Merge reviewed PR #3858

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haelyra committed 2026-11-05 23:10:32 -05:00
commit 932d83073e
3 files changed
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@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@
"id": "hand-seeded",
"source": "manual-curation-pending-regeneration"
},
"registryDigest": "6f213dc845937b4093bc018d041b25b538d88d78451b9d799ad614989b360ee4",
"registryDigest": "65b0e26848994515124a8e256e8f2ec996453b98bd89c461407edf3c2d1e3883",
"schemaVersion": 1,
"triggers": {
"skill:agent-runtime-gateway-smoke-test": [
+52 -15
View File
@@ -271,25 +271,39 @@ import json, sys, os, re
# Linear-time secret matcher. Bounded quantifiers and a fixed set of auth
# schemes (instead of a generic [A-Za-z]+\s+ that overlapped the value class)
# prevent the catastrophic backtracking that pegged python at 100% CPU (#2278).
# The value class is disjoint from the separators, so it runs to the end of the
# token: a long labeled key is redacted whole instead of leaving its tail.
_SECRET_RE = re.compile(
r"(?i)((?:api[_-]?key|token|secret|password|authorization|credentials?|auth)(?:_access_key|_key)?)"
r"""(["'"'"'\s:=\\]{1,8})"""
r"((?:bearer|basic|token|bot)\s+)?"
r"([A-Za-z0-9_\-/.+=]{8,256})"
r"([A-Za-z0-9_\-/.+=]{8,})"
)
# Value-shaped secrets that carry no keyword: PEM private key blocks (to END or
# end of the truncated text), GitHub tokens, AWS key IDs, and DSN passwords
# (scheme://user:PASSWORD@host keeps scheme and user). Each branch is anchored
# on a literal prefix and uses bounded or non-overlapping classes (#2278).
# end of the truncated text), GitHub tokens, AWS key IDs, Anthropic and OpenAI
# style sk- keys, JWTs (eyJ header, payload, optional signature) and DSN
# passwords (scheme://user:PASSWORD@host keeps scheme and user). Each branch is
# anchored on a literal prefix and uses bounded or non-overlapping classes (#2278);
# the sk- and JWT classes run to the end of the token so a long value is never
# half redacted.
# Tokens may follow a JSON escape (\n, \t, \uXXXX) since dict I/O is encoded
# before scrubbing; a DSN cut by truncation before its "@" ends at \Z,
# except a bare trailing host:port after http(s):// such as http://localhost:3000;
# any other scheme (postgres://app:1234) is redacted even when the password is numeric (#3568).
# PEM blocks run first: a label such as secret= in front of the BEGIN marker
# would otherwise let _SECRET_RE eat "-----BEGIN" and hide the block from this match.
_PEM_RE = re.compile(r"-----BEGIN[A-Z ]{0,40}PRIVATE KEY-----[\s\S]*?(?:-----END[A-Z ]{0,40}PRIVATE KEY-----|\Z)")
_SECRET_VALUE_RE = re.compile(
r"-----BEGIN[A-Z ]{0,40}PRIVATE KEY-----[\s\S]*?(?:-----END[A-Z ]{0,40}PRIVATE KEY-----|\Z)"
r"|(?:(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])|(?<=\\[bfnrt])|(?<=\\u[0-9a-fA-F]{4}))(?:gh[pousr]_[A-Za-z0-9]{20,255}|github_pat_[A-Za-z0-9_]{20,255}|(?:AKIA|ASIA)[A-Z0-9]{16})\b"
r"(?:(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])|(?<=\\[bfnrt])|(?<=\\u[0-9a-fA-F]{4}))(?:gh[pousr]_[A-Za-z0-9]{20,255}|github_pat_[A-Za-z0-9_]{20,255}|(?:AKIA|ASIA)[A-Z0-9]{16})\b"
r"|(?:(?<![A-Za-z0-9_-])|(?<=\\[bfnrt])|(?<=\\u[0-9a-fA-F]{4}))(?:sk-(?:ant|proj|svcacct|admin|or)-[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,}|sk-[A-Za-z0-9]{20,}[A-Za-z0-9_-]*|eyJ[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,}\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]+\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]*)"
r"""|(?<=://)(?:(?<=https://)|(?<=http://)|(?<!https://)(?<!http://)())([^\s:/@"\\]{1,256}:)(?(1)|(?!\d{1,5}\Z))[^\s@/"\\]{1,256}(?=@|\Z)"""
)
# A capture cut at its length limit can end inside an sk- key or JWT that the
# full patterns no longer match. Only applied when the text was actually cut,
# so a short output that happens to end in "sk-learn" stays readable.
_CUT_TAIL_RE = re.compile(
r"(?:(?<![A-Za-z0-9_-])|(?<=\\[bfnrt])|(?<=\\u[0-9a-fA-F]{4}))(?:sk-[A-Za-z0-9_-]*|eyJ[A-Za-z0-9_-]*(?:\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]*)?)\Z"
)
import signal
def _clv2_bail(*_):
@@ -301,9 +315,13 @@ try:
except Exception:
pass
raw = sys.stdin.read()[:2000]
raw_full = sys.stdin.read()
raw = raw_full[:2000]
raw = _PEM_RE.sub("[REDACTED]", raw)
raw = _SECRET_RE.sub(lambda m: m.group(1) + m.group(2) + (m.group(3) or "") + "[REDACTED]", raw)
raw = _SECRET_VALUE_RE.sub(lambda m: (m.group(2) or "") + "[REDACTED]", raw)
if len(raw_full) > 2000:
raw = _CUT_TAIL_RE.sub("[REDACTED]", raw)
print(json.dumps({"timestamp": os.environ["TIMESTAMP"], "event": "parse_error", "raw": raw}))
' >> "$OBSERVATIONS_FILE"
exit 0
@@ -356,31 +374,50 @@ observation = {
# Linear-time secret matcher. Bounded quantifiers and a fixed set of auth
# schemes (instead of a generic [A-Za-z]+\s+ that overlapped the value class)
# prevent the catastrophic backtracking that pegged python at 100% CPU (#2278).
# The value class is disjoint from the separators, so it runs to the end of the
# token: a long labeled key is redacted whole instead of leaving its tail.
_SECRET_RE = re.compile(
r"(?i)((?:api[_-]?key|token|secret|password|authorization|credentials?|auth)(?:_access_key|_key)?)"
r"""(["'"'"'\s:=\\]{1,8})"""
r"((?:bearer|basic|token|bot)\s+)?"
r"([A-Za-z0-9_\-/.+=]{8,256})"
r"([A-Za-z0-9_\-/.+=]{8,})"
)
# Value-shaped secrets that carry no keyword: PEM private key blocks (to END or
# end of the truncated text), GitHub tokens, AWS key IDs, and DSN passwords
# (scheme://user:PASSWORD@host keeps scheme and user). Each branch is anchored
# on a literal prefix and uses bounded or non-overlapping classes (#2278).
# end of the truncated text), GitHub tokens, AWS key IDs, Anthropic and OpenAI
# style sk- keys, JWTs (eyJ header, payload, optional signature) and DSN
# passwords (scheme://user:PASSWORD@host keeps scheme and user). Each branch is
# anchored on a literal prefix and uses bounded or non-overlapping classes (#2278);
# the sk- and JWT classes run to the end of the token so a long value is never
# half redacted.
# Tokens may follow a JSON escape (\n, \t, \uXXXX) since dict I/O is encoded
# before scrubbing; a DSN cut by truncation before its "@" ends at \Z,
# except a bare trailing host:port after http(s):// such as http://localhost:3000;
# any other scheme (postgres://app:1234) is redacted even when the password is numeric (#3568).
# PEM blocks run first: a label such as secret= in front of the BEGIN marker
# would otherwise let _SECRET_RE eat "-----BEGIN" and hide the block from this match.
_PEM_RE = re.compile(r"-----BEGIN[A-Z ]{0,40}PRIVATE KEY-----[\s\S]*?(?:-----END[A-Z ]{0,40}PRIVATE KEY-----|\Z)")
_SECRET_VALUE_RE = re.compile(
r"-----BEGIN[A-Z ]{0,40}PRIVATE KEY-----[\s\S]*?(?:-----END[A-Z ]{0,40}PRIVATE KEY-----|\Z)"
r"|(?:(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])|(?<=\\[bfnrt])|(?<=\\u[0-9a-fA-F]{4}))(?:gh[pousr]_[A-Za-z0-9]{20,255}|github_pat_[A-Za-z0-9_]{20,255}|(?:AKIA|ASIA)[A-Z0-9]{16})\b"
r"(?:(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])|(?<=\\[bfnrt])|(?<=\\u[0-9a-fA-F]{4}))(?:gh[pousr]_[A-Za-z0-9]{20,255}|github_pat_[A-Za-z0-9_]{20,255}|(?:AKIA|ASIA)[A-Z0-9]{16})\b"
r"|(?:(?<![A-Za-z0-9_-])|(?<=\\[bfnrt])|(?<=\\u[0-9a-fA-F]{4}))(?:sk-(?:ant|proj|svcacct|admin|or)-[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,}|sk-[A-Za-z0-9]{20,}[A-Za-z0-9_-]*|eyJ[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,}\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]+\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]*)"
r"""|(?<=://)(?:(?<=https://)|(?<=http://)|(?<!https://)(?<!http://)())([^\s:/@"\\]{1,256}:)(?(1)|(?!\d{1,5}\Z))[^\s@/"\\]{1,256}(?=@|\Z)"""
)
# A capture cut at its length limit can end inside an sk- key or JWT that the
# full patterns no longer match. Only applied when the text was actually cut,
# so a short output that happens to end in "sk-learn" stays readable.
_CUT_TAIL_RE = re.compile(
r"(?:(?<![A-Za-z0-9_-])|(?<=\\[bfnrt])|(?<=\\u[0-9a-fA-F]{4}))(?:sk-[A-Za-z0-9_-]*|eyJ[A-Za-z0-9_-]*(?:\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]*)?)\Z"
)
def scrub(val):
if val is None:
return None
val = _SECRET_RE.sub(lambda m: m.group(1) + m.group(2) + (m.group(3) or "") + "[REDACTED]", str(val))
return _SECRET_VALUE_RE.sub(lambda m: (m.group(2) or "") + "[REDACTED]", val)
val = str(val)
# Tool I/O is cut to 5000 chars before it reaches this process.
cut = len(val) >= 5000
val = _PEM_RE.sub("[REDACTED]", val)
val = _SECRET_RE.sub(lambda m: m.group(1) + m.group(2) + (m.group(3) or "") + "[REDACTED]", val)
val = _SECRET_VALUE_RE.sub(lambda m: (m.group(2) or "") + "[REDACTED]", val)
return _CUT_TAIL_RE.sub("[REDACTED]", val) if cut else val
if parsed["input"]:
observation["input"] = scrub(parsed["input"])
+196 -3
View File
@@ -42,6 +42,13 @@ function capture(phase, input, expectedEvent) {
}
}
// The persisted input/output is the scrubbed JSON of the tool payload, so one
// field can be compared exactly instead of only checking a canary is gone.
function capturedField(records, field) {
const record = JSON.parse(records);
return JSON.parse(record.event === 'tool_start' ? record.input : record.output)[field];
}
console.log('=== Actual registered observation secret redaction ===');
if (process.platform === 'win32') {
console.log('Skipping shell fixtures: native Windows runner requires platform CI.');
@@ -52,6 +59,17 @@ if (process.platform === 'win32') {
// Synthetic canary data proves that captured credential-shaped text is masked.
const canary = 'CANARY_TOKEN_abcdefghijk';
const pemCanary = 'MIIEcanaryPEMbodyAAAA';
// Prefixes are split so secret scanners do not flag the synthetic fixtures.
const anthropicCanary = 'CANARYanthropic_Key-0123456789abcdefghijklmnop';
const anthropicKey = `${'sk-'}ant-api03-${anthropicCanary}`;
const openaiCanary = 'CANARYopenaiProject0123456789abcdefghij';
const openaiProjectKey = `${'sk-'}proj-${openaiCanary}`;
const legacyCanary = 'CANARYlegacy0123456789abcdefghijklmnopqrstu';
const legacyKey = `${'sk-'}${legacyCanary}`;
const jwtCanary = 'Q0FOQVJZc2lnbmF0dXJl';
const jwt = `${'eyJ'}hbGciOiJIUzI1NiJ9.eyJzdWIiOiJjYW5hcnkifQ.${jwtCanary}`;
// e30 is base64url for {}, a valid but very short claims segment.
const emptyClaimsJwt = `${'eyJ'}hbGciOiJIUzI1NiJ9.e30.${jwtCanary}`;
for (const [label, content, secret = canary] of [
['double-quoted source', 'const apiKey = "CANARY_TOKEN_abcdefghijk";'],
['single-quoted source', "const password = 'CANARY_TOKEN_abcdefghijk';"],
@@ -68,13 +86,30 @@ if (process.platform === 'win32') {
['truncated PEM private key block', `-----BEGIN OPENSSH ${'PRIVATE'} KEY-----\n${pemCanary}`, pemCanary],
['GitHub classic token', `GH_PAT=${'ghp_'}CANARY${'0'.repeat(30)}`, `CANARY${'0'.repeat(30)}`],
['GitHub fine-grained token', `use ${'github_pat_'}CANARY_${'1'.repeat(40)}`, `CANARY_${'1'.repeat(40)}`],
['AWS access key id', `key id ${'AKIA'}CANARY0EXAMPLE00`, 'CANARY0EXAMPLE00']
['AWS access key id', `key id ${'AKIA'}CANARY0EXAMPLE00`, 'CANARY0EXAMPLE00'],
// Bare sk- keys and JWTs carry no keyword, so only their shape gives them away (#3846).
['bare Anthropic key', `echo ${anthropicKey} > key.txt`, anthropicCanary],
['bare OpenAI project key', `client = OpenAI(${openaiProjectKey})`, openaiCanary],
['bare legacy sk- key', `KEYS = [${legacyKey}]`, legacyCanary],
['bare JWT', `curl -H "X-Session: ${jwt}" https://api.example.com`, jwtCanary],
['bare JWT with empty claims', `curl -H "X-Session: ${emptyClaimsJwt}" https://api.example.com`, jwtCanary],
// Redacted to the end of the token, not skipped because a hyphen follows.
['bare legacy sk- key with a suffix', `KEYS = [${legacyKey}-CANARYsuffix]`, 'CANARYsuffix']
]) {
test(`redacts ${label} before persisting tool input`, () => {
const records = capture('pre', { tool_name: 'Write',
tool_input: { file_path: '/tmp/example.js', content } });
assert.ok(!records.includes(secret), 'seeded credential persisted');
assert.ok(records.includes('[REDACTED]'));
if (label === 'bare JWT') {
assert.equal(capturedField(records, 'content'), content.replace(jwt, '[REDACTED]'));
}
if (label === 'bare JWT with empty claims') {
assert.equal(capturedField(records, 'content'), content.replace(emptyClaimsJwt, '[REDACTED]'));
}
if (label === 'bare legacy sk- key with a suffix') {
assert.equal(capturedField(records, 'content'), 'KEYS = [[REDACTED]]');
}
});
test(`redacts ${label} before persisting structured tool output`, () => {
const records = capture('post', { tool_name: 'Read',
@@ -92,7 +127,9 @@ if (process.platform === 'win32') {
['GitHub fine-grained token after tab', `col\t${'github_pat_'}CANARY_${'1'.repeat(40)}`,
`CANARY_${'1'.repeat(40)}`],
['AWS access key id after CRLF', `id:\r\n${'AKIA'}CANARY0EXAMPLE00`, 'CANARY0EXAMPLE00'],
['AWS session key id after newline', `id:\n${'ASIA'}CANARY0EXAMPLE00`, 'CANARY0EXAMPLE00']
['AWS session key id after newline', `id:\n${'ASIA'}CANARY0EXAMPLE00`, 'CANARY0EXAMPLE00'],
['Anthropic key after newline', `key:\n${anthropicKey}`, anthropicCanary],
['JWT after tab', `jwt\t${jwt}`, jwtCanary]
]) {
test(`redacts ${label} in structured tool output`, () => {
const records = capture('post', { tool_name: 'Read',
@@ -102,6 +139,107 @@ if (process.platform === 'win32') {
});
}
// The three commands from #3846. Only the first two have a keyword in front of the key.
for (const command of [
`ANTHROPIC_API_KEY=${anthropicKey} claude -p hi`,
`curl -H "x-api-key: ${anthropicKey}" https://api.example.com`,
`echo ${anthropicKey} > key.txt`
]) {
test(`redacts the Anthropic key in Bash input and output: ${command.split(' ')[0]}`, () => {
for (const records of [
capture('pre', { tool_name: 'Bash', tool_input: { command } }),
capture('post', { tool_name: 'Bash', tool_input: { command: 'cat key.txt' },
tool_response: { stdout: command, stderr: '' } })
]) {
assert.ok(!records.includes(anthropicCanary), 'Anthropic key persisted');
const field = JSON.parse(records).event === 'tool_start' ? 'command' : 'stdout';
assert.equal(capturedField(records, field), command.replace(anthropicKey, '[REDACTED]'));
}
});
}
test('redacts a bare Anthropic key in the parse-error fallback', () => {
const records = capture('post', JSON.stringify([`echo ${anthropicKey}`]), 'parse_error');
assert.ok(!records.includes(anthropicCanary), 'Anthropic key persisted');
assert.ok(records.includes('[REDACTED]'));
});
// Truncation can also cut a bare JWT inside its payload or a key inside its
// body. What is left at the end of the capture must still be redacted.
const jwtKept = jwt.slice(0, jwt.indexOf('.') + 10);
const jwtPayloadStart = jwtKept.slice(jwt.indexOf('.') + 1);
const keyKept = anthropicKey.slice(0, 'sk-ant-api03-'.length + 12);
const cutAt = (end, value, kept) => `${'a'.repeat(end - kept.length - 1)} ${value}`;
for (const [label, value, kept, leak] of [
['JWT', jwt, jwtKept, jwtPayloadStart],
['Anthropic key', anthropicKey, keyKept, keyKept.slice('sk-ant-api03-'.length)]
]) {
for (const [where, phase, input, expectedEvent] of [
['string tool output', 'post', { tool_name: 'Bash', tool_input: { command: 'env' },
tool_response: cutAt(5000, value, kept) }],
// json.dumps prefixes '{"content": "' (13 chars) before the value.
['structured tool output', 'post', { tool_name: 'Read', tool_input: { file_path: '/tmp/x' },
tool_response: { content: cutAt(5000 - 13, value, kept) } }],
['parse-error fallback', 'post', JSON.stringify([cutAt(2000 - 2, value, kept)]), 'parse_error']
]) {
test(`redacts the ${label} cut at the truncation boundary in ${where}`, () => {
const records = capture(phase, input, expectedEvent);
assert.ok(!records.includes(leak), `cut ${label} persisted`);
assert.ok(records.includes('[REDACTED]'));
});
}
}
// A long key or JWT is redacted whole, never only up to some length cap.
const longTail = 'CANARYlongTail';
for (const [label, value] of [
['an over-long Anthropic key', `${anthropicKey}${'A'.repeat(600)}${longTail}`],
['a JWT with a long signature', `${jwt}${'s'.repeat(1500)}${longTail}`]
]) {
test(`redacts ${label} completely`, () => {
const records = capture('post', { tool_name: 'Read', tool_input: { file_path: '/tmp/x' },
tool_response: { content: `value ${value} end` } });
assert.equal(capturedField(records, 'content'), 'value [REDACTED] end');
});
}
// A keyword-labeled value is redacted whole, however long it is and whatever
// shaped token sits at its start.
for (const [label, text, expected] of [
['long sk-proj key', `OPENAI_API_KEY=${openaiProjectKey}${'B'.repeat(300)}${longTail}`, 'OPENAI_API_KEY=[REDACTED]'],
['sk- password with a suffix', `password=${'sk-'}${'A'.repeat(30)}.${longTail}`, 'password=[REDACTED]'],
['GitHub token with a suffix', `token=${'ghp_'}${'0'.repeat(30)}/${longTail}`, 'token=[REDACTED]'],
['PEM private key block',
`secret=-----BEGIN RSA ${'PRIVATE'} KEY-----\n${longTail}\n-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----`, 'secret=[REDACTED]']
]) {
for (const [phase, input, expectedEvent] of [
['post', { tool_name: 'Read', tool_input: { file_path: '/tmp/x' }, tool_response: { content: text } }],
['post', JSON.stringify([text]), 'parse_error']
]) {
test(`redacts a keyword-labeled ${label} completely (${expectedEvent || 'tool_complete'})`, () => {
const records = capture(phase, input, expectedEvent);
assert.ok(!records.includes(longTail), 'value tail persisted');
assert.ok(records.includes(expected));
});
}
}
// A labeled JWT cut inside a payload longer than 256 chars at the capture limit.
test('redacts a keyword-labeled JWT cut inside a long payload', () => {
const labeled = `Authorization: Bearer ${'eyJ'}hbGciOiJIUzI1NiJ9.eyJ${'p'.repeat(600)}${longTail}`;
const records = capture('post', { tool_name: 'Bash', tool_input: { command: 'env' },
tool_response: `${'a'.repeat(5000 - labeled.length + 5)} ${labeled}` });
assert.ok(!records.includes('pppp'), 'JWT payload persisted');
assert.ok(records.includes('Authorization: Bearer [REDACTED]'));
});
// The end-of-capture match only applies to text that was actually cut.
for (const output of ['git checkout sk-learn', 'payload eyJhIjoxLCJiIjoyfQ']) {
test(`keeps short string output ending in "${output.split(' ').pop().slice(0, 8)}" unredacted`, () => {
const records = capture('post', { tool_name: 'Bash', tool_input: { command: 'echo' },
tool_response: output });
assert.ok(records.includes(output), 'short output altered');
assert.ok(!records.includes('[REDACTED]'));
});
}
// Capture truncation (5000 chars, 2000 in the parse-error fallback) can cut a
// DSN right before its '@'; the password must still be redacted (#3568).
const cutSecret = 'CANARYcutPassw0rd';
@@ -148,7 +286,17 @@ if (process.platform === 'win32') {
'password_hash = hashlib.sha256(pw)',
'fetch(http://localhost:8080/api/v1)',
'git clone git@github.com:org/repo.git',
'https://user@example.com/path'
'https://user@example.com/path',
// Hashes, ids and base64 that look random but are not keys (#3846).
'git show 3f9a1c2b7e4d5f6a8b9c0d1e2f3a4b5c6d7e8f90',
'sha256 e3b0c44298fc1c149afbf4c8996fb92427ae41e4649b934ca495991b7852b855',
'id 550e8400-e29b-41d4-a716-446655440000',
'background: url();',
'payload: data:application/json;base64,eyJhIjoxLCJiIjoyLCJjIjozfQ==',
'git checkout -b sk-learn-upgrade-for-pipelines',
'risk-assessment-for-the-quarterly-report-v2',
'ssh deploy@eyeglasses.example.com',
'Keys start with the sk- prefix.'
];
test('keeps ordinary code and credential-free URLs unredacted', () => {
const records = capture('post', { tool_name: 'Read',
@@ -156,6 +304,51 @@ if (process.platform === 'win32') {
for (const line of benign) assert.ok(records.includes(line), `benign text altered: ${line}`);
assert.ok(!records.includes('[REDACTED]'));
});
// Both writers carry the same patterns. Run them on 300 KB of adversarial
// input so a pattern that backtracks quadratically (#2278) fails here.
test('scrub patterns stay identical in both writers and linear on 300 KB input', () => {
const hook = fs.readFileSync(
path.join(repoRoot, 'skills/continuous-learning-v2/hooks/observe.sh'), 'utf8');
const copies = hook.split('_SECRET_RE = re.compile(').slice(1).map((rest) =>
`_SECRET_RE = re.compile(${rest.split(/\n(?:import signal|def scrub)/)[0]}`
.replace(/'"'"'/g, "'"));
assert.equal(copies.length, 2);
assert.equal(copies[0], copies[1], 'the parse-error copy of the patterns drifted');
const driver = String.raw`
import re, sys, time
ns = {"re": re}
exec(sys.stdin.read(), ns)
patterns = [ns[n] for n in ("_PEM_RE", "_SECRET_RE", "_SECRET_VALUE_RE", "_CUT_TAIL_RE")]
n = 300000
cases = {
"hyphen run": "a-" * (n // 2),
"sk- then hyphen run": "sk-" + "a-" * (n // 2),
"repeated sk-": "sk-" * (n // 3),
"sk- keys followed by a hyphen": (" sk-" + "a" * 40 + "-") * (n // 45),
"eyJ segments": ("eyJ" + "a-" * 10 + ".") * (n // 24),
"repeated eyJ dots": "eyJ." * (n // 4),
"label then hyphens": "token=" + "-" * n,
"repeated labels": "token:" * (n // 6),
"escaped newline before sk-": "\\nsk-" * (n // 5),
"unfinished DSNs": "a://b:" * (n // 6),
"unterminated PEM": "-----BEGIN RSA PRIV" + "ATE KEY-----" + "A" * n,
}
for name, text in cases.items():
start = time.perf_counter()
for pattern in patterns:
pattern.sub("X", text)
print("%s\t%.3f" % (name, time.perf_counter() - start))
`;
const result = spawnSync('python3', ['-c', driver],
{ input: copies[0], encoding: 'utf8', timeout: 60000 });
assert.equal(result.status, 0, result.stderr || 'timed out');
const timings = result.stdout.trim().split('\n');
assert.equal(timings.length, 11);
for (const line of timings) {
const [name, seconds] = line.split('\t');
assert.ok(Number(seconds) < 2, `${name} took ${seconds}s`);
}
});
test('keeps a trailing host:port in string output unredacted', () => {
const records = capture('post', { tool_name: 'Bash', tool_input: { command: 'npm run dev' },
tool_response: 'listening on http://localhost:3000' });