fix(hooks): redact joined-fragment secret values and make JWT scan linear

- Replace the secret=/api_key= value regex with a single-pass, quote-aware
  scanner so the whole Bash word is redacted when quoted and unquoted
  fragments are joined (e.g. --secret='prefix-'suffix), while a value inside
  an enclosing quoted string stops at that string's closing quote.
- Searching for the keyword itself (grep -n "secret =" file,
  rg 'api_key:' dir) no longer redacts the rest of the command.
- Use a lookbehind instead of \b before the JWT header so long dot-free
  ey-ey-... runs are scanned in linear time instead of quadratic.
- Add regression tests for joined fragments, keyword searches, and the
  ey- performance case.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
Gaurav DubeyandClaude Opus 5.5 committed 2026-11-04 03:41:05 +00:00
1 parent 0b57406e57
commit 4d3e66e0ab
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@@ -33,18 +33,96 @@ function redactJwt(token) {
return token;
}
const ASSIGNMENT_KEY = /(\b|_)(secret|api[_-]?key)(\s*[:=]\s*)/gi;
function isQuoteStart(text, i) {
return text[i] === '"' || text[i] === "'" || (text[i] === '$' && text[i + 1] === "'");
}
// Index just past the quoted fragment opening at `start`, or the end of the
// text when the quote is never closed.
function skipQuoted(text, start) {
const ansi = text[start] === '$';
const quote = ansi ? "'" : text[start];
const escapes = ansi || quote === '"';
let i = start + (ansi ? 2 : 1);
while (i < text.length) {
if (escapes && text[i] === '\\') i += 2;
else if (text[i] === quote) return i + 1;
else i++;
}
return text.length;
}
// End of the shell word starting at `start`. Bash joins adjacent fragments,
// so `'prefix-'suffix`, `a"b c"` and `first\ second` are each one value.
function wordEnd(text, start) {
let i = start;
while (i < text.length && !/\s/.test(text[i])) {
if (isQuoteStart(text, i)) i = skipQuoted(text, i);
else if (text[i] === '\\') i += 2;
else i++;
}
return Math.min(i, text.length);
}
// End of a value that sits inside an enclosing quoted string, e.g.
// `-H "x-api-key: VALUE"`: the value runs to the enclosing closing quote.
function enclosedEnd(text, start, open) {
const close = open === '"' ? '"' : "'";
const escapes = open !== "'";
if (text[start] === close) {
// `grep "secret =" file` is a search, not an assignment. If a word
// follows the quote instead, the quote state was misread; fall back to
// redacting the whole word so nothing leaks.
const next = text[start + 1];
return next === undefined || /\s/.test(next) ? start : wordEnd(text, start);
}
let i = start;
while (i < text.length && text[i] !== close) i += escapes && text[i] === '\\' ? 2 : 1;
return Math.min(i, text.length);
}
// Redact secret=/api_key= values in one pass, tracking the enclosing quote.
function redactAssignments(text) {
let out = '';
let copied = 0;
let scan = 0;
let open = null; // '"', "'", "$'" or null
ASSIGNMENT_KEY.lastIndex = 0;
let match;
while ((match = ASSIGNMENT_KEY.exec(text))) {
const valueStart = match.index + match[0].length;
while (scan < valueStart) {
if (open === null) {
if (isQuoteStart(text, scan)) {
open = text[scan] === '$' ? "$'" : text[scan];
scan += open.length;
} else scan += text[scan] === '\\' ? 2 : 1;
} else if (open !== "'" && text[scan] === '\\') scan += 2;
else {
if (text[scan] === (open === '"' ? '"' : "'")) open = null;
scan++;
}
}
const end = open === null ? wordEnd(text, valueStart) : enclosedEnd(text, valueStart, open);
if (end > valueStart) {
out += `${text.slice(copied, valueStart)}<REDACTED>`;
copied = end;
ASSIGNMENT_KEY.lastIndex = end;
}
}
return out + text.slice(copied);
}
function sanitizeCommand(command) {
return String(command || '')
const masked = String(command || '')
.replace(/\n/g, ' ')
.replace(/-----BEGIN [A-Z0-9 ]*PRIVATE KEY-----[\s\S]*?(?:-----END [A-Z0-9 ]*PRIVATE KEY-----|$)/g, '<REDACTED>')
.replace(/\bsk-[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,}/g, '<REDACTED>')
.replace(/\be[wy][A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,}\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]+\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]*/g, redactJwt)
// Value: "..." with escapes, $'...' with escapes, '...', or a bare word
// with backslash escapes. Unterminated quotes are redacted to the end.
.replace(
/(\b|_)(secret|api[_-]?key)(\s*[:=]\s*)("(?:[^"\\]|\\.)*(?:"|$)|\$'(?:[^'\\]|\\.)*(?:'|$)|'[^']*(?:'|$)|(?:[^\s"'\\]|\\.)+)/gi,
'$1$2$3<REDACTED>'
)
// Lookbehind, not `\b`: `\b` matches after each `-`, making `ey-ey-...` quadratic.
.replace(/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_-])e[wy][A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,}\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]+\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]*/g, redactJwt);
return redactAssignments(masked)
.replace(/--token[= ][^ ]*/g, '--token=<REDACTED>')
.replace(/Authorization:[: ]*[^ ]*[: ]*[^ ]*/gi, 'Authorization:<REDACTED>')
.replace(/\bAKIA[A-Z0-9]{16}\b/g, '<REDACTED>')
@@ -131,6 +131,52 @@ if (
passed++;
else failed++;
if (
test('sanitizeCommand redacts the whole Bash word when fragments are joined', () => {
const tail = ['suffix', 'tail', '123'].join('');
const commands = [
`app --secret='prefix-'${tail} --next`,
`app --secret=prefix-"${tail} two" --next`,
`app --secret=first\\ ${tail} --next`,
`app --secret=${FAKE_VALUE}\\`,
];
for (const command of commands) {
const sanitized = sanitizeCommand(command);
assert.ok(!sanitized.includes(tail) && !sanitized.includes(FAKE_VALUE), `value leaked: ${sanitized}`);
}
assert.strictEqual(sanitizeCommand(commands[0]), 'app --secret=<REDACTED> --next');
})
)
passed++;
else failed++;
if (
test('sanitizeCommand keeps the rest of the command when the keyword is searched for', () => {
const commands = ['grep -n "secret =" settings.py', "rg 'api_key:' config/ --type yaml"];
for (const command of commands) {
assert.strictEqual(sanitizeCommand(command), command);
}
assert.strictEqual(
sanitizeCommand(`curl -H "x-api-key: ${FAKE_VALUE}" -d "payload" https://api.example.com`),
'curl -H "x-api-key: <REDACTED>" -d "payload" https://api.example.com'
);
})
)
passed++;
else failed++;
if (
test('sanitizeCommand stays linear on long dot-free ey- runs', () => {
const start = Date.now();
sanitizeCommand('ey-'.repeat(350000));
sanitizeCommand('eyJ-'.repeat(250000));
const elapsed = Date.now() - start;
assert.ok(elapsed < 2000, `took ${elapsed} ms`);
})
)
passed++;
else failed++;
if (
test('sanitizeCommand redacts secret= and api_key= assignments (#3846)', () => {
assert.strictEqual(