* fix(evidence)!: require ESP flash_dump and PE unsigned attribute OIDs Both fields were optional only for Evidence recorded before REA reported them (6.8.0 and earlier). Every producer writes them: the ESP image reader and facts builder write `flash_dump` (null unless the file is a flash dump read from a later address), and the PE certificate parser writes `unsigned_attribute_oids` (null when the signer has none). They are now required and nullable, and the inspection hint no longer branches on an absent `flash_dump`. The ESP acceptance test that read pre-6.9 inventory Evidence now checks that such Evidence is refused. A call-path comment called Evidence without relationship coverage "legacy"; providers that report no coverage still produce it, so the comment now says so. BREAKING CHANGE: inline inventory Evidence for an ESP image root without `format_metadata.flash_dump`, and PE certificate Evidence whose signers lack `unsigned_attribute_oids`, are refused as invalid input. Recreate the observation with the current REA. Refs #10510 * test(certificates): refuse a signer without unsigned_attribute_oids; update the guide
5.6 KiB
PE Authenticode certificate tables
inspect_pe_certificates / inspect-pe-certificates answers whether one
selected local PE32/PE32+ image declares an IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY
table, which WIN_CERTIFICATE entries that table stores, and which PKCS#7
signer and X.509 fields those entries carry. It reads the file without
executing it and does not require a Windows SDK, catalog file, or disassembler.
rea inspect-pe-certificates /absolute/path/to/application.exe --json
The CLI resolves relative paths against the caller's working directory. MCP and the advertised input schema require an absolute filesystem path and preserve that exact selection:
{
"name": "inspect_pe_certificates",
"arguments": { "path": "/artifacts/application.exe" }
}
Observations
The inline Evidence result contains the artifact path, SHA-256, and byte length.
table is the file-offset security directory, or null when the directory is
absent or zero. Each entries[] item reports WIN_CERTIFICATE length,
revision, type, and the payload SHA-256.
Type-2 entries may count their zero alignment padding in dwLength. The PE
entry owner accepts only the exact gap to the next eight-byte boundary after
the parsed ContentInfo; extra data or nonzero counted padding fails. Entry
ranges retain all declared bytes, including counted padding. CMS payload
ranges and hashes exclude counted padding.
For WIN_CERTIFICATE type 2 (PKCS#7 signedData) pkcs7 contains digest
algorithm OIDs, embedded X.509 serial/issuer/subject/validity fields, and
signer identifier facts. A signer identified by subject key identifier reports
that value as subject_key_identifier_hex. Other certificate types keep
pkcs7 null.
Each name attribute reports rdn_index, the zero-based position of its relative
distinguished name (RDN) in the encoded name. Attributes in the same RDN share
an index. Older retained Evidence may omit the index.
A distinguished name's text joins those attributes in encoded order.
Attributes in one RDN are joined with +
(commonName=A+organizationName=B). Separate RDNs are joined with ,
(commonName=A, organizationName=B). The separators follow
RFC 4514 multi-valued RDN notation.
Encoded order is kept, and values are copied as decoded, without RFC 4514
escaping or RDN reversal, so a name of only single-valued RDNs still places
, between attributes.
Each signer reports unsigned_attribute_oids: null means the signer has no
unsigned attributes, and an array lists their types. Evidence that omits the
field (written before REA 6.9.0) is refused; recreate the observation. Unsigned attribute contents, including nested signatures and timestamp
tokens, are not decoded; their presence makes coverage partial and adds a
limitation. Certificate and signer counts refer to the outer SignedData.
A missing table is observed absence of that directory. It is not proof the image is unsigned in every catalog or overlay sense.
Limits and failures
Confirmed DOS-only MZ files and declared NE, LE, or LX signatures are outside
this PE32/PE32+ workflow and return unsupported_target with target-selection
recovery. A recognized non-PE signature does not need a PE COFF header to be
classified. Unrecognized signatures and truncated PE headers remain malformed
input. inspect-pe-resources uses the same header admission and classifications.
The selected file is limited to 64 MiB by default (512 MiB maximum). At most
eight WIN_CERTIFICATE entries are examined by default. Malformed PE headers,
truncated certificate entries, and PKCS#7 that is not structurally signedData
fail without partial success. A security directory that ends in fewer than
eight header bytes, including zeros, is a truncated WIN_CERTIFICATE and
fails the same way. SignedData must contain at least one SignerInfo, and
each SignerInfo must carry a non-empty signature value. Each embedded X.509
certificate must include subjectPublicKeyInfo and signatureValue.
Certificate issuer/subject and signer issuer names require nonempty RDN sets
and exactly two fields (type and value) in each attribute, as defined in
RFC 5280.
Malformed name structures fail before their text is reported. Decoded
certificate name text, serials, validity spellings, and subject key identifiers
share a 64 KiB budget per PKCS#7 payload, and each payload decodes at most
16,384 ASN.1 values. Exhausting either fixed allowance returns a nonretryable
resource_constraint error naming it, not an invalid-input error; this release
has no runtime override, and max_file_bytes and max_entries do not raise
it. Unsupported certificate name
encodings, including GeneralString, fail explicitly. TeletexString (T.61)
values are rendered with the ISO-8859-1 compatibility mapping used by OpenSSL;
this is not a full T.61 decoder, so the result includes a limitation whenever
that mapping is used. RFC 5280 retains TeletexString for backward compatibility
and describes its repertoire as ASCII-like Latin with additional characters.
The structural CMS reader accepts definite lengths and BER indefinite lengths
for constructed values, including the outer ContentInfo sequence. Primitive
values must have definite lengths. Embedded X.509 certificates and signed
attributes must also use definite length encoding, as required by their DER
profiles. This is a bounded structural subset: it does not implement every BER
string form or validate DER canonical encoding, and it does not verify
signatures.
This workflow does not verify signatures, certificate chains, timestamps, or Authenticode digest coverage of image bytes.