): fail the CDP session closed when an event listener throws

An exception from a CDP event subscriber escaped CdpTransportCore's socket message callback uncaught (for example the service-worker blocker's protocol_error on a Target event without a sessionId). The transport now stops delivery, fails the connection as a protocol error whose cause is the listener's exception, rejects pending and later commands with it, and notifies protocol-failure subscribers. The Playwright CDP session relay applies the same rule to its event listeners.

* fix(browser): report a failed service-worker policy connection at the next policy check

The policy's event listener rejects a malformed Target event, which now fails its connection. With no policy command pending, nothing reported it and later iframe targets went unprotected. The policy records its connection's protocol failure and assertBlocked, run before each scenario step, rethrows it.

* fix(browser): keep cleanup commands available after a listener failure

A listener failure no longer marks the wire as broken. The transport still rejects pending commands, notifies protocol-failure subscribers, stops delivering events and refuses reuse, but it keeps reading replies and admits commands sent in cleanup grace. The service-worker policy can then remove its init scripts, restore the main realm, detach and release its socket. Wire-level protocol errors still refuse every later command. The PlaywrightScenarioSession policy fake gains onProtocolFailure, which the policy now subscribes to.

* refactor(browser): keep raw CDP event payloads out of the received event (#10764)

* refactor(browser): keep raw CDP event payloads out of the received event

CdpReceivedEvent and CdpTransportEvent no longer carry params: receiveCdpEvent hands the raw payload only to the registered schema, so a subscriber cannot read it by property access, destructuring or computed keys. This supersedes the event.params text guard in architecture-guards, which is removed.

* refactor(browser): read registered event payloads in the JavaScript verifiers

The runtime, storage and URL-userinfo verifiers subscribe to CdpConnection, which no longer hands subscribers raw params. They now read event.registered. A test scans every scripts/ onEvent callback for raw payload reads, since the TypeScript check does not cover them. The storage verifier's pause trace records a malformed pause instead of the unregistered reason member.

* refactor(browser): track the timeline's main frame with the document tracker (#10779)

TimelineCapture kept its own mutable main frame id and replaced it on a root replacement. It now holds the CdpDocumentTracker that CdpTargetSession owns and observes the replacement document through it; every main-frame check (lifecycle, navigation, document request, redirect) reads the tracker's current frame. A characterization test pins that the replaced root's lifecycle events are no longer recorded.

* refactor(browser): select CDP events only by their registered name (#10829)

CdpReceivedEvent carried the wire method as a plain string, so a subscriber
could compare it with a misspelt or unregistered name and the check compiled
but never matched. Three owners selected Inspector.targetCrashed, an
unregistered event, that way.

Register Inspector.targetCrashed and drop the wire method from the received
event. Subscribers select events by registered.method, whose type is the
registered event names. The capture coverage start keeps reading the
wire domain, now the event's domain field.

* fix(browser): retire a policy child session that CDP reports gone

After a listener failure the connection stops delivering events, so an
iframe's Target.detachedFromTarget never retires its policy target. Cleanup
then sent Page.removeScriptToEvaluateOnNewDocument to the dead session,
kept the stale child, and every retry failed before detaching the root.

The service-worker policy owner now treats CDP's session-not-found
rejection as proof that the child is gone and retires it. The classifier
moves from CdpTargetSession to CdpCommandRejection, its owner, and the
target-session detach path uses the same one.

* refactor(browser): route target events through one session owner (#10835)

* refactor(browser): route target events through one session owner

Page capture, WebMCP discovery, screenshot capture and the runtime sources
each compared the envelope session ID themselves, while the observation
window and execution collection used cdpTargetEventMatches, which also
routes the root Target.detachedFromTarget that names the target's session.

onCdpTargetEvent in CdpTargetEvents.ts now subscribes every target consumer
with that one rule; the matcher is private and the per-subscriber
comparisons are removed. Electron inspection keeps its own filter while
its capture isolation awaits a maintainer decision.

* fix(browser): report WebMCP subframe tools whose document is unverified (#10839)

* fix(browser): report WebMCP subframe tools whose document is unverified

A committed subframe navigation kept the frame's tools silently when CDP
reported no loader at the same URL, and removed them on any URL change even
when the loader proved the same document.

Each frame now carries a CdpDocumentTracker, the session's document
identity owner. Only a proven change removes the frame's tools. An unknown
comparison keeps them visible, marks webmcp_tools attach-limited and names
the frames whose document identity could not be established.

* test(browser): prove an unverified live subframe limits WebMCP coverage

* fix(browser): key a WebMCP registration by its frame and tool name

A subframe tool kept across a committed navigation that changed the URL
but not the loader was stored under a key built from the old URL, so a
later toolsAdded for the same frame and name added a second entry.
Registrations are now keyed by frame and name; tool_key still records the
registering frame URL.

* test(browser): deliver fake CDP events through the transport's admission (#10840)

Event fakes each rebuilt the received event: CdpAgentHints typed its
listeners as raw wire events behind an unknown cast, and the Electron,
scenario-session and routing tests each wrapped receiveCdpEvent by hand.

fakeCdpEvents (tests/fixtures) is a CdpConnection.onEvent fake whose emit
admits each raw event with receiveCdpEvent and the wire byte count, so a
change to the received event shape fails at the fake instead of silently
not exercising subscribers.

* refactor(browser): own the selected page generation in one target document tracker (#10860)

* refactor(browser): own the selected page generation in one target document tracker

Page capture, screenshot, the observation window, the runtime session and
the execution window each built a document tracker or rule of their own
from root-frame navigation events. CdpTargetDocument now follows the target
session's root-frame events and the frame-tree replies its consumers read,
classifies root identity once, and reports each navigation to consumers
that decide only what it means for their evidence.

* fix(browser): report a lost scenario policy connection before the next step (#10864)

* fix(browser): report a lost scenario policy connection before the next step

The service-worker policy recorded only protocol failures. When its CDP
socket closed or its page session detached, later documents lost the
blocking script, but the scenario learned of it only when a frame check
found an unprotected realm. The owner now records the disconnect or
detach when CDP reports it; the next policy check and the next step's
action report it first.

* fix(browser): refuse an unregistered CDP command before it reaches the browser (#10868)

JavaScript verifiers can name any command, and the send owners refused an
unregistered one only when its reply arrived, after the browser had acted
on it. CdpConnection and the Playwright session now refuse the name before
sending, and the Playwright session refuses an unregistered event name
instead of subscribing to events no listener receives. The verifier text
scan stays as an early warning and documents what it cannot see.

* fix(browser): keep a proven root change and the loaderless selection's uncertainty

Two review findings on the target document owner. A root event naming
another frame with a malformed loader set `changed` but was announced as
unidentified, so the execution window failed with protocol_error and
dropped what it had collected; the owner now announces it as the proven
change it is. The runtime session compared each frame-tree reply with the
tracker's current document, which can learn a loader from an event, so a
loaderless selection followed by an event and a reply with that loader
compared as same; it now compares the reply with the selected document
through the owner, and reports target_changed as before.

* test(browser): refuse the next scenario step after the policy session detaches

* refactor(browser): read WebMCP document identity from the target document owner (#10884)

* refactor(browser): read WebMCP document identity from the target document owner

WebMCP discovery compared the first and last frame-tree roots itself and
kept a document tracker per subframe. CdpTargetDocument now follows the
selected root and each committed subframe for it: the final frame tree
feeds the owner, a root change proven by a navigation event during
discovery is target_changed as in page capture, and a subframe whose
committed document changed loses its tools. A subframe navigation without
a loader still keeps the tools and reports them as unverified.

* fix(browser): start a subframe first seen within its document with an unknown loader

A subframe absent from the initial frame tree and first seen through Page.navigatedWithinDocument had no document tracker, so a later commit started a fresh one and the tools it registered meanwhile lost the unverified-document limitation. The owner now starts such a subframe with an unknown loader.

* fix(browser): refuse a verifier's unregistered CDP event name at subscription (#10885)

JavaScript verifiers subscribed to every event with CdpConnection.onEvent
and compared registered.method with a string literal. A misspelt or
unregistered name never matched and the verifier waited until its timeout.
CdpConnection.onRegisteredEvent now takes one event name, refuses an
unregistered one before subscribing (the same registry check the Playwright
session applies), and hands the listener only that event's registered
parse. The verifiers subscribe only through it, and the evaluation test
rejects a raw onEvent subscription in scripts.

* fix(browser): keep subframe documents by frame and loader without their URLs
2026-11-15 19:54:17 +08:00

605 lines
21 KiB
TypeScript

import type { InspectWebPageInput } from "../domain/browserObservation.js";
import type { WebPageInspection } from "../domain/browserObservationSchemas.js";
import type { ProgressReporter } from "../application/ProgressReporter.js";
import { BrowserObservationError } from "../domain/browserObservationError.js";
import { AnalysisError } from "../domain/analysisErrorBase.js";
import {
AnalysisCancelledError,
OwnerCancellation,
} from "../domain/analysisErrorCore.js";
import type { BrowserObservationOperation } from "../domain/browserObservationErrors.js";
import { stableWebResources } from "../domain/webInventory.js";
import type { CdpEndpointDiscovery, CdpEndpointTarget } from "./CdpEndpoint.js";
import { CdpConnection } from "./CdpConnection.js";
import { onCdpTargetEvent } from "./CdpTargetEvents.js";
import { CdpCaptureEvents } from "./CdpCaptureEvents.js";
import { authorizedMainFrame } from "./CdpAuthorizedMainFrame.js";
import { cdpOriginScopeRefusal } from "./CdpOriginScopeError.js";
import { captureStorage } from "./CdpCaptureStorage.js";
import { CdpTargetDocument } from "./CdpTargetDocument.js";
import {
cdpRootDocument,
unverifiedDocumentLimitation,
} from "./CdpTargetSession.js";
import { optionalCdpCommand } from "./CdpOptionalCommand.js";
import { CdpCommandRejection } from "./CdpCommandRejection.js";
import {
captureAccessibility,
captureDom,
captureFrames,
captureResources,
emptyDomCapture,
excludeDocumentEvidence,
type CapturedResource,
type DomCapture,
} from "./CdpCaptureDocuments.js";
import { observedFrameUrl } from "./protocol/CdpFrameTree.js";
import {
CdpMalformedReply,
type CdpCommandResult,
} from "./protocol/CdpCommands.js";
import { capturedSvgNodeKind } from "./CdpCaptureDomNamespaces.js";
import {
allowedSanitizedUrl,
delayWithCancellation,
} from "./CdpCaptureValues.js";
import {
captureScripts,
finalizeScriptInventory,
} from "./CdpPageCaptureScripts.js";
import { captureWorkers } from "./CdpPageCaptureWorkers.js";
import type { WebSourceMapRequest } from "./WebSourceMapFetcher.js";
export interface CaptureContext {
readonly connection: CdpConnection;
readonly sessionId: string | undefined;
readonly operation: Extract<
BrowserObservationOperation,
"inspect_web_page" | "analyze_web_bundle"
>;
readonly discovery: CdpEndpointDiscovery;
readonly target: CdpEndpointTarget;
readonly input: InspectWebPageInput;
readonly signal?: AbortSignal;
readonly progress?: ProgressReporter;
}
interface CaptureState {
readonly context: CaptureContext;
readonly events: CdpCaptureEvents;
readonly allowedOrigins: ReadonlySet<string>;
readonly limitations: string[];
readonly startedAt: string;
}
interface CapturedSections {
readonly attachedUrl: string;
readonly frames: WebPageInspection["frames"];
readonly dom: DomCapture;
readonly accessibility: ReturnType<typeof captureAccessibility>;
readonly scripts: WebPageInspection["scripts"];
readonly resources: WebPageInspection["resources"];
readonly workers: WebPageInspection["workers"];
readonly storage: WebPageInspection["storage"];
}
export interface CapturedPage {
readonly inspection: WebPageInspection;
readonly sourceMapRequests: readonly WebSourceMapRequest[];
}
/** Capture and normalize one attached page without evaluating page JavaScript. */
export const capturePage = async (
context: CaptureContext,
): Promise<CapturedPage> => {
const allowedOrigins = new Set(context.input.allowed_origins);
const events = new CdpCaptureEvents(context.input, allowedOrigins);
const removeListener = onCdpTargetEvent(
context.connection,
context.sessionId,
(event) => events.ingest(event),
);
const state: CaptureState = {
context,
events,
allowedOrigins,
limitations: [
...(context.discovery.limitations ?? []),
"Observation starts when REA attaches; prior network and console activity is unavailable.",
"Worker targets are a final inventory snapshot, not worker-session observation. Their attached flag describes any debugging client; this page-session collector does not observe worker network, console, or script events, and short-lived workers may be absent from the snapshot.",
"Raw network headers, bodies, cookies, storage values, console objects, and WebSocket payloads are never retained; explicitly requested primitive console text is retained verbatim, while payload captures retain value-free shapes.",
"Source maps are reported only as declarative URLs and are not fetched.",
"URL-less scripts and console events without an allowed source URL are excluded because their origin cannot be proven.",
...(context.target.attached === null
? [
"CDP discovery could not establish the target's debugger attachment state.",
]
: []),
],
startedAt: new Date().toISOString(),
};
try {
return await captureAuthorizedPage(state);
} catch (cause: unknown) {
// A navigation can invalidate an in-flight script ID or another document
// read. Report the observed capture invalidation before its stale-read
// symptom, while preserving caller cancellation.
if (
context.signal?.aborted !== true &&
!(cause instanceof AnalysisCancelledError) &&
!(cause instanceof AnalysisError && cause.userCategory === "cancelled")
)
assertObservedCaptureValid(state, cause);
throw cause;
} finally {
removeListener();
events.document?.close();
}
};
/**
* A document change is reported first, carrying any failure it caused. Scope
* applies to the current document only when the selected one is unchanged.
*/
const assertObservedCaptureValid = (
state: CaptureState,
cause?: unknown,
): void => {
const reason =
state.events.document?.changed === true
? "target_changed"
: state.events.unknownRootIdentity
? "protocol_error"
: state.events.originViolation
? "target_not_allowed"
: undefined;
if (reason === "target_not_allowed")
throw cdpOriginScopeRefusal(state.context.operation, { cause });
if (reason !== undefined) {
if (cause instanceof BrowserObservationError && cause.reason === reason)
throw cause;
throw new BrowserObservationError(state.context.operation, reason, {
cause,
});
}
};
const captureAuthorizedPage = async (
state: CaptureState,
): Promise<CapturedPage> => {
const { context, allowedOrigins, limitations } = state;
const { input } = context;
await authorizeObservationWindow(state);
await captureJsonResponseBodies(state);
const frameResult = await authorizedMainFrame({
connection: context.connection,
sessionId: context.sessionId,
signal: context.signal,
allowedOrigins,
operation: context.operation,
document: state.events.document,
});
const attachedUrl = observedFrameUrl(frameResult.root.url) ?? "";
const frameCapture = captureFrames(
frameResult,
allowedOrigins,
undefined,
state.events.completeness,
);
const frames = frameCapture.items;
const captureDocument = cdpRootDocument(frameResult);
if (frameCapture.root === undefined || captureDocument === undefined)
throw new BrowserObservationError("inspect_web_page", "protocol_error");
assertObservedCaptureValid(state);
const resourceCapture = await capturePageResources(state);
const resources = stableWebResources(
resourceCapture.items.map(publicResource),
);
const dom = await capturePageDom(state);
const accessibility = await accessibilityForFrames(state, frames);
const scripts = await captureScripts({
context,
events: state.events,
rawResources: resourceCapture.items,
resources,
frameIds: new Set(frames.map((frame) => frame.frame_id)),
});
const workers = await captureWorkers(
{ context, allowedOrigins, limitations, events: state.events },
new Set(frames.map((frame) => frame.frame_id)),
);
const storageCapture = await captureStorage(
context,
attachedUrl,
limitations,
);
if (!input.include_storage_keys)
state.events.completeness.exclude("storage_keys", "not_approved", null);
else if (storageCapture.keysExclusion !== undefined)
state.events.completeness.exclude(
"storage_keys",
storageCapture.keysExclusion,
null,
);
await report(context.progress, 3, "Normalizing browser evidence");
await assertCompletedDocument(state);
// Body IDs were enumerated before asynchronous CDP reads. Events remain
// enabled through the final capture, so account for eligible responses that
// arrived while those reads were pending.
state.events.settleUnexaminedResponseBodies();
const scriptInventory = finalizeScriptInventory(scripts, state.events);
state.events.recordScriptMetadataBudgetExclusions();
return {
inspection: normalizedInspection(state, {
attachedUrl,
frames,
dom,
accessibility,
scripts: scriptInventory,
resources,
workers,
storage: storageCapture.value,
}),
sourceMapRequests: scripts.sourceMapRequests,
};
};
/** Compare the final document first; scope then applies to that document. */
const assertCompletedDocument = async (state: CaptureState): Promise<void> => {
const { context, allowedOrigins, events } = state;
const completed = await context.connection.send(
"Page.getFrameTree",
{},
context.sessionId,
context.signal,
);
const comparison = events.document?.observeTree(completed);
assertObservedCaptureValid(state);
if (comparison === undefined)
throw new BrowserObservationError("inspect_web_page", "protocol_error");
await authorizedMainFrame({
connection: context.connection,
sessionId: context.sessionId,
signal: context.signal,
allowedOrigins,
operation: context.operation,
initial: completed,
document: events.document,
});
// Navigation events can arrive while an unavailable URL is retried.
assertObservedCaptureValid(state);
if (events.document?.unknown === true) {
events.completeness.attachLimited("frames");
state.limitations.push(
unverifiedDocumentLimitation(events.document.selected),
);
}
};
/** A malformed resource tree omits only the resource inventory, never empties it. */
const capturePageResources = async (
state: CaptureState,
): Promise<ReturnType<typeof captureResources>> => {
const { connection, sessionId, signal } = state.context;
try {
return captureResources(
await connection.send("Page.getResourceTree", {}, sessionId, signal),
state.allowedOrigins,
state.events.completeness,
);
} catch (cause: unknown) {
if (!(cause instanceof CdpMalformedReply)) throw cause;
state.events.completeness.exclude(
"resources",
"invalid_protocol_value",
null,
);
return { items: [] };
}
};
const captureJsonResponseBodies = async (
state: CaptureState,
): Promise<void> => {
const requests = state.events.responseBodyRequests();
for (let index = 0; index < requests.length; index += 1) {
const candidate = requests[index];
if (candidate === undefined) continue;
const current = state.events.currentResponseBodyRequest(candidate);
if (current === undefined) continue;
if (current.encoded_data_length === null) {
state.events.responseBodyUnavailable(candidate);
continue;
}
let reply: Awaited<
ReturnType<typeof optionalCdpCommand<"Network.getResponseBody">>
>;
try {
reply = await optionalCdpCommand(
state.context,
"Network.getResponseBody",
{ requestId: candidate.requestId },
state.limitations,
);
} catch (cause: unknown) {
if (
!(cause instanceof CdpCommandRejection) ||
cause.command !== "Network.getResponseBody" ||
cause.code !== -32_000 ||
cause.reportedMessage === null
)
throw cause;
state.events.responseBodyUnavailable(candidate);
state.limitations.push(
`Response body unavailable for request ${candidate.requestId}: ${cause.userMessage}`,
);
continue;
}
if (reply.ok || reply.error._tag === "CdpMalformedReply") {
state.events.ingestResponseBody(
candidate,
reply.ok ? reply.value : "malformed",
);
continue;
}
for (const remaining of requests.slice(index))
state.events.responseBodyUnavailable(remaining);
return;
}
};
const authorizeObservationWindow = async (
state: CaptureState,
): Promise<void> => {
const { context, allowedOrigins, events } = state;
const { connection, sessionId, signal } = context;
await report(context.progress, 1, "Enabling passive CDP domains");
await connection.send("Page.enable", {}, sessionId, signal);
const initialFrameResult = await authorizedMainFrame({
connection: context.connection,
sessionId: context.sessionId,
signal: context.signal,
allowedOrigins,
operation: context.operation,
});
const mainFrame = captureFrames(initialFrameResult, allowedOrigins).root;
const document = cdpRootDocument(initialFrameResult);
if (mainFrame === undefined || document === undefined)
throw new BrowserObservationError("inspect_web_page", "protocol_error");
events.beginAuthorizedFrame(CdpTargetDocument.watch(context, document));
await enableObservationDomains(state);
await report(context.progress, 2, "Observing page events");
await delayWithCancellation(
context.input.observation_ms,
context.operation,
signal,
);
assertObservedCaptureValid(state);
};
const capturePageDom = async (state: CaptureState): Promise<DomCapture> => {
const { context, allowedOrigins } = state;
let result: CdpCommandResult<"DOMSnapshot.captureSnapshot">;
try {
result = await context.connection.send(
"DOMSnapshot.captureSnapshot",
{
computedStyles: [],
includePaintOrder: false,
includeDOMRects: false,
},
context.sessionId,
context.signal,
);
} catch (cause: unknown) {
// A malformed snapshot leaves the DOM and its derived metadata unknown.
if (!(cause instanceof CdpMalformedReply)) throw cause;
excludeDocumentEvidence(
state.events.completeness,
"invalid_protocol_value",
null,
);
return emptyDomCapture;
}
const capture = captureDom(
result,
allowedOrigins,
context.input,
state.events.completeness,
);
let step = capture.next();
let descriptionUnavailable = false;
const pendingController = new AbortController();
const signal =
context.signal === undefined
? pendingController.signal
: AbortSignal.any([context.signal, pendingController.signal]);
while (!step.done) {
const pending = step.value.map(async (query) => {
if (descriptionUnavailable) return undefined;
try {
return capturedSvgNodeKind(
query,
await context.connection.send(
"DOM.describeNode",
{ backendNodeId: query.backendNodeId, depth: 0 },
context.sessionId,
signal,
),
);
} catch (cause: unknown) {
// A detached node can disappear between snapshot and description, and
// one malformed description leaves only that node's kind unknown.
// Preserve partial metadata, but propagate transport/cancellation errors.
if (cause instanceof CdpMalformedReply) return undefined;
if (!(cause instanceof CdpCommandRejection)) throw cause;
if (cause.code === -32_601) descriptionUnavailable = true;
else if (cause.code !== -32_000) throw cause;
return undefined;
}
});
try {
// Promise.all preserves snapshot order even when CDP replies out of order.
step = capture.next(await Promise.all(pending));
} catch (cause: unknown) {
// Stop and settle this bounded batch before the session can be detached.
pendingController.abort(OwnerCancellation.noLongerNeeded);
await Promise.allSettled(pending);
throw cause;
}
}
if (step.value.unresolvedSvgNodes > 0)
state.limitations.push(
`SVG identity was unavailable for ${String(step.value.unresolvedSvgNodes)} snapshotted XLink candidate nodes; their URL destinations remain unknown.`,
);
return step.value;
};
const normalizedInspection = (
state: CaptureState,
captured: CapturedSections,
): WebPageInspection => ({
browser: state.context.discovery.version,
target: normalizedTarget(
state.context.target,
captured.attachedUrl,
state.allowedOrigins,
),
capture_window: {
started_at: state.startedAt,
ended_at: new Date().toISOString(),
observation_ms: state.context.input.observation_ms,
},
completeness: state.events.completeness.snapshot(),
frames: [...captured.frames],
dom: {
total_nodes: captured.dom.total,
node_value_length_unit: captured.dom.nodeValueLengthUnit,
nodes: [...captured.dom.nodes],
},
accessibility: {
total_nodes: captured.accessibility.total,
text_capture: captured.accessibility.textCapture,
nodes: [...captured.accessibility.nodes],
},
scripts: captured.scripts,
resources: [...captured.resources],
network: {
requests: [...state.events.network.values()],
websocket_connections: [...state.events.webSocketConnectionsById.values()],
coverage_started_at: state.events.coverageStartedAt("Network"),
prior_activity_available: false,
},
console: {
events: [...state.events.console],
coverage_started_at: state.events.coverageStartedAt("Runtime"),
prior_activity_available: false,
},
workers: [...captured.workers],
metadata: {
responses: [...state.events.responseMetadata],
dom_urls: [...captured.dom.urls],
agent_hints: deduplicatedAgentHints([
...state.events.agentHints,
...captured.dom.agentHints,
]),
excluded_dom_urls: captured.dom.excludedUrls,
headers_allowlisted: true,
},
storage: captured.storage,
limitations: state.limitations,
});
const enableObservationDomains = async (state: CaptureState): Promise<void> => {
const { connection, sessionId, signal } = state.context;
await connection.send("Runtime.enable", {}, sessionId, signal);
state.events.markDomainEnabled("Runtime");
await connection.send("Debugger.enable", {}, sessionId, signal);
await connection.send("Network.enable", {}, sessionId, signal);
state.events.markDomainEnabled("Network");
};
const accessibilityForFrames = async (
state: CaptureState,
frames: readonly { readonly frame_id: string }[],
): Promise<ReturnType<typeof captureAccessibility>> => {
const { context, limitations, events } = state;
const results: CdpCommandResult<"Accessibility.getFullAXTree">[] = [];
let unavailable = false;
for (const frame of frames) {
const reply = await optionalCdpCommand(
context,
"Accessibility.getFullAXTree",
{ frameId: frame.frame_id },
limitations,
);
if (reply.ok) results.push(reply.value);
else if (reply.error._tag === "CdpCommandUnavailable") unavailable = true;
else
events.completeness.exclude(
"accessibility",
"invalid_protocol_value",
null,
);
}
if (unavailable) events.completeness.unavailable("accessibility");
const capture = captureAccessibility(results, {
includeText: context.input.include_accessibility_text,
...(results.length === 0 && unavailable ? { unavailable: true } : {}),
completeness: events.completeness,
});
if (!context.input.include_accessibility_text)
events.completeness.exclude(
"accessibility",
"not_approved",
capture.textCapture.excluded_fields,
);
if (capture.hasUnobservedChildren)
events.completeness.truncate("accessibility");
return capture;
};
const publicResource = ({ rawUrl: _rawUrl, ...resource }: CapturedResource) =>
resource;
const deduplicatedAgentHints = (
hints: WebPageInspection["metadata"]["agent_hints"],
): WebPageInspection["metadata"]["agent_hints"] => {
const seen = new Set<string>();
return hints.filter((hint) => {
const key = `${hint.mechanism}\0${hint.declaration}\0${hint.url ?? ""}`;
if (seen.has(key)) return false;
seen.add(key);
return true;
});
};
const normalizedTarget = (
target: CdpEndpointTarget,
currentUrl: string,
allowedOrigins: ReadonlySet<string>,
): WebPageInspection["target"] => {
const url = allowedSanitizedUrl(currentUrl, allowedOrigins);
return {
target_id: target.id,
type: target.type,
title: target.title,
url: url?.url ?? "[unsupported-url]",
origin: url?.origin ?? "",
attached: target.attached,
};
};
const report = async (
progress: ProgressReporter | undefined,
completed: number,
message: string,
): Promise<void> =>
await progress?.report({
phase: "browser_observation",
completed,
total: 3,
message,
...(completed === 3 ? { terminal: true } : {}),
});